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The Critical Technologies Approach: Controlling
Scientific Communication for the National Security
Valerie M. Fogleman*
James Etienne Viator**
I.

INTRODUCTION

For several decades now, the United States has been engaged in a
technological race with its adversaries, and potential adversaries. 1 The
balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union has
been maintained mainly by preservation of the United States' slender
technological "lead time." 2 This technological edge, which has been
under constant attack by the Soviet Union's superior spending on military research and development, 3 largely resulted from the rapid devel• Associate, Gary, Thomasson, Hall & Marks, P.C., Corpus Christi, Texas; B.L.A. 1983,
J.D. 1986, M.S. 1989, Texas Tech University.
•• Associate Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law; B.A. 1971, University
of New Orleans; J.D. 1985, Louisiana State University Law Center. The authors would like to
thank Professor Thomas E. Baker of Texas Tech University School of Law and Professor George
Anastaplo of Loyola University of Chicago School of Law for their aid and encouragement in the
preparation of this article.
I. Sff Suprrcomputas: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Science and Technolor;v, 98th
Cong., I st Sess. 17 5 (1983) [hereinafter Superromputrrs Hearings J (statement of Edith Martin,
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Advanced Technology). Dr. Martin argued
that "[ t ]here is no turning back on our early decision to gain leverage from our superior technical
potential. The often used term 'arms race' is a misnomer. We are really immersed in a technological race with our adversaries." /d.; see also Transfer of Technology: Hearing Before the Pennanmt Subromm. on /m>estigation.l of the Smale Comm. on Go!'ernmental Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 277 (1984) [hereinafter Transfer of Technology Hearings] (statement of Richard Pede, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy) (declaring that "maintenance of our
technological superiority . . is, quite literally, the foundation upon which our deterrence posture
rests").
2. See Report of the Secretary of Defense, Caspar W. Weinberger, to the Congress in the FY
1985 Budget, FY 1986 Authorization Request and FY 1985-89 Defense Programs 272 (Feb. I,
1984).
3. See Address by Fred C. Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense for PoliC)~, Defense Policy for
the 1990's (May 3, 1984), reprinted in 3 WoRLD AFF. ]. 45, 45 (Summer 1984). The Soviet
Union's technological position is strengthened by the graduation in the Soviet Union of about
300,000 scientists and engineers each year, compared to about 80,000 in the United States. Defense Department Authorization and O!•asight: Hearings on H.R. 5167 Before the House
Cmn111. on Armed Sen'ices, pt. 4, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1202 (1984) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R.
5167] (statement of Edith Martin, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Advanced Technology).
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opment of science and technology in American universities and research
laboratories.'' The encouragement of scientific advancement 11 by the Department of Defense (Defense) has been jeopardized, however, by the
access of America's adversaries and potential adversaries to those scientific advances. In the mid-1970s, faced with evidence that the Soviet
Union was using American science and technology to advance Soviet
military power, 6 Defense proposed an extensive system of controls on
the release of American scientific and technological information.
The cornerstone of Defense's structure of controls on scientific and
technological information is the Militarily Critical Technologies List
(MCTL). The MCTL covers numerous goods and technologies regarded as "militarily critical" because their acquisition by the United
States' adversaries and potential adversaries would result in otherwise
unachievable military advances. Controls based on the MCTL are
aimed at prohibiting transfer of the scientific and technological ideas
used to produce goods rather than the control of the goods themselves.
Using the MCTL as a guide, Defense and other federal agencies
have prohibited scientists from publishing, presenting, teaching, or receiving "militarily critical" information. 7 Controls that are generally
applied to classified information have been adopted by executive order
for unclassified and privately-sponsored information, 8 and various ex4. See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, BASIC RESEARCH PROGRAM 6 (1983).
5. SPP gmerally Norman, Pentagon Seeks to Build Bridges to Arademe, 228 SCI. 303 (1985)
(stating that broad support of university research is considered part of Defense's legitimate
mission).
6. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, SoVIET MILITARY PowER 75-78 (2d ed. Mar.
1983) (describing loss of technology to Soviet Union); CENTRAL INTEI.I.IGENCE AGENCY, SoviET
ACQUISITION OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGY 4-10 (!982) (unclassified version of study indicating
significant loss of technology to Soviet Union). The Soviets have acquired Western science and
technology through open publications for over twenty years. See, e.g., A. DuLLES, THE CRAFT OF
INTELLIGENCE 56-57, 239-40 (1963) (describing Soviet acquisition of knowledge from American
scientific and technical journals).
Suppression of American scientific information to prevent its acquisition by the Soviet bloc
also dates back over twenty years. See, e.g., F. RouRKE, SECRECY AND PUBLICITY: DILEMMAS OF
DEMOCRACY 28-32 (1961) (describing suppression of American scientific information during Cold
War era). This article will examine the current movement by Defense to control American scientific ideas, which began in the 1970s.
7. For examples of scientific information that has been subjected to control, see Appendix to
this article.
8. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 165 (1983), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401
note at 56 (1982) (classifying and safeguarding data); DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 5400.02, WITHHOLDING OF TECHNICAL DATA FROM THE PUBLIC, 32 C.F.R. pt. 250 (1989) (unclassified data); Final
Rule Adding VHSIC to Munitions List, 48 Fed. Reg. 28,633 (1983) (supplementary information)
("All integrated circuits and related technical data which do not meet [VHSIC specifically
designed for military applications] criteria will remain under the export controls of the Department of Commerce."). For discussion of the "force of law" of Executive Orders, see Fleishman &
Aufses, Law and Orders: The Problem of Presidmtial Lfgislation, 40 L. & CoNTEMI'. PROBS. I
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port control laws have been interpreted to cover the dissemination of
scientific ideas on university campuses. 9
The MCTL has become a compendium of American science and
technology. 10 The details of the list's contents are classified, 11 thereby
inhibiting scientists' best efforts to discover whether their ideas may be
legally disseminated. Technologies in the process of emerging from basic scientific theories are included in the MCTL's controls. 12 Although
voluminous, the MCTL is not exclusive,I 3 and Defense and other
agencies have the option of controlling unlisted scientific and technological information.
Although we agree with the goal of the controls (the preservation
of the United States' technological lead over its adversaries and potential adversaries), we believe that Defense's approach to controlling scientific information has the potential to stifle, and has stifled, scientific
creativity. When scientists are hindered in determining whether their
ideas can be legally disseminated, 14 scientific advancement necessarily
slows as caution overrides innovation. The desire to publish a scientific
theory is outweighed when balanced against imprisonment and heavy
fines if Defense or another agency perceives potential military significance in that theory. Defense officials have found military significance
in Apple computers, 15 dialysis machines/ 6 and grainP The potential
(1976); Note, Pmidmtwl Lfgislation by Exauti1•e Order, 37 U. CoLo. L. Rf:V. 105 (1964).
9. Srr, r.g., Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403 (1982 & West Supp. 1990)
(technical data controls); Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751, 2778 (1982) (Munitions
List controls); 10 U.S.C. § 130 (1988) (control over data subject to export control).
10. SPP Trrluwlogy Trmufer: Hen rings Brfore the Technology Transfer Panel of the Housr
Com111. on Armrd Srn•irrs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 262 (1983) [hereinafter Trrhnology Transfer
Hmrings] (statement of David Wilson, Co-Chairman, Working Group on Export Controls,

DOD-University Forum).
11. An unclassified version of the MCTL is available from the National Technical Information Service. See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, THE MILITARILY CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES LIST
(1986).
12. SPP Wallerstein, Srimlifir Communiralions and National Saurily in 1984, 224 Sci.
460, 466 n.l1 ( 1984 ). The Militarily Significant Emerging Technologies Awareness List
(METAL) supplements the MCTL. ld. at 465.
13. See 45 Fed. Reg. 65,015 (1_980).
14. Sre BASIC RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 4, at 8. The Basic R_esrarch Program, a
publication designed to attract scientists to Defense-sponsored research, states:
A final word on relevance: we find that all too often good ideas are never brought to
DoD's attention becavse the researcher does not see an immediate "military application." This is unfortunate, since the extramural researcher is not usually the person
who should make this determination. We in DoD are interested in all good ideas, and
it is the responsibility of the scientific program managers, not the researchers, to decide
on the applicability of a particular research project.
/d.
15. Transjrr of Technology Hearings, supra note 1, at 163 (statement of Richard Perle,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy).
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for finding military significance in theoretical ideas akin to E = MC 2 is
greater. 18
This article traces the evolution and breadth of Defense's critical
technologies approach to controlling scientific and technological information.19 The information controls stemming from this approach are
constitutionally and statutorily sound. The federal agencies with the
power to apply the controls have defined them more narrowly than
they did in the late 1970s and nearly 1980s. Public confrontations between agency personnel and scientists over the publication of research
findings appear to be a thing of the past. Nevertheless, the creation and
continued existence of the broad framework that now exists for controlling scientific and technological information has the potential to jeopardize the very scientific and technological preeminence that the framework seeks to preserve. Instead of emulating the closed Soviet system of
scientific research, the United States would be better served by maintaining the tradition of open scientific research that has served it so well
m the past.

II.

THE CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES APPROACH

The critical technologies approach depends on the MCTL, a guide
devised by Defense to control exportation of technology that could be
used to endanger the national security of the United States. Although
Defense recognizes that technological advances cannot be maintained
indefinitely, 20 it also realizes that preservation of the United States'

16. Tuhnology Trrwsfa Hmrings, wpm note 10, at 66 (statement of Lionel Ulmer, Under
Secretary of Commerce for International Trade).
17. L'.S. Embargo of Food and Tnlmology to thr Soi•irl ['nion: HmrinJ!' Before the Suh-

ro/11111. o11 International Finanrr ofthr Snwtr Co/11111. on Banking. Hou.1ing, and L'rban Affairs,
96th C:ong., 2d Sess. 92 (1980) [hereinafter Food and Trrhnology Fmllllrp:o /-Imring.1] (statement
of W. Graham Clayton, Jr., Deputy Under Secretary of Defense). The MCTL reportedly contains items of such doubtful military significance as cigar-making machines and mauress fillers.
Terhnolog_1· Tra nsfn /-Ira rings, supra note 10, at 287 (statement of Rep. Zschau).
18. q: Cheh, G!!l'nmnmt Control uf Pril'fllf' Ideas-Striking a Balance Brtu•rm Srirnttfic
Frwlom and .Votional Srmrity, 23 jURIMt:TRICS J. 1, 23 & n.151 (1983) (inquiring whether
E = MC 2 (scientific speech) or Marxist theory (political speech) is more revolutionary).
19. This article has purposely not attempted to differentiate between science and technology,
but has used the terms interchangeably. It is our eontention that a useful differentiation is impossible when considering the "gray areas" bordering basic and applied science. Defense's attempts to
differentiate between basic and applied science have, in large part, caused the existing friction
between Defense and the scientific community.
20. Srr Drpartmnzt of Drfrnsr Policy Statrmrnt on Export Control uj Unitrd State.\ Technology: llmrinp: Brforr the Subromm. on Intematiunal Economic Policy and Tmdr of thf' Howr
Conun. on Intrrnational Rt'ltLtions, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1977) ]hereinafter Drfi'IISf Policy
Hearing] (statement of Ellen Frost, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Eco-

nomic Affairs).
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technological lead time could be crucial. 21 The MCTL is designed to
identify goods and technologies that are not possessed by, or available
to, controlled countries (primarily Soviet bloc nations), 22 but which
could result in significant military advances if acquired by them. 23 Emphasis is on control of technology rather than control of end products: 24
while the importation of a high-technology product could yield a military advantage to a country, a greater advantage would accrue if the
expertise to manufacture that product were acquired.
The MCTL exists in classified and unclassified form. The classified version has over 700 pages supplemented by an additional 10,000
pages of documentation, 25 while the unclassified version has only 243
pages. 26 This difference means that Defense and other government
agencies applying the MCTL to a technology have access to voluminous data not available to the exporter of the technology. 27 The government agency involved has the power to prohibit dissemination of unclassified technological data 28 if, in the opinion of an official, that data
21. Sf!' Martin, Thr DOD Srirnrr and TNhnolop;y Program: Somr Mruwgnnmt Prrspa24 ARMY REs. DEv. & AcQUISITION MAG. 1, 1 (Sept.-Oct. 1983). Dr. Edith Martin was
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Advanced Technology. !d.
22. Controlled countries indude Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and
the Soviet Union. Srr Export Administration Act, SO U.S.C. app. § 2403-1 (d) (1982).
23. Srr id. § 2404(d)(2) (Supp. V 1987).
. that can be
24. !d. § 2401(8) (1982). Technology is "the information and knowhow
used to design, produce, manufacture, utilize or reconstruct goods, including computer software
and technical data, but not the goods themselves .
." !d. § 2415( 4) (Supp. IV 1987).
25. Srr Tramfrr of Unitrd Stairs High Trchnology to thr Sm•il'l Union and Sm•irt Bloc
ln'PS,

:Vatiow: Hrarinp;.1 B!forr thr Prnnmznzt Subcomm. on hn•rstigation.1 of thr Smatr Comm. 011
GoJ'fllllllflllal Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 557 (1982) [hereinafter Hip;h Trchnology Hrarin~;s]
(statement of Michael Lorenzo, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for International Programs
and Technology).
26. Srr DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, supra note 11.
27. "Exporter" is used broadly and includes individuals or industries with a proprietary interest in technology and university scientists involved in the discovery of scientific knowledge. Srr
infra note 70 and accompanying text.
28. The authors agree that classified "[s]cientific, technological, or economic matters relating
to the national security" should be controlled. Srr Exec. Order No. 12,356, § l.3(a)(6), 3 C.F.R.
169 (1983), rrJ,rintrd in 50 U.S.C. § 401 note at 51-52 (1982). Classified data does not create the
same problem of uncertainty as unclassified data potentially subject to export controls or to being
classified in the future. Scientists involved in classified research are aware in advance of restrictions imposed on their research. In the university context, classified research is either practiced in
separate facilities (e.g., Lawrence-Livermore Laboratory, University of California) or in restricted
on-campus facilities (e.g., Georgia Tech University). Because the elaborate safeguards required to
control classified data are contrary to free academic exchange, many universities refuse to allow
such research on campus. Srr Wilson, Sational Srcunty Controls on Trchnolup;iml lnjonnation,
25 jURIMFTRICS j. 109, JJ7 (1985).
Authority to classify data top secret, secret, or confidential may be delegated to government
officials either by the President or by agency heads and officials designated by the President as
having original classification authority. Exec. Order No. 12,356, § 1.2, 3 C.F.R. 167-68 (1983),
rP/Jrintrd in 50 U.S.C. § 401 note at 52 (1982). Classification authority stems almost entirely
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could contribute to the military superiority of a controlled country. The
difficulty of delimiting this discretion is apparent. The MCTL could
theoretically prohibit dissemination of all scientific and technological
data in the United States. 29 If technical data can contribute to a controlled country's military significance, it is irrelevant whether the data
is classified, unclassified, or private: it can be controlled.
A.

Origin

The concept of a militarily critical technologies list originated in a
1976 Defense Science Board Task Force Report, commonly referred to
as the Bucy Report, after the Task Force's chairman, ]. Fred Bucy. 30
The Bucy Report recommended that technology transfer be curtailed by
from the executive branch. Although Congress periodically conducts oversight hearings, monitoring of the classification procedure is difficult because of the large number of classifiers, and the
amount and nature of documents classified. Srr gmrrally English, Cmz{;rrssional O<•rnight of
Security Classification Politi', I Gov'T INFO. Q. 165, 171 (1984 ). In 1980, about 7000 government personnel had original classification authority. More than one million classification derisions
are made annually, leading to about 16.5 million derivative classification actions (i.e., paraphrasing, generating classified information in a new form, and marketing new material). /rl. at 170.
One of Congress's rate exercises of classification authority was the "born classified" concept
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. 83-703, 68 Stat. 714, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2014(y)
(1982). Under the born classified concept, "restricted data" is automatically classified at its inception and requires a positive act to declassify it.
29. Sff, e.g., Trchnology Transfer Hmrin{;S, supra note 10, at 21 (statement of Peter
Sharfman, Program Manager, International Security and Commerce, Office of Technology Assessment) (observing that "it is difficult to identify any technology which has no military relevance"); id. at 262 (statement of David Wilson, Co-Chairman, Working Group on Export Controls, Defense-University Forum) ("[MCTL] seems to be a catalog of all technologies in the
country today."); Extmsion and Rruision of thr Export Administration Art of 1979: Hmrin{;S
and Markup on H.R. 3231 Beforr thr House Comm. on Forei{;n Ajj(zirs and its Sulmmnn. on
lntrmational Economic Politi' and Tradr, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 201 (1983) [hereinafter Fxtension Heari1zgs] (statement of William Schneider, Jr., Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology) (maintaining that "[n]early all new technology developments have
direct or indirect military application").
30. See DEFENSE SCIENCE: BoARD TASK FORCE ON EXPORT OF U.S. TECHNOLOGY, AN
ANALYSIS OF EXPORT CONTROL OF U.S. TECHNOLOGY-A DOD PERSPECTIVE (1976) [hereinafter Bucy REPORT]. It has been suggested that the Defense Science Board was formed due to the
requirement in the Export Administration Amendments of 197 4, Pub. L. No. 93-500 § 9, 88 Stat.
1552, 1555 (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403-1 (a) (1982)), for Defense's review of applications for exports to communist countries. See Walsh, Controls 011 Trade and Trrhnulogy: Pmtagon Puts Stress on Know-How, 197 Sci. 1261, 1262 (1977). An alternate theory is that formation of an outside group to advise Defense was necessary because Defense's credibility in
reviewing export licenses needed salvaging as a result of the agency's tendency to forbid the export
of anything and everything. Multinational Corporations and Unital Stairs Forrign Polin·: Hearings Brjorr the Subcomm. on Multinational Corporations of the Smatr Comm. on Foreip;n Relations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 272 (1974) [hereinafter Multinational Corporatiolls Hearings] (statement of J. Fred Bucy, Executive Vice President, Texas Instruments, Inc.). Sff gmerally UNITED
STATES
COMPTROLLER
GENERAL,
THE
GOVERNMENT'S
ROLE
IN
EAST-WEST
TRADE-PROBLEMS AND ISSUES 46 (1976) (stating that other agencies viewed Defense as
obstructionist).
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controlling: (1) "arrays of design and manufacturing know-how"; (2)
"keystone manufacturing, inspection, and test equipment"; and (3)
"products accompanied by sophisticated operation, application, or
maintenance know-how." 31 By closely controlling critical technologies,
the Bucy Report argued, export restrictions on noncritical technologies
could be relaxed. 32 This result would benefit industry as well as the
federal government-the two groups represented on the Task Force. 33
31. Bucv REPORT, supra note 30, at xiii. The quoted language-with the exception of the
word "products," which is replaced by "goods" -is repeated in the Export Administration Act of
1979 as the criteria for developing the MCTL. 5Pf 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(d)(2) (Supp. V 1987).
Although the Task Force deliberated for two years before publishing its recommendations, those
recommendations closely paralleled convictions expressed by the chairman, Mr. Bucy, before the
group was formed. In 1974, Mr. Bucy testified to Congress that "[t]he transfer of technology
knowhow which upgrades the strategic military capability of Communist countries should be prohibited. We must recognize that while many product sales have no military significance, almost all
knowhow sales provide the purchaser with the capability to increase his 'war making' capacity."
,\Iultinational Corporations Hmrings, supra note 30, at 280.
Although the Bucy Report focused primarily on controlling technology exports to all communist nations, United States policy has differentiated between Soviet bloc nations and the People's
Republic of China (PRC). For example. in the early 1980s, exports to the Soviet bloc were discouraged; exports to the PRC were encouraged. 5ff gmaally Simon, TNhnology for China: Too
Much Too Fast?, 87 TECH. Rt:v. 38, 47 (Oct. 1984) (explaining that many building-block technologies including electronics and advanced materials were exported to the PRC). But Sff S. REP.
No. 522, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1986) (recognizing potential danger to United States of
Chinese acquisitions of American technology).
32. Bucv REPORT, supra note 30, at 28-29.
33. It is not suggested that Mr. Bucy was concerned with anything other than the best interests of the United States, but only that he saw those interests as being synonymous with the best
interests of Texas Instruments. Mr. Bucy stated "that in no case should goods of strategic military
value to communist economies be sold to them by this country." ThP Rolf ofthf Export-Import

Bank and Export Control.\ in U.S. lnlfrnational Economic Policy: Hnmngs Bfjorf lhf Subcomm. on Intrrnational Finana of thf Smatf Comm. on Banking, Housing, and l./rban Affairs,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 577 (1974) [hereinafter Export-Import Bank Hmrings]. Mr. Bucy perceived
no significant national security problem in exporting other products of high technology without the
know-how to manufacture them. !d. at 578. He viewed national defense and economic realities of
technology transfer as being intertwined, id. at 579, stating that it was "axiomatic in high technology industries that the only adequate payment for know-how is market share." !d. at 575. Mr.
Bucy stated:
Industry in this country must be more careful about knowhow sales to state-owned
competitors, which create competition in Communist economies. A communist competitor[] can enter foreign markets without pricing restraint if it serves its political purpose,
whereas a free enterprise competitor must have a price that yields a profit .
. It is
common sense for us to be cautious about providing such state-controlled enterprises
with the knowhow to compete with us.
J1ultinational Corporations Hmrings, supra note 30, at 275; sn also Bucy, ProtNting "'Militarih Critiml Tuhnolor;y," 53 ELECTRONICS 26 (Jan. 17, 1980) (advocating United States adoption of critical technologies approach and emphasizing that "technology-intensive firms [such as
Texas Instruments] already use concepts similar to the critical technologies approach to protect
their competitive position"). 5ff gmaall_~ R. CARRICK, EAST-WEST TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN
Pt:RSPECTIVE 84 (1978) ("It almost seems that arguable and disputed economic views about technology transfer are dressed [in the Bucy RPport] in apparently respectable strategic clothing."). Cj.
Export-Import Bank HParings, supra, at 391 (statement of C. Lester Hogan, Vice Chairman of
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Participation by universities was planned but failed to materialize. 34
Despite their lack of contribution to the Bucy Rrport, the universities were included in the report's findings. After noting that export controls have not traditionally been applied to universities, the report recommended that government-to-government scientific exchanges 311 and
training of communist nation citizens "at the more significant laboratories of U.S. technical institutes and universities" 36 be monitored and
controlled. The report and Mr. Bucy appear to disagree on this point.
Mr. Bucy repeatedly stressed that science should remain unfettered, 37

the Board, Fairchild Camera & Instrument Co.) (arguing that "policy guidelines .
involving
sensitive technology should be set by [officials and experts) who are not connected with any individual company interested in the results").
According to one commentator, fears that the export of advanced plants and equipment to the
Soviet bloc would lead to an influx of Soviet goods on western markets has not occurred. Amann,
Terlmiral Progress and Soviet Economic Drl'elopmrnt: Setting the Srme, in TECHNICAL PRoGRESS AND SOVIET EcoNOMIC DEVELOPMENT 5, 9 (R. Amann & j. Cooper, eds., !986).
34. See Export-hnfJort Bank Hmrings, sufJra note 33, at 272 (statement of J. Fred Bucy,
Executive Vice President, Texas Instruments, Inc.) ("It is my hope [that the Task Force] will be
as balanced as we can make it, by selecting from industry, universities, and people within the
Government.").
35. Bucv REPORT, supra note 30, at 38. Between 1972 and 1974, the United States and the
Soviet Union entered into ten cooperative agreements in science and technology, including agriculture, atomic energy, environmental protection, oceanic studies, space, and transportation. See, e.g.,
Cultural Relations Agreement, June 19, 1973, United States-U.S.S.R., 24 U.S.T. 1395, T.I.A.S.
No. 7649 (contacts, exchanges and cooperation). Ser grnerally CoNGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND SciENTIFIC CooPt:RATION BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION: A REVIEW 14-23 (Comm. Print 1977) (prepared
for the Subcomm. on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Comm. on International Relations) [hereinafter Scn:NTIFIC CooPERATION REvn:w]. Under the agreements, scientific visits were exchanged, joint research was conducted, and conferences and symposia were
organized. /d. at 8.
Mr. Bucy was especially critical of the Apollo-Soyuz program, considering that the Soviets
"may have benefitted greatly from this project." Transji>r of" Trrhnology to the Sm•irt U11ion and

Eastrnz Europr, Hranng Brforr thr Pennanrnt Subromm. 011 Im•estigations of thr Srnatr
Comm. on Gm•enzmrntal Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1977) [hereinafter Swirl Union Hrarnzg). A congressional study of the Apollo-Soyuz program, however, determined that the program
had equally benefitted both parties and had resulted in little technology loss to either. SciENTIFIC
CooPERATION REVIEW, supra, at 124-25.
The scientific cooperation program substantially ended in 1980 due to the reaction by American scientists to Soviet treatment of the physicist, Andrei Sakharov. Ties were tentatively reestablished in 1985. Srr US, Sol'irt Srirnre Acadnnies Mm•e Toward Renewal of Tirs, IS SCI. &
Gov'T REP. I, I (Feb. I, 1985).
36. Bucv REPORT, supra note 30, at 38-39. Mr. Bucy has referred to these "citizens" as
foreign graduate students. SOl'iet Union Hraring, supra note 35, at 13.
37. Sn, e.g., Address by J. Fred Bucy, Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (jan. II, 1979), reprinted in U.S. Export Control Polir)' and Fxtmswn of the Export

Administration Art: Hraring Before the Subromm. on /ntenzational Fina11rr of the Smale
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, pt. 2, 96th Cong., I st Sess. 307, 307 (1979)
[hereinafter US. Export Control Policy Hraring) ("Science is directed to ohtaining knowledge.
Scientific information and data are exchanged around the world, and in so doing add to man's
understanding. It should continue to flow freely"); Sm•iet Union Hraring, wpra note 35, at 3
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and that communist nations do not wish to acquire American science
because "[t]hey are highly skilled in scientific theory." 38 The Bucy Report, however, concluded (with no discussion) that "[scientific] exchanges obviously have the potential to transfer technology very
actively. " 39
Defense began implementation of the Bucy Report by compiling a
critical technologies list to be used as a guide by the Department of
Commerce (Commerce) and the Department of State (State) in preparing their export control lists. 4 ° Commerce's list, known as the Control
List, is authorized by the Export Administration Act (EAA). 41 Under
the EAA, Commerce promulgates the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to control goods and technology with a dual use, that is,
with potential military and civilian uses. 42 Licenses issued for items on
the Control List differ depending on the nature of the item to be exported, its end-use, and its destination. Most items are exported under
general licenses, which are neither applied for nor issued. 43 Items not
qualifying for general licenses require validated licenses, which cover
specific exports. Applications for validated licenses must be made. 44
A "General License Technical Data Publicly Available" (GTDA)
(technical data available to all destinations) covers scientific and educational data communicated by academic instruction as long as the data is
communicated through catalog courses and associated teaching labora("Science is devoted to the collection and expansion of knowledge. In contrast to technology, science has no boundaries and the free and open exchange of science benefits all those engaged in
research").
38. 50l'iet Union Hearing, supra note 35, at 23. Mr. Bucy stated that "[d]istinguishing
among science, technology and products [was] critical to the formulation and implementation of a
national policy. The [Soviet bloc] nations don't want science, which they can get free through our
scientific publications and exchanges or for the price of tuition at major graduate schools and
technical institutes." !d.
39. Bucv REPORT, supra note 30, at 7-8 (emphasis added). Mr. Bucy may consider any
scientific exchanges between American and Soviet students to be a threat to national security. He
suspects that Soviet students will "renew[] contacts with former classmates after graduation from
U.S. universities, to glean whatever information they can." Soz•iet Union Hearing, supra note 35,
at 17.
40. Defense Policy Hearing, supra note 20, at 4 (statement of Ellen Frost, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Economic Affairs).
41. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(b) (Supp. V 1987). The Secretary of Commerce has primary
responsibility for controlling civilian exports through the Control List.
42. IS C.F.R. § 799.1 (1990); 55 Fed. Reg. 25,086-89 (1990) (interim rule). The Control
List is frequently revised to reflect changes in export policy. See, e.g., 51 Fed. Reg. 36,212 (1986)
(final rule revising Control List based on Coordinating Committee (Cocom) review); 49 Fed. Reg.
12,678 (1984) (interim rule expanding and clarifying export controls on certain commodities as a
result of Cocom review).
43. 15 C.F.R. § 771.1 (1990).
44. !d. § 772.2.

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

302

[Volume 4

tories. 411 University-based research is likewise "normally" covered by a
GTDA license if it is considered to be "fundamental research." 46 Once
data enters the public domain, it may be exported under a general
license. 47
The regulations extending a GTDA license to publicly available
technical data and information resulting from fundamental research
were proposed by Commerce in 1986. 48 Publicly available technical
data included material disseminated in the public domain to interested
scientific or engineering disciplines or the general public and material
communicated at open gatherings. 49 The proposed regulation defined
open gatherings as conferences, meetings, seminars, or trade shows
which "all technically qualified members of the public are eligible to
attend. " 50
As a general rule, research conducted in universities by scientists,
engineers, and students would be considered fundamental research. 111
But if academic researchers accepted national security contract controls
on government research that affected communications with people other
than citizens or permanent residents or that affected publication, 112 the
research would no longer be categorized as fundamental research. 53 In
45. !d. §§ 779.3(a)(3), (d).
46. !d. § 779 3(b)(2).
47. !d. § 779.3(a)(l).
48. 51 Fed. Reg. 17,986 (1986). Commerce-with input from Defense, Justice, and
State-was responsible for revising the regulations, together with the academic community, the
National Academy of Sciences, and the National Science Foundation. Srr EAST-WEST TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: A CONGRESSIONAL DIALOG WITH THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, jOINT EcoNOMIC CoMMITTEE, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (Comm. print 1984) [hereinafter DIALoG[. The
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy established an Advisory Committee on
Scientific Communication in 1984 to "ensure an appropriately balanced representation of the scientific and engineering communities in those areas of science and engineering most directly impacted by the technical data regulations . . and related laws and regulations." 49 Fed. Reg.
34,320 (1984 ).
49. 51 Fed. Reg. at 17,988.
50. !d.

51. !d.
52. /d. at 17,988-89.
53. Sn also Advanced Technology Systems, Final Report, Control of Unclassified Technology with Military Application I, II (Apr. 15, 1983) (submitted to Director of Defense for
Counterintelligence and Security Policy) (recommending that Defense apply controls via contract
restrictions and commenting that "[v)iolation of these requirements would be tantamount to violation of the export control laws").
An interagency working group established to recommend how the revised regulations should
treat scientific communications recommended in 1985 that breach of prepublication controls should
not trigger EAR sanctions. Report of Working Group on Export Controls and Scientific Communications I, 9 (Apr. 5, 1985). The Working Group regarded publication as "the paramount mechanism of scientific communication in our system" and recognized the harm to the American scientific community of restrictions placed on it. !d. at 5. The proposed regulations rejected this
recommendation by specifying controls with the right to prohibit publication or to prevent dissemi-
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such a case, breach of contract controls would trigger EAR sanctions,
which include imprisonment of up to five years, or fines up to $50,000,
or both.M If information were released to persons not citizens or permanent residents, knowledge or intent to export would be presumed.~>~~
In October 1988, Commerce again proposed export controls for
technical data under the EAR. 116 The proposed regulations were completely rewritten. 117 Commerce states that the only change in the section
containing definitions of terms such as "technical data," "export," and
"release" was to exclude certain categories of immigrants from the definition of foreign nationals covered by export controls. 118 The final regulations, published in October 1989, focused on product development,
production, and use. 119 Although the regulations excluded fundamental
research as a general rule, they firmly established the proposition that
export controls were approximately applied to scientific research in
universities.
State's export contro list, known as the United States Munitions
List, is authorized by the Arms Export Control Act. 60 Exports covered
by the Munitions List are single (military) use goods and technology. 61
Such exports are regulated under the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (IT AR). 62
To export either an item or technical data concerning an item on
the Munitions List, a license must be obtained from State; 63 but data
nation to noncitizens as the type of national security controls covered by the EAR. 51 Fed. Reg. at
17,989.
54. 15 C.F.R. § 787.1 (a)(i) (1990). The sanctions for willful violations include imprisonment
of up to 10 years and/or fines up to $250,000. Irl. § 787.1 (a)(ii)(19R8).
55. 51 Fed. Reg. at 17,987. In a 1978 case involving the !TAR, the Ninth Circuit held that
the nonmilitary use of an article for which technical data had been unlawfully exported was a
factor in determining whether the exporter had the necessary srirntrr for culpability. United
States v. Edler Indus., 579 F.2d 516, 522 (9th Cir. 1978).
56. 53 Fed. Reg. 40,07 4 ( 1988).
57. Ser id. at 40,075.
58. !d. at 40,07 5, 40,080.
59. 54 Fed. Reg. 40,643-51 (1989); srr 15 C.F.R. pt. 779 & Supp. 5 (1990).
60. 22 FS.C. § 2751 (1982). In addition to controlling the l'vfunitions List, the Secretary of
State may review any export license application for foreign policy export controls. 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2405(a)(5) (Supp. V 1987)
61. 22 C.F.R. § 120.3 (1990).
62. !d. pts. 121-30.
63. !d. § 123.1. Technical data includes "[i ]nformation which is directly related to the design, engineering, development, production, processing, manufacture, use, operation, overhaul, repair, maintenance, modification, or reconstruction of [defense articles]" lri. § 120.21(c). Also included is classified information relating to defense articles and defense services, id. § 120.21 (a),
and data covered by an invention secrecy order. !d. § 120.21(b).
Technical data must be significantly and directly related to items on the Munitions List.
United States v. Edler Indus., Inc., 579 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1978). In practice, State requires
a reasonable connection between technical data and goods on the list. Determinations are made on
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"concerning general scientific, mathematical or engineering principles"
for items on the list are specifically excluded from the ITAR. 64 Licenses list the country of ultimate destination, which must be the country of ultimate end use. 6 ~ If technical data subject to the ITAR are to
be disclosed to a national of a country other than that designated on the
license, written approval from State is required. 66 Without this approval, the communication to the national of the third country is a constructive reexport of the data. An unauthorized export occurs even if an
unauthorized individual from a third country overhears an authorized
communication. 67 As in the EAR, the export of technical data is
broadly defined to include oral, visual, or documentary disclosure regardless of the method by which the data are communicated. 68 Also, as
in the EAR, sanctions include imprisonment or fines. 69 Once data have
entered the public domain, they are no longer subject to the ITAR. 70
Universities are exempt from disclosure requirements for exportcontrolled data in the case of foreign nationals only if the foreign nationals: ( 1) are bona fide, full-time regular employees; (2) have their
permanent abode during their employment in the United States; (3) do
not come from a controlled country; and (4) have been informed in
writing by the university that they may not transfer technical data to
other foreign nationals without the prior written approval of State. 71
Beginning in the mid-1970s, Commerce and State used the Defense-initiated critical technologies approach to update their respective
export control lists. 72 Implementation resulted in the Bucy Report's directive being broadened to control not only design and manufacturing
know-how, but also the means to manufacture end products, including
"the scientific know-how, and the processes which allow you to transfer
a case-by-case ba>is. Srr Comment, Tlu Rrgulation of Trrhniml Data Undrr thr Arms Export
Control Act of 1976 and thr Export Administration Art of 1979: A Mattrr ofFxPruti<•r Discrrtion, 6 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. Rf~V. 169, 181 & n.110 (1983) (citing telephone conversation
between student author and official of State's Office of Munitions Control (Feh. 1982)).
64. 22 C.F.R. § 120.21(c) (1990). The !TAR's restrictive definition of technical data is a
response to the Ninth Circuit's restrictive interpretation in United States v. Edler Indus., 579 F.2d
516, 520-21 (9th Cir. 1978); Sff Letterman, U.S. Controls on Exporting Tfl'hnical Data: An
Analnis and Srlrrtn•r Prartitionrr's Guidr, 9 Hous. J. !NT'L L. 'i9, 68 (1986).
65. 22 C.F.R. § 123.9 (1990).
66. Jd. § 125.1(c)
67. Sn Letterman, .>UjJm note 64, at 87.
68. 22 C.F.R. § 125.2(c) (19'.l0).
69. ld. § 127.3(b).
70. !d. § 125.1
71. !d. § 125.4(b)(10)
72. Drfmsr Policy Hraring, sujna note 20, at 7 (quoting Bucv Rn•oRT, sujna note 30, at
xiii).
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science into a specific application." 73 Controls, therefore, were applied
not only to a product's technology but also to the scientific ideas from
which the technology emerged. Scientists became "exporters" whenever
they shared with foreigners, either in the United States or abroad, any
militarily critical information they had created. 74
Defining which technology was militarily critical and determining
at what point science became technology were obviously difficult tasks,
and because no bright line could be drawn, controls on science began to
be formulated despite Mr. Bucy's frequent assertions that science was
not technology 711 and despite assurances by Defense 76 and Commerce77
officials that science would not be subject to export controls. In August
of 1977, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown issued an interim policy
statement outlining guidelines for controlling the export of techno!73. /d. (statement of Ruth Davis, Deputy Director of Defense for Research and Advanced
Technology).
7 4. The EAR provides that: "technical data may be released for export through: (i) Visual
inspection by foreign nationals of U.S. origin equipment and facilities; (ii) Oral exchanges of
information in the United States or abroad; and (iii) the application to situations abroad of personal knowledge or technical experience acquired in the United States." 15 C.F.R. § 779.1 (b)(2)
(1990)
The IT AR provides that:
[u]nless otherwise expressly exempted . . a license is required for the oral, visual or
documentary disclosure of technical data to foreign nationals in connection with visits
by U.S. persons to foreign countries, visits by foreign persons to the United States, or
otherwise. A license is required regardless of the manner in which the technical data is
transmitted (e.g., in person, by telephone, correspondence, electronic means, telex. etc.).
22 C.F.R. § 125.2(c) (1990).
75. Sff, P.[;., Transfrr of Trrluwlor;y and thr Drr;,n Industrirs Lzrrminr; Action.,: Hrrninr;
Brforl' thr Prnnanrnt Suhromm. 011 Im•rstigations of thr Smatr Comm. on Gm•amnmtal /iffain, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 144 (1978) [hereinafter Drrs.\Pr hulustrirs Hra rinp;] (statement of J.
Fred Bucy declaring that '·[s]ince the meaning of technology is often misunderstood, I emphasize
that technology is neither products nor science"); Exj)(Jr/ LirPIIsinr; of Ad1•anrrd Tnhnology: A

Rrl'il'll', Hrarinp; Brforr thr Subromm. on Intrrnationa/ Tradr and Cummtrcr of thr Housr
Comm. 011 Intrmationa/ Rr/ations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 213 (1976) [hereinafter Export Limzsing Hraring] (statement of J. Fred Bucy) ("[W]e must clearly distinguish between 'science' and
'technology'. 'Science' is simply knowledge of the physical world and its phenomena. 'Technology',
on the other hand, is the application of science to the manufacture of useful products'').
76. Sn DrP.ISI'r Indwtries Hraring, supra note 75, at 109 (statement of William Perry,
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) ("Technology transfer is not simply
sending a piece of paper to somebody or writing a report or writing a journal article. Technology
transfer involves the transfer of manufacturing and engineering know-how. That is what Fred
Bucy was describing.").
77. Export Licensing HParinp;, sujJra note 75, at 241-42 (statement of Betsy Ancker-Johnson, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Science and Technology) ("[Technology is] that kind of
knowledge, that know-how which is applied, namely for products or processes. All of the current
scientific exchanges that we have, international conferences, the publication of papers in scientific
journals, would continue precisely as it has, unabated. We are only focusing in on that kind of
know-how-and I use that term as Mr. Bucy has just suggested, that kind of know-how which
issues in design and manufacturing.").
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ogy. 78 Defense officials recommended that the guidelines, which reiterated the conclusions of the Bucy Report, be incorporated into Commerce procedure and disseminated to all industrial exporters. 79 The
head of the ad hoc steering group, whose year-long study was the basis
of the policy statement, described Defense's new policy as "the first
major zero-base, total review of the export control system since its inception two-and-a-half decades ago." 80 He added that although exportation of technological know-how was to be tightly controlled, scientific
inquiry would be unrestricted. 81
This assertion, however, is inconsistent with the policy statement,
which specified that "[ t ]his policy shall be applied without regard to
whether the exporter is a government department or agency, a commercial enterprise, an academic or non-profit institution [or] an individual
entrepreneur . . . . " 82 The policy statement explicitly mentioned scientific and technical exchanges as examples of technology transfer, adding
that "[ w ]hen the potential for inadvertent transfer of critical technology
is considered to be high, Defense shall formulate and recommend to the
responsible agencies restrictions on the amount, extent or kind of interpersonal exchange in a given transaction. Visitor control mechanisms
within the Department of Defense will be improved." 83 Under the new
policy Defense coordinated with other agencies to identify, maintain,
and continuously update a list of specific technologies and/or end products, the export of which were restricted on the basis of national
security. 84
In 1978, Defense broadened the scope of its critical technologies
approach by asserting itself into the dominant position in the triennial
review of the multinational Cocom export list. 811 The Cocom (or Coordinating Committee) is an informal organization of fourteen western
countries plus Japan whose members secretly negotiate revisions to a
list of military, strategic, and nuclear items every three years. Although
78. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, INTERIM DOD POLICY STATEMENT ON
EXPORT CoNTROl. OF UN!Tt:D STATES TECHNOLOGY, NEWS RELEASE 410-77 (Sept. 2, 1977)
(containing Aug. 26, 1977 memorandum from Secretary of Defense Brown to Secretaries of Military Divisions) [hereinafter DEHNSE POLICY STATEMENT].
79. };xport Litf'ILiiug: Corom List Rl"l•iruo Proposals of thr Unitrd Stairs: Hrarings Brfinr

thr Subco/1111/, Oil Intrrnational r:coi/OIIIir Policy and Trarlr of thr Hou.\P Conrm. Oil hztrrnntional Rrlatio>ll, 9Sth Cong., 2d Sess. 103-04 (1978) [hereinafter Com111 List Rl"l•irw] (statement
of Ellen Frost, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Emnomir Affairs).
80. Srr Kozicharow, DOD Rr1•isrs Policy on Fxport, 113 AviATION WEEK & SPACE TECH.
11 (Sept. 1077).
81 Sff id.
82. DEFENSE POLICY STATEMENT, sujna note 78, at 1.

83. !d.
84. Srr Kozicharow, lllj!l'a note 80, at 12.
85. Drfrmr Polin Hmring, 1ujna note 20, at 17.
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members generally agree that items on the list will not be exported to
Soviet bloc nations, unilateral exceptions are not unusual. 86
State was the primary United States agency-contributor to the
Cocom review, but Defense participated in all thirteen interdepartmental technical task groups established to review the Cocom list, chairing
seven. 87 Defense thus ensured that, although the critical technologies
list was not sufficiently advanced to be incorporated in the revised
Cocom list, task groups negotiating revisions to the list would follow
the critical technologies approach. 88
Meanwhile, Defense was developing the critical technologies list
by the establishment of nine industry-government committees. 89 "Critical" was interpreted broadly to include technologies available outside
the United States and those that were no longer state-of-the-art. 90 One
Defense official freely admitted that intelligence personnel generally
lacked the technological expertise necessary to precisely assess military
implications of technology exports. 91 Implementation of the approach
also proved to be difficult, with one Senator describing Defense's review of export licenses as cursory and inadequate. 92
One set of licenses in particular drew congressional attention.
Dresser Industries of Dallas had applied to Commerce for validated
licenses to export technical data for a turnkey factory and for a computer-controlled electron beam welder to manufacture oil drilling rock
bits. 93 The turnkey factory was to be built in the Soviet Union. AI86. Stf Coram List Rn•il'll', supra note 79, at 3-5.
87. lrl. at 102 (statement of Ellen Frost, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Economic Affairs).
88. lrl. at 83 (statement of William Baraclough, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
International Trade Policy).
89. lrl. at 103. The groups studied: (I) acoustic array technology, (2) array processor computer technology, (3) computer network technology, (4) diffusion bonding technology, (5) high
energy laser technology, (6) infrared detection technology, (7) jet engine technology, (8) large scale
integration/integrated circuit production technology, and (9) wide-body aircraft technology. !d. At
the request of Defense's Director of Research and Engineering, Battelle Columbus Laboratories
identified strategically significant technologies for study by Commerce. 5ff !16TH REPORT ON
U.S. ExPORT CoNTROLS 11 (1977).
90. 51'1' UNITED STATES COMPTROLLER GENERAL, ADMINISTRATION OF U.S. EXPORT LICENSING SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED TO BE MORE Rt:SPONSIVE TO INDUSTRY 17 ( 1978); Sff
also R. CARRICK, supra note 33, at 85-86 (implementation of Bury RfjiOrt will depend "on what
exactly is meant by such imprecise but inevitable and colourful words as 'key,' 'strategic,' 'critical,'
and 'significant' "); Root, Trrulf Controls That Work, 56 FOREIGN POI.'Y 61, 78 (1984) ("allies
have reached to this grammatical challenge by proposing adverbs to modify the adjectives, such as
'very' significant, 'clearly' serious, or 'really' critical").
91. Export LimHing HNning, supra note 75, at 5 (statement of Edwin Speaker, Office of
Deputy Director for Scientific and Technical Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency).
92. Drt.ISI'r lndustrifs HNJring, supra note 75, at !58 (statement of Sen. Jackson).
93. /d. at 2. The rock drill bits manufactured by Dresser were capable of drilling deep wells.
This capability would enable the Soviet Union to produce oil from deeper, previously inaccessible
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though neither the rock bits nor the electron beam welder were on the
Control List when Dresser applied for validated export licenses,9"' the
unpublished technical data (e.g., blueprints, training, specifications, and
know-how) 911 and the computer control were subject to export
restrictions. 96
Defense reviewed the Dresser license applications, determined that
the technology involved was not on its critical technologies list, and approved the licenses, 97 which were then issued by Commerce. 98 Public
criticism of the licensing soon followed, causing Defense to request J.
Fred Bucy of the Defense Science Board to review Dresser's application.99 Mr. Bucy determined that deep-well technology had potential
military application. 100 Defense, however, considered the military significance of the export to be insufficient to recommend denial of the
license and recommended suspension instead. 101 Meanwhile, President
Carter approved both of Dresser's licenses. 102
The congressional committee that later investigated Defense's review of the licenses was highly critical of the agency's procedure 103 and
its narrow interpretation of national security. 104 The committee stressed
that national security centered around whether an export could be of
military significance. 1011 In doing so, however, it equated military
strength with economic strength. 106 In the case of the oil drilling equip-

oil reservoirs. /d. at 97.
94. Rock drill bits were removed from the Control List in 1972, and electron beam welders
without computer controls were removed in 1973. SPP id. at 14. In July, 1978, President Carter,
in response to Soviet treatment of dissidents, placed exportation of oil and gas drilling equipment
to the Soviet Union on the Control List. Srr grnrrally Huntington, Trarir, TNhnology, and L1'1.•rraw: Economic Dij1/omacy, 32 FOREIGN Pm.'Y 63, 76 (Fall 1978) (describing foreign policy
controls). Defense did not review Dresser's export license due to this foreign policy control (which
is under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of State), but reviewed the case for the export of unpublished technical data, which is subject to national security controls. /d.
95. Drrssrr Industrirs Hraring, supra note 75, at 14 (statement of Peter Sullivan, Assistant
Counsel for Subcommittee).
96. !d.
97. !d. at 16-17.
98. /d. at 29.
99. /d.
100. Bucy, An Assessmrnt of Rock Drill Bit Technolog;•, reprinted in Dresser Industries
Hraring, supra note 75, at 9-10.
101. Dressrr Industries Hraring, supra note 75, at 29 (statement of William Perry, Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering).
102. Srr id.
103. Srr id. at 158.
104. Ser id. at 95, 111-12; cj REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT TO CONGRESS, 95TH CoNG., 2D
SESS., INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY 9-10 (Comm. Print 1978) (defining national
security as including political, economic, and military aspects).
105. Drrssrr Industries Hraring, supra note 75, at 97 (statement of Sen. Percy).
106. !d. at 112.
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ment, therefore, the committee concluded that Defense should have considered whether the Soviet Union's capacity to produce oil had been
increased. 107 The committee's criticism of Defense stood in sharp contrast to its high praise of Mr. Bucy's recommendation to deny the permit based on criteria outlined in the Bucy Report. 108 In recommending
denial of the permit, however, Mr. Bucy had been instructed by Defense to base his decision on the broad strategic impact of the export in
addition to its military significance/ 09 a criterion that was not in Defense's statutory mandate. 110
During review of Dresser Industries' licenses, the critical technologies list contained 138 technologies and measured less than three
pages. 111 Defense described it as "an initial candidate listing identified
for study by industry and government." 112 Technologies on the list
were chosen because the end products were embedded in existing and
projected weapon systems. 113 No presumption existed that an unlisted
technology was not cri tical. 114
Congressional interest in Defense's review of export licenses provided the impetus for increased attention to development of an export
control policy by Defense. 1111 Other agencies were also investigating export controls. In response to a congressional request for review of the
effect of export controls on trade, the Comptroller General's Office
published a report recommending that Defense's review of export licenses be transferred to Commerce. 116 Commerce, meanwhile, completed a study mandated by Congress to determine the impact on national security and foreign policy of publicly available technical data. 117
107. !d.
108. !d. at 143, !57 (statement of Sen. Jackson).
109. !d. at 144 (statement of J. Fred Bury, President, Texas Instruments, Inc.).
110. Srr Export Administration Amendments of 1974, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403-l(a) (1982).
Ill. Drrs.srr Industrirs Hraring, supra note 75, at 133.
112. /d. at 142 (Defense's response to questions by Senate Committee).
113. Tradr and Tahnolog_y: Hraring Brforr thr Subrmmn. on lntrrnational Financr of thr
Smatr Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1979) [hereinafter Tradr and Trrhnology Hraring] (statement of William Perry, Under Secretary of Defense
for Research and Engineering). Defense had requested the military services to submit candidate
technologies. The 800 technologies submitted were formulated into a working list of 138 technologies. !d.
114. Drrssrr Industrirs Hraring, sufJra note 75, at 142.
115. /d. at 112 (statement of William Perry, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering).
116. UNITED STATES COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 90. The report conceded the
difficulties involved in defining critical technology or know-how, id. at 17, but recommended that
Commerce technicians be given overall control over export administration by terminating review
by Defense, NASA, State, and Energy. /d. at 34.
117. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF CoMMERCE, EXPORTS OF TECHNICAL DATA BY
PUBLICATION OR OTHER Mt:ANS OF PUBLIC DISSEMINATION, rrprintrd in OFFICE OF EXPORT

310

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 4

Commerce found that monitoring all of the 1.5 million technical and
scientific reports published each year would be cost-prohibitive but suggested that monitoring could be feasible if its scope were narrowed pursuant to the critical technologies list. 118
In January 1979, Defense completed the first list of military critical technologies, 119 the same month that Mr. Bucy delivered a stinging
criticism of the agency's tardiness in producing a list that industry
could use. 120 The list identified fifteen broad categories of applied science and engineering. 121 Industry-government groups, assigned to each
category to determine specific component technologies, identified elements of design, manufacture, testing, utilization, and maintenance.
These elements were to be controlled by inclusion in a Military Critical
Technology Product and Information List, to be supplemented by a list
of technology transfer mechanisms subject to export controls. 122
In May 1979, Congress again attacked the failure of the national
export control policy. Precipitating the criticism were reports that
American-designed trucks, manufactured at the Kama River truck factory in the Soviet Union, were being used with military units. 123 Export licenses for technology to construct the truck plant had been
granted on the understanding that only civilian trucks would be manufactured.124 The apparent failure of the export control procedure/ 25

ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMME:RCE, EXPORT ADMINISTRATION
REPORT (Apr.-Sept. 1977) app. D, 137 (1978) [hereinafter EXPORTS OF TECHNICAL DATA]; Iff
Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, § 120, 91 Stat. 235, 243.
118. EXPORTS OF TECHNICAL DATA, supra note 117, at 137. Commerce realized that the
cost of monitoring based on the critical technologies list would still be significant because
thousands of articles would have to be reviewed each year and also that "this effort does not take
into accout [sic] the other transfer mechanisms that would also need to be monitored, such as
public symposia, exhibits, and corporate reports." !d. at 138. Commerce concluded its report by
recommending against any form of monitoring. !d. at 142.
119. Srr OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGY AND EAST-WEST TRADE 93
(1980).
120. Address by J. Fred Bucy, Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association
Symposium (Jan. 11, 1979), rrprintrd in U.S. Export Control Policy Hra ring, sujmz note 37, at
307.
121. SPP 0FFJO: OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 119, at 93.
122. Sn id. at 93-94.
123. Srr 125 CoN G. REc. 15,581 (1979) (statement of Rep. lchord).
124. Srr id. Forty American companies negotiated contracts worth more than $550 million to
construct the Kama River truck plant. For an account of the plant's construction and types of
technologies involved, see Schaum, KamrlZ Foundr)', U.S.A. on Display, 66 MoDERN CASTING 42
(Mar. 1976); Sff a/so G. HOLLIDAY, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO THE USSR, 1928-1937 &
1966-1975 154-65 (1979) (describing interaction between Soviet management and Western exporters at the Kama River truck factory).
125. One of the more critical export licenses to construct the Kama River truck factory was
approved by the President following denial by Defense. Sn Multinational Corj)()ra/iolls Hrarings, supra note 30, at 226 (statement of Roger Shields, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense).
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and political infighting within Commerce, 126 set the stage for the elevation of Defense's critical technologies approach to the status of official
export control policy.
Statutory adoption of Defense's critical technologies approach was
facilitated by congressional renewal of the EAA (under which Commerce controls dual use exports). 127 The lengthy hearings and debates
on the Act's renewal focused on the necessity of balancing the needs of
industrial exporters with the protection of national security. 128 Because
of concern that the United States' competitiveness in world trade could
be weakened by an overly stringent and badly administered export control policy, the effect of export controls on science was barely addressed.
On the rare occasions during the hearings when science was discussed,
agency officials assured Congress that scientific research would not be
Commerce determined that no national security risk existed because comparable technology was
available from Western Europe and Japan. Commerce recognized that the trucks could be used as
military logistical support but concluded that the trucks did not fill a "tactical or combat military
role." Hrarinf'-' on S. 1487 Brforr thr Subromm. on Intrmational Finana of thr Smatr Comm.
on Brmkinf', Housing, and Urban l1Jfairs, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 50-51 (1972) (statement of Harold Scott, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Domestic and International Business),
Licenses for spare parts for the Kama River truck factory were revoked in January 1980
following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Tradr and Tahnology Hraring, supra note 113, at
511 (response by Commerce to subcommittee questions), Immediately following the export license's revocation, a manufacturer from an allied country exported similar products to the Kama
River truck factory, Srr Root, supra note 90, at 70.
The foreign policy controls on exports destined for the Kama River and ZIL truck factories
were removed in 1990. 55 Fed. Reg. 3205 (1990) (to be codified at 15 CTK § 799.1).
126. Lawrence Brady, Deputy Director of Commerce's Office of Export Administration, after testifying to a House subcommittee that the export control process was "a shambles," cooperated with Congress to the obvious disapproval of other Commerce officials who argued that Commerce should retain control over exports, Comparr 125 CoNG, REc 19,940 (1979) (letter to Sen.
Jackson from Juanita Kreps, Secretary of Commerce (June 18, 1979)) (stating that "Mr. Brady
has not been 'demoted' nor has any action been taken against him") with id, at 19,940-41 (memo
to Juanita Kreps, Secretary of Commerc( from Lawrence Brady, Deputy Director, Office of Export Administration) ("I would like to address the matter of my demotion .
, I believe your
letter confirms my testimony on the export control system. It is in essence, a 'shambles'.").
127. Srr supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
128. Srr, P-f'-· Extmsion and Rer•ision of thr Export Administration Act of /969, Hrarings
and ,\1arkup Brforr thr Subromm, on hztrmational Economic Policy and Tradr of thr Housr
Comm. on Forrign Affairs, jJI- 1, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 535 (1979) [hereinafter Hrarings and
Markup 1] (statement of Rep, Wolff) (arguing that export items critical to national security would
be the only items remaining controlled); 125 CoNG, REc. 26,812 (1979) (statement of Rep.
Lagomarsino) (stating that "we have struck a reasonable and realistic balance between preserving
the national security . . as well as providing greater security for business"); id, at 19,965 (statement of Sen. Jackson) (stating that "we are simply trying to find a solution that will address
properly and effectively the national security area and, at the same time, not create an impasse in
trade and commerce"); id. at 19,960 (statement of Sen. Stevenson) (stating that "we can ..
protect the national security against improvident exports of technologies without unnecessarily
injuring our economy and hence our national security").
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controlled.lll9 Science was mentioned peripherally during the debates,
but application of export controls to science was never seriously
addressed. 130
It is doubtful whether many members of Congress even considered
that export controls would affect sc.ientific communications. 131 The
know-how and technology discussed related to industrial exports. 132
129. Sn, r.g., Extmsion and Rf'l•ision of thr Export Administration Act of/969, HParing1
and Markuf' Br(orr thf Housf Cmnm. on ForPign Affairs, pt. 2, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 98 (1970)
[hereinafter Hmrings and Markup 2[ (statement of Ruth Davis, Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering) ("Without [limiting controls to practical know-how] we
would find we were suggesting that one might want to control the transfer of scientific knowledge,
and that would absolutely be against all of our principles in the United States."); Hrarings and
Markup I, sujna note 128, at 696 (statement of Stanley Marcuss, Commerce Senior Deputy for
Industry and Trade) ("[The proposed registration system] does not include information exchanged
by way of universities or educational institutions and so forth.").
130. Representative !chord, author of the critical technologies amendment that gave statutory
authority to the MCTL, briefly mentioned scientific exchanges as one method of transferring
technology. 5fr 125 CoNG. REC. 24,041 (1979). Representative !chord's primary concern, however, was "to effect export controls to protect the domestic economy, to protect foreign affairs and
to protect the national security." !d. at 26,813. Congress's Office of Technology Assessment determined that even people recommending that scientific exchanges be monitored only favored restraining commercial exchanges. Restraints on academic exchanges were thought to violate academic freedom. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 119, at 27.
The only scientist in the Senate, Senator Schmitt, suggested that export controls on technology "[flew] in the face of something we cannot control," 125 CoNG. REC. 19,964 (1974), but no
discussion of their application to science ensued. During the same debate, Senator Moynihan discussed the freedoms of inquiry, association, and dissent as being essential to science. !d. at 19,965.
Moynihan's point, however, was that because science did not flourish in totalitarian societies, the
Soviets were attempting to import American scientific and technological innovations. !d. Senator
Hayakawa argued that "technological breakthroughs are most likely to occur in free countries
where researchers and scientists can proceed with their own experiments . . ." !d. at 19,943. It
is unlikely that Senators Moynihan and Hayakawa would have spoken of the freedoms of the
American scientific community had they intended that the Act they were debating be applied in
derogation of those freedoms.
5Pf also Memorandum to Frank Press, Science Advisor to the President, from Larry Hammond, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice 4 n.7
(May 11, 1978), rPfnintNI in ThP G01'nnmmt's Classification of Primtf ldPa.1: Hm ring Btjorr
a Subromm. ojthf Housp Comm. 011 Gal'Pnunmt OpPrntwns, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 268, 271 n.7
(1980). The Justice Department memorandum, which discussed the !TAR, stated:
It is by no means clear from the language or legislative history of either [the Mutual
Security Act of 1954 or the Arms Export Control Act] that Congress intended that the
President regulate noncommercial dissemination of information, or considered the
problems such regulation would engender. We therefore have some doubt whether § 38
of the Arms Export Control Act [which controls export of unclassified technical data]
provides adequate authorization for the broad controls over public cryptography which
the IT AR imposes.
131. The sponsor of the critical technologies amendment, Representative !chord, believed that
99 out of 100 members of Congress did not understand what his amendment involved. Srf Export
Control Extmsion, 1979 CoNG. Q. ALMANAC 300, 304.
132. SPf, f.g., 125 CoNG. REc. 20, 109 (1979) (statement of Rep. Bingham) (discussing
"technology-the knowledge of how to produce things"); id. at 19,957 (statement of Sen. Steven-
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The critical technologies approach endorsed by Defense offered a
method of reducing the number of exports requiring licenses/ 33 while
ensuring that technologies critical to national security would not be exported.134 Hence, scientific communications were generally beyond the
scope of the debaters' concerns.

B.

Congressional Approach

In September 1979, Congress statutorily adopted Defense's critical
technologies approach. 1311 The relevant section of the EAA reads:
The Secretary of Defense shall bear primary responsibility for developing a list of militarily critical technologies. In developing such list,
primary emphasis shall be given to(A) arrays of design and manufacturing know-how,
(B) keystone manufacturing, inspection, and test equipment,
(C) goods accompanied by sophisticated operation, application,
or maintenance know-how, and
(D) keystone equipment which would reveal or give insight into
the design and manufacture of a United States military
system,
which are not possessed by, or available in fact from sources outside
the United States to, controlled countries and which, if exported,
would permit a significant advance in a military system of any such
country. 136
The MCTL was to be developed in accordance with the Bucy Report's
criteria. 137 Commerce's Technical Advisory Committees were to advise
the Secretary of Defense in addition to the Secretary of Commerce. 138
son) (arguing that "control on technology by the United States simply gives the business to some
other nation. a foreign competitor . . . with the result that our economy is hurt").
133. See, e.g., Hearinp and Markup 2, supra note 129, at 95 (statement of Ruth Davis,
Deputy Under-Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) (maintaining that "inherent
in procedures that . . Defense is invoking . . . is the presumption that there is a small list of
technologies which are significant to national security"); 125 CoNG. Rt:c. 24,041 (1979) (statement of Rep. !chord) ("Even looking at this [critical technologies] approach has resulted in the
removal of 162 commodities from the export control lists.").
134. See, e.g., 125 CoNG. REc. 24,050 (1979) (statement of Rep. Bingham) (stating that
MCTL will allow focus "on the items that are important to national security").
135. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 5(d)(2), 93 Stat. 503, 508
(codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(d)(2) (Supp V 1987)).
136. 50 U.S. C. app. § 2404(d)(2) (Supp V 1987). Subparagraph (D) was added in 1985. Ser
Pub. L. No. 99-64, § 106(a)(1), 99 Stat. 120, 128 (1985).
137. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(d)(2) (Supp. V 1987); see also supra text accompanying
note 31 (listing Bucv REPORT criteria); 125 CoNG. REc. 19,936 (1979) (statement of Sen. Stevenson) ("[The EAA] provides the statutory basis for implementing the critical technologies approach recommended in the report of the Defense Science Board Task Force.").
138. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(h)(2) (Supp. V 1987) (current version at 50 U.S.C.A. app. §
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Both Congress and Defense assumed that the MCTL would be
short. 139 The initial version of the MCTL was to be published in an
appropriate form in the Federal Register by October 1, 1980. 140
National security controls were to be sharply delineated from controls for foreign policy: 141 foreign policy controls were curtailed/ 42
while controls for national security purposes were strengthened. 143 The
Control List, prepared by Commerce to control the export of certain
dual-use products and technology, was to include both types of controls.
During enforcement, however, the particular control to be exerted was
to be clearly identified.w Items of the MCTL on which the secretaries
of Commerce and Defense agreed were to be incorporated in the Control List. 1411 Scientific exchanges resulting in the export of unpublished
technical data were to be reported to the Secretary of Commerce only if
commercial agreements were involved, 146 but universities, colleges, and
other educational institutions were specifically exempted from this
requirement. 147
2404(h)(2) (West Supp. 1990)).
139. Srr, r.g., Hrarings and Markup 2, supra note 129, at 95-% (statement of Ruth Davis,
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) (supporting the "presumption
that there is a small list of technologies which are significant to national security"); Hraring1 and
Markup 1, supra note 128, at 534 (statement of Rep. Wolff) ("! envision this 'critical technologies list' to be quite small.").
140. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(d)(4) (1982). The words "in an appropriate form" were inserted
in the Act so that parts of the list could be classified if necessary. Srr 125 CoNG. Rn:. 24,042
(1979) (statement of Rep. Bingham). The current version requires Defense to review the MCTL
on an ongoing basis. 50 U.S.C.A. § 2404(d)(5) (West Supp. V 1990).
141. Srr, r.g., 125 CoNG. REC. 20,108-09 (1979) (statement of Rep. Bingham) (maintaining
that a clear distinction between national security and foreign policy controls was an important
feature of the bill).
142. Foreign policy controls were only to be enforced after both consultation with appropriate industries and countries and a study of alternatives. 50 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 2405(c)-(d) (West
Supp. 1990). The President must consult with Congress before imposing any foreign policy export
control. Jd. § 2405(f) (Supp. V 1987).
143. In contrast to foreign policy controls, Commerce could exercise national security controls
after consultation with Defense or any appropriate government agency. /d. § 2404(a)(l ). The
President was not restrained from exercising national security controls because of an executive
agency's failure to specify end-use conditions. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 482, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
_ _ , rrprintrd in 1979 U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1180, 1182. This reference was an
obvious reaction to Commerce's failure to require end-use conditions in contracts for the Kama
River truck factory. Srr 125 CoNG. REC. 26,813 (1979) (statement of Rep. !chord).
144. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(c)(l) (Supp. V 1985). Section 2404(c)(l), which governs national security controls, provides that "goods and technology [in the Control List] shall be clearly
identified as being subject to controls under this section." /d. Section 2405(1), which governs foreign policy controls, provides that goods and technology in the Control List are to be clearly
identified as being subject to controls under that section. /d. § 2405(1). The Control List is described mfra in text accompanying note 309.
145. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(c)(2) (1982 & West Supp. 1990).
146. !d. § 2404(j)(l) (Supp. V 1987).
147. Id. § 2404(j)(2); srr also Hrarings and Markup 1, sujna note 128, at 696 (statement
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One section of the EAA enabled Defense generally to ignore comments made by Commerce. 148 If the Secretary of Commerce recommended a license over the Secretary of Defense's objection, the President would have to break the impasse. If the President overrode the
Secretary of Defense's objection, he was required to provide reasons for
his decision to Congress together with the Secretary of Defense's
recommendation. 149
Passage of the 1979 EAA resulted in a renewed Defense effort to
establish the MCTL. Defense employees responsible for developing
and administering the list were reorganized under the Under Secretary
of Defense for Research and Engineering and the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs. 11~ 0 International Security Affairs retained a policy role regarding sensitive cases, 151 but Research
and Engineering became responsible for developing and implementing
MCTL's technology base. 152 Personnel responsible for determining
which technologies were militarily critical-and therefore controlled-were thus the same people who determined which technologies
to promote in the United States. 153 Defense officials hoped that coordination of control and promotion functions would be synergistic. 154 By
coordinating technology transfer functions, Defense personnel gained
leverage by offering certain technologies to allies or by threatening to
withhold technologies in exchange for the allies' cooperation in controlling technology transfer. 155
Defense staff members disagreed over the aims and probable results of the MCTU 56 and worried that it would be simply an in-house
exercise. 157 By the end of 1979, however, it became certain that the
MCTL would reach beyond Defense. Additional monies allocated to
of Stanley Marcuss, Commerce Senior Deputy for Industry and Trade) (maintaining that commercial cooperation agreements refer exclusively to commercially exchanged information, not "scientific exchange [or] scholarly exehange").
148. Srr Root, supra note 90, at 80.
149. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2409(g) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (current version at 50 U.S.C.A. app.
§ 2409(g) (West Supp. 1990)).
150. Trchnology ExjJort: Drpartmml of Drfmsr Organization and Prrfonnanrr, Hmring

Brforr thr Suhcomm. on lntnnationa/ Economic Policy and Tradr ofthr Housr Co111111. on Forrign Affair.l, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-8 (1979) [hereinafter Drfmsr Organization Hra ring] (statement of William Perry, Under Seeretary of Defense for Research and Engineering).
151. !d. at 18 (statement of David McGiffert, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs).
152. !d. at 5-8 (statement of William Perry, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering).
153. !d. at 19.
154. !d.
155. !d. at 28-29.
156. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 119, at 94.
157. !d.
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the critical technologies program 1118 permitted extensive hiring of contractors to further develop the approach. 1119
Industrial groups completed their inputl 60 by reviewing items in
the Control List for inclusion in the MCTL. 161 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) provided
information on foreign availability of critical technologies, 162 and the
Navy and Air Force conducted separate reviews. 163 The industry-government, Navy, and Air Force reviews were combined to form the initial MCTL. 164 The major technologies were subdivided into controllable products and information, 1611 and transfer mechanisms were
delineated, accompanied by recommendations of available government
controls and by suggestions about the ways in which the controls should
be invoked. 166 The MCTL now included over 5,000 pages of supple158. In 1979, $2.5 million was allocated to the critical technologies program. Drfrnll' Or[(ani:ation Hraring, supra note 150, at 24 (statement of William Perry, Under Secretary of Defense
for Research and Development).
159. Jd. at 24. The Institute for Defense Analyses was contracted in December 1979 to
develop the MCTL for publication in the Frdrral Rr[(i.llrr by October 1, 1980. Srr INSTITUTE
FOR DEFENSt: ANALYSt:S, THE CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES PROJECT, Executive Summary 1-1
(1981) (IDA Rep. No. R-258)
160. Drfrnsr Orwznization Hraring, supra note !50, at 27.
161. lntrrnational Affairs Functions of thr Trrasury and thr ExjJorl Administration Act,

Hrarill[(' Brjorr thr Subcomm. on lnlrrnational Finanrr and Monrtary Polin of thr Srnalr
Com111. Oil Ba11king, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1981) [hereinafter
Trrasun Hrarings] (statement of Oles Lomacky, Director for Technology Trade, Office of the
l!nder Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering). The industry-government working
groups were supplemented by representatives from the Armed Services, NSA, NASA, Commerce,
State, DIA, and the CIA. Jd.
162. Hrarin[(S and MarkujJ 1, supra note 128, at 413 (statement of Ruth Davis, Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Advanced Technology).
163. Trrasury Hrarin[(S, supra note 161, at 70-71 (statement of Oles Lomacky, Director of
Technology Trade, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering).
164. ld. at 71. Differences existed regarding technical requirements for identifying an item
as militarily critical. /d. at 44 (statement of Frank Conahan, Director, International Division of
the General Accounting Office). The Institute for Defense Analyses defined militarily critical as
"[t]echnology not possessed by our principal adversaries that specifically contributes to the superior characteristics (performance, reliability, maintainability, and cost) of a military system, a significant component thereof, or a related strategic product of any such adversary." INSTITUTE FOR
DEFENSE ANALYSES, supra note 159, at 1-13. Militarily critical technologies were defined by
selecting significant technologies, and determining whether the technology had military utility and
adversary capabilities. /d. at 1-12. Significant technology was defined as "[ t]echnology that specifically contributes to the superior characteristics (e.g., performance, reliability, maintainability, cost)
of a system, a significant component thereof, or a related product." /d. at 1-13. Applying these
definitions, any civilian technology not possessed by an adversary or a potential adversary that
reduces the cost of any items strategically related to any military system is militarily critical.
Inclusion of such technologies on the MCTL implies a broad reading of national security controls.
165. Hmrin[(S and Markup 1, supra note 128, at 412-14.
166. /d. at 413.
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mental data. 167 Despite the Bucy Report's recommendation that certain
universities be monitored and controlled, the MCTL's controls did not
include controls on university-based research and publications. 168

C.

Application of the Critical Technologies Approach to Science

In early 1980, international events caused Defense and the American scientific community to reevaluate American-Soviet relationships.
In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter ordered an embargo on strategic items shipped to the Soviet Union. 169
The President determined that the embargo was necessary in the interests of foreign policy and national security. He directed the Secretary of
Defense and other officials to review and revise export controls on high
technology and other strategic items to the Soviet Union. 170 In the interim, outstanding export licenses were suspended and no new licenses
were issued. 171
American disapproval of Soviet actions in Afghanistan was exacerbated by the exile of the Soviet theoretical physicist, Andrei
Sakharov/ 72 and scientific exchanges between the two nations virtually
ceased. 173 American scientific organizations cancelled joint US-USSR
symposia, and individual scientists pledged to boycott all scientific exchanges until Sakharov's exile ended. 174
In this somber atmosphere, Defense reviewed its export controls.
167. Trfasury HParin{!;s. supra note 161, at 72 (statement of Oles Lomacky, Director for
Technology Trade, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering).
168. /d. at 71. The definition of technology used by the Defense contractor developing the
MCTL excluded "research or store of scientific knowledge on which the application concept is
based.
."INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES, supra note 159, at 1-14. The fact that science
was exempted from items as they were selected for inclusion in the MCTL would not, however,
automatically preclude science's subsequent inclusion.
169. Letter from President Jimmy Carter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President of the Senate, rfprintrd in 16 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 183 (Jan. 22,
1980). The President exercised his executive and Commander-in-Chief powers and his authority
under the EAA. Commerce completed its review of strategic items in March of 1980. In April,
1980, it adopted a more stringent export control policy in regard to the Soviet Union. DEPARTMENT OF CoMMERCE, EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ANNUAL R~:PORT 1980 22 (1981).
170. Letter from President Jimmy Carter, supra note 169, at 184-85. Foreign policy controls
expire after one year unless they are extended annually by the President. 50 U.S.C. app. §
2405(a)(3) (Supp. V 1987).
171. Letter from President Jimmy Carter, supra note 169, at 184.
172. Srr Jacobs, Sakhar01' Exilr Tri{!;f!:PrS Rmction in U.S. Physirs Community, 33 PHYSICS
ToDAY 133, 133 (Mar. 1980). Sakharov's exile ended in December 1986. Srr Rich, Sakharo!'-A
Wind of Changr, 325 NATURE 3, 3 (1987).
173. Srr Jacobs, supra note 172, at 133.
174. Rmctions Escalatr to Sm'ift Actions, CHEM. & ENG'G Nt:ws, Mar. 3, 1980, at 6. But
cf Feshbach, Lfl's Not Boycott Sm•ift Physicists, 33 PHYSICS ToDAY 160, 160 (Mar. 1980) (condemning Soviet action but advocating caution in not destroying individual Soviet-American scientific communication).
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A statement made by the then Deputy Secretary of Defense illustrates
Defense's difficulty in distinguishing national security standards (under
which the controls were reviewed) from foreign policy considerations. 1711
In the aftermath of the Afghanistan invasion, national security controls
were applied to technology that "could be used to improve the performance of Soviet military equipment or to improve the productivity of the
Soviet defense industry," 176 a somewhat broader definition than that
contained in the EAA. 177
Scientific exchanges by means of symposia, visits, and journals had
already been characterized by Defense as effective transfer mechanisms/78 and extensive dosiers had been compiled on all Soviet science
and technology students in the United States. 179 As the national security context changed, so did application of export controls. 180 Stringent
restrictions were imposed by Defense on student exchanges in science
and technology .181 Attendance by foreigners at scientific symposia was
restricted/ 82 and individual academic visits were controlled. 183
An official of the D lA 184 testified to a congressional subcommittee
175. Sre, P.f(., Food and Trrhnology Embargo Hmrings, supra note 17, at 89 (statement of
W. Graham Clayton, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense) (declaring that the decision to embargo
grain was justified for national security and foreign policy reasons). Mr. Clayton argued that the
national security of the United States was threatened by Soviet aggression. !d.
176. Transfer of Technology to thr Sm•iet Bloc: Hearing Brjine thr Pennmznll Subromm. on
hll'ntigntion.l of the Snzntr Gl!l'enunrntal Affairs Comm., 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1980) [hereinafter Sm•irt Blor Hearing] (statement of William Perry, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering).
177. Srr SO U.S.C. app. § 2404(d)(2) (Supp. V 1987). Sertion 2402(d)(2) mandated control
of technology that "would permit a significant advance in a military system of any [controlled]
country." !d.
178. Sm•irt Defense I-;xpmditures and Rrlatrd Programs, Hearing.\ Befine tht Subromm. on
GtnNal Prorurnnent ojthr Smatr Comm. on Annrd Sen•ires, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (1979)
[hereinafter Sm•irt Dejnzse Expenditure.\ Hearing] (statement of Jack Varona, Deputy Director
for Scientific and Technical Intelligence, DIA).
179. Sm•iet Bloc Hearing, supra note 176, at 29.
180. Sn Food and Trrhnology Embargo Hearings, supra note 17, at 93.
181. Sm•iet Bloc Hearing, supra note 176, at 29-30 (statement of William Perry. Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering).
182. See Appendix. One meeting in particular drew national attention. The CIA requested
the American Vacuum Society's program for its 1980 conference on bubble memories in Santa
Barbara. State, arting in cooperation with Defense and Commerce, advised the society to disinvite
Chinese srientists and to require all foreign nationals to sign a pledge that they would not divulge
unpublished information obtained at the conference to Eastern bloc nationals. Ser id. at 81-82.
State, which was trying to improve relations with the PRC, did not want the Chinese disinvited.
As a result, the Chinese arrived in Santa Barbara, were disinvited, and then admitted late on the
condition they sign a pledge not to divulge information. Wade, Srienrr Mertings Catch thr L'.S.Sm•irt Chill, 207 Sci. 1056, 1056 ( 1980). The society's president, who was warned of the severity
of EAR sanctions, agreed to the government's controls. !d. at 1058.
183. Sre Appendix.
184. The DIA and the CIA advise Defense and Commerce on individual licenses and on the
types of goods and technical data which should be reviewed by Defense. It!. at 207-08 (written
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about Soviet abuse of the scientific exchange program. 1811 One scientist,
who was head of Hungarian research on magnetic bubble memories,
had been observed visiting American universities and conferences. Research observed by the Hungarian scientist was unclassified because it
had not reached the stage where it could be applied to weapon systems/86 but Defense believed that the technology "may have military
application. " 187
On October 1, 1980, Defense met its statutorily mandated deadline under the EAN 88 by publishing the initial MCTL in the Federal
Register. 189 Unfortunately, the list did not simplify or clarify regulations by identifying militarily critical technology, as Defense had previously indicated it would. 190 Not only was publication limited to the
MCTL's table of contents, but unlisted technical data were not precluded from control. 191
Congress further aided Defense's controls over science in 1980 by
imposing conditions on the funding of a Defense research program on
Very High Speed Integrated Circuits (VHSIC). The conditions, contained in the explanatory statement of the conference report accompanying the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 192 made funding
contingent on the research's being controlled by the IT AR. 193 No legisanswer to committee question by Kent Knowles, Director of Office of Export Administration).
185. /d. at 71 (statement of Jack Vorona, Deputy Director for Scientific and Technical Intelligence, DJA).
186. lrl.
187. Irl.
188. 50 U.S C. app. § 2404(d)( 4) (1982).
189. 45 Fed. Reg. 65,014 (1980). The Department of Energy also published a list of energyrelated militarily crifical technologies on October 1, 1980. /d. at 65,152.
190. Srr Trarlr and Trrhnology Hmring, supra note 113, at 40 (statement of William
Perry, l:nder Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering). Secretary Perry states: "We
believe that imposition of control on the technology transfer process and simplification and clarification of regulations that apply to militarily critical technologies will meet both the objectives of
the Department of Defense and our National Economic objectives." !d.
191. Srr 45 Fed. Reg. 65,015 (1980).
192. Pub. L. No. 96-107, 93 Stat. 803 (1979); srr H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 546, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. ( 1979).
193. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 546, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1979). The provision's origin is
unknown. Neither the House nor the Senate committees initiated it; it simply appeared in a conference report. Com parr H.R. REP. No. 166, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 102-03 (1979) (recommending
deferral of VHSIC funding) and S. R~:r. No. 197, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1979) (proposing
funding for VHSIC program) u•ith H.R. REP. No. 546, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1979) (placing
VHSIC program under !TAR) and S. CoNF. REP. No. 371, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1979)
(same) SN /!.l'l•t'ra/ly Dickson, Campus Chirfs Protrst DOD Srrurity Rulrs, 11 Sc1. & Gov'T
REP. 5. ~ (l\!.1v 1981) (describing appearance of VHSIC control provision). The joint explanatory
statement read, in pertinent part:
The conferees . . approved authorization for [the VHSIC] program with the following understanding:
The export of the technology developed in this program would be controlled
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lative history exists to explain why the stringent controls were imposed.
When VHSIC research was first sponsored by Congress, universities
were informed that the program was unclassified and that research
could be published. 194
In December 1980, the scientists learned of the change in the
treatment of their research when Defense issued guidelines to VHSIC
program directors. The program directors were instructed to distinguish between basic and applied research. Applied research, which was
controlled under the IT AR, was not to be disclosed at open meetings or
symposia, or to foreign nationals. If the program directors had difficulty delineating basic from applied research, they were instructed to
forward research results to Defense for a determination. The guidelines
declared Defense's preferrence that only citizens, or immigrants who
had declared their intent to be citizens, participate in basic research. 1911
A Defense official stated that "[i]n general [Defense does] not want to
control academic exchanges of a basic science nature, [but we) are concerned possibly about some aspects of [the VHSIC) program, which
have military applications." 196
where applicable by tbe International Traffic in Arms Regulations until the
state-of-the-art for such technology progresses to the point where national
security permits its transfer to other controls for export. H.R. CoNF. REP.
546, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1979). Because the condition on VHSIC
funding was not part of the Authorization Act, it was not printed in the
Statulfs at L!lrf!,f, and could, therefore, remain in relative obscurity.

!d.
194. Srf Dickson, Arademr Ponders Dfjmsf Curbs on Resmrch, 11 Sci. & Gov'T RFP. 5,
5 (Mar. 1981).
195. See Kolata, Attnnpts to Safr{!,uard TNhnolo{!,y Draw Fire, 212 Scr. 523, 526 (1981).
The reference to basic research read:
In the case of basic research supported by the VHSIC program, although such research
and its results are not generally controlled, it is the preference of the Program Office
that only U.S. citizens and immigrant aliens who have declared their intention of becoming citizens participate. Where this preference cannot be accommodated, the contractor should be directed to the Program Office for resolution.
!d. (quoting Memorandum to VHSIC Program Directors from Larry Sumney, Defense Department (Dec. 12, 1980)).
196. Treasury Hearings, sufna note 161, at 170 (statement of Oles Lomacky, Director for
Technology Trade, Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering).
Applying the !TAR to Defense-sponsored VHSIC research does not preclude application of
similar export controls to private VHSIC research. The Munitions List only includes "[VHSIC]
semiconductor devices that are specifically designed for military applications." 22 C.F.R. § 121.1
category XI (1990). The EAR, however, control other VHSIC technology. See 48 Fed. Reg.
28,633 (1983) (supplementary information to final rule adding VHSIC to Munitions List) ("All
integrated circuits and related technical data which do not meet [VHSIC specificallv designed for
military applications] criteria will remain under the export controls of the Department of Commerce."); sn also Transfer of Technology Hearings, supra note 1, at 264 (statement of Larry
Sumney, Prior Director, VHSIC Program) ("We were also satisfied that the EAR would control
commercial chips approximating VHSIC capability."). Sff gmnally Schmitt, Srimtijlr bz-
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The universities and Defense attempted to resolve the dispute over
the VHSIC controls quietly, but private resolution became impossible
when a letter written to Defense, State, and Commerce by five university presidents was published on February 27, 1982. 197 The letter protested application of the ITAR and EAR to university activities and
questioned Defense's capacity to differentiate basic from applied VHSIC research. The letter suggested that until Defense, State, and Commerce had thoroughly assessed the implications and effectiveness of a
policy extending controls to unclassified research, the most sensitive
parts of the VHSIC program should be relegated to classified research
facilities. 198
Replies from the agencies to the university presidents' letter were
uncoordinated. 199 A State official replied that no determination had
been made on whether the VHSIC program came under the ITAR. 200
Defense officials, realizing that their extensive university research program had been damaged, attempted to mitigate the effects of the dispute.201 Defense accepted the Defense Science Board's recommendation
to establish a forum of Defense and university representatives. 202 The
subsequently formed DOD-University Forum 203 created a Working
Group on Export Controls to evaluate controls to protect technology
vital to the national security while preserving free speech.
Another group was formed under the National Academy of Sciences. In the spring of 1982, the Panel on Scientific Communications
terrha nge and National Seru rity, 35 PHYSICS ToDAY 120, 120 (Dec. 1982) (arguing that controls on academic research would necessarily have a deleterious impact on industrial research).
A 1985 Defense security plan restricts VHSIC technology in the hands of American companies and research laboratories from acquisition by foreign countries and manufacturers. The plan
includes application of export controls, controls over public disclosure of technical information, and
security classification. Sn VHSIC Srrurity, 122 AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH. 15, I~ (1985).
197. See Kalata, supra note 195, at 523.
198. Letter from Donald Kennedy, President, Stanford University; Marvin Goldberger,
Pr~sident, California Institute of Technology; Paul Gray, President, MIT; Frank Rhodes, President Cornell University; and David Saxon, President, University of California to Malcolm Baldridge, Secretary of Commerce; Alexander Haig, Jr., Secretary of State; and Caspar Weinberger,
Secretary of Defense (Feb. 27, 1981), reprinted in Export Administration Amendment' Art nf

1981: Hearing' and MarkujJ Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs and its Suhromm. on
lntemational Economic Polir)' and Trade, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 136, 136-6!l (1981).
199. See Wilson, supra note 28, at 120. State and Commerce, which were relatively minor
actors in the controversy, responded by separate letters. !d.
200. Letter from Under Secretary of State James Buckley (.July 8, 1981), riled in Greenstein, .\'atumal Security Controls on Scientific Jnfonnation, 23 JuRIMf:TRICS J 50, 64 ( 1982).
201. Wilson, supra note 28, at 120. But srr Weinberger, Tedmolor;y Tramfen to thr Sm•iel
Cnion, Wall St. ]., Jan. 12, 1982, at 32, col. 3 (describing how Soviets are aided in acquiring
technology by "merely reading the full range of technical literature openly published").
202. After examining export controls, the Defense Science Board recommended in its .January 1981 report that a coordination group be created. Ser Wilson, supra note 28, at 120-21.
203. Ser 48 Fed. Reg. 54,095 (1983).
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and National Security (panel) met for the first time under the leadership of Dale Corson, President Emeritus of Cornell University. 204 The
panel's mandate was to study, evaluate, and recommend a workable
solution to the impasse between free scientific communication and national security concerns on technology transfer. 205
Concurrent with the work of the panel and the DOD-University
Forum, the VHSIC Working Group on Export Control implemented
methods of protecting emerging VHSIC technology. Certain elements
of the VHSIC program were designated for classification. 206 Other
VHSIC research was added to the Munitions List when the devices
and accompanying technology reached the design state. 207 Less advanced VHSIC research was regulated under the EAR. 208 By implementing this three-stage approach, Defense not only controlled dissemination of VHSIC technology and prevented its commercial application
but also developed a methodology to apply to other emerging technologies supported by Defense. 209
Development of the MCTL, meanwhile, continued under a revised executive mandate that included control of "process know-how
[that] enhance[ d] Soviet military capabilities through contributions to
key military support industries [such as] motor vehicular, chemicals,
machine tool, computers, ship building, aerospace, and metallurgy." 210
A revised MCTL, issued in classified form in November 1981,211 was
used by Defense as the basis for its export controls. 212 Commerce, however, despite determining that identification of critical technology was
204. Hrarings on HR. 5167, 'uprn note 3, at 1174 (statement of Edith Martin, Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Advanced Technology). The two other working
groups established by the Forum studied Defense's engineering and science education requirements, and Defense's foreign language and area studies requirements. Irl. at 1174-75.
205. PANEL ON SciENTIFIC CoMMUNICATION AND NATIONAL SE<:I!RITY, CoMMITTEE oN
SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND PUBLIC PoLICY OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, AND INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, SCIENTIFIC COMMUNICATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY ix-xii ( 1982) [hereinafter CoRSON REPORT].
206. High TPrhnvlugy Hmrings, supra note 25, at 593 (statement of Stephen Bryen, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Economics, Trade and Security Policy).
207. !d. at 592-93. Plans for an IEEE workshop on the VHSIC program were aborted
when Defense officials advised the workshop's organizers that a discussion of the chips' performance would require participants to show proof of United States citizenship. Willenbrock, Sa tiona I
Srruri!_l· and Opm Trrhniral Communications, 2 IEEE TECH. & Soc'y MAG. 7, 9 (Dec 1983).
208. High Trrhnology Hrarings, supra note 25, at 592.
209. !d. at 593; Dallmeyer, National Srcunty and thr Snniconrlurtor lnrlwtry, 90 TFCH.
REV. 47, 51 (Nov.-Dec. 1987).
210.

SN Letter from Senator Jackson to Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense (Oct. 1, 1980).

rrprintrrlm 128 CaNt;. REc. 1642 (1982).
211. Sn UNITED STATES CoMPTROLU:R GENERAL, ExPORT CoNTROL Rn;vLATION
CoULD BE REDUCED WITHOUT AFFECTING NATIONAL SECURITY app. J, at 32 ( 1982).
212. !d. at 31.
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"the essence of export controls," 213 considered the MCTL to be inadequate, and refused to use it as the basis of its export controls. 214
Within Defense, responsibility for developing the MCTL remained with the Office of Research and Engineering, but the Office of
International Security Policy (Policy) became the contact for interagency and international development and implementation. 2111 In practice, communication and coordination between the two Defense offices
was often inadequate, leading to policy decisions being made by either
office alone. 216 Policy cooperated with Commerce in incorporating the
MCTL into the Control List, with technical assistance provided by Research and Engineering. 217 Defense did not limit its contribution to export decisions to items it considered critical but also commented on
"important" i terns. 218
In January 1982, Admiral Inman, Deputy Director of the CIA,
suggested to the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science (AAAS) that the scientific community voluntarily adopt a system of prior restraint. 219 Admiral Inman was concerned
213. CoNGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 97TH CoNG., 2n SEss., EAsT-WEsT CoMMERCIAL Poucv: A CoNGRESSIONAL DIALOGUE WITH THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 26 (Comm.
Print 1982) (prepared for Joint Economic Committee) (answer by Commerce).
214. UNITED STATES CoMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 211, at 31. Industry considered
that the MCTL should be integrated into the Cocom List before it was implemented in the United
States. !d.
215. Ea>I-H'PSI Economic Rrlations: Hrarinp; BrjiJrP tlu Subrvmm. on lntnnalional Economic Policy ojlhr Srnatr Com111. on Frnfign Rflaliom, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1981) [hereinafter f.·a.\1-\Vr.lt Rflations] (on setting out Defense's responses to questions submitted by the
subcommittee).
216. SPP H.R. REP. No. 664, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1982).
217. Erzsi-Wrst Rrlations, supm note 215, at 50. Defense officials also envisioned moving
some MCTL items to the Munitions List. Export Controls 011 Oil and Gas Equijm1ml: Htaring'

rznd .\1arkup on H.R. 6838, Brforr thf Housr Comm. 011 Forrip;n Ajjiur.1 and liS Subcomm.1. on
Eurojlf rrnd lhr ,\1iddlr Er1.1l allfl on Intnnational Economic Policy rznd Tradr, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 23 ( 1n 1) [hereinafter Oil Equipmmt Hfa rinp;s] (responses by Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy).
218. Oil Equipmrnl Hrarinp;s, supra note 217, at 45-46 (statement of Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy). Secretary Perle remarked:
I think the list will have one very important impact; that is it will enable us to distinguish between things that it is critically important to limit and things that it is not so
critically important to limit. There are things that, while not critical, <\re nevertheless
important, and these will necessarily have to be examined on a case-by-case basis.
!d. at 46.
219. Address given by Admiral Bobby Inman, at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (Jan. 7, 1982), rrprintrd in Imparl oj,Valionrzl Saurit\'

Con.1idrralion1 011 Srinll'e allfl Tahnology: Hfarinp;.\ Brforr thP Subrom111. on Srimre, Rrvarrh,
and Tnhnolog\ and thr Subwnnn. 011 hn•rstip;atioll> and O<'frsip;hl of lhr Housr Co111111. rn1
Srirnrr and Trrhnolop;y, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 230, 237 (1982) [hereinafter Impart Hearinp;s]. In a
subsequent extension of his speech, Admiral Inman rationalized his suggestion for voluntary restraints on scientific information. Inman stated:
Society, acting through its elected and appointed Federal officials-whether in Con-
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that national security could be damaged by publication of cryptographic
research and certain other technical information, including computer
hardware and software, lasers, and even crop projections. 220 Inman
later explained that his purpose in suggesting a voluntary system was
to spur scientists into action in lieu of anticipated action by the federal
government. 221 He realized that a system of prior restraint would be
unpopular with scientists, but he believed that they would be able to
differentiate between controls on scientific research which could be
freely communicated and controls on scientific developments sought by
the Soviet Union. 222
Also, in January 1982, the Defense Science Board on University
Responsiveness to National Security Requirements published a report
which determined that universities could not be exempted from the
IT AR and EAR. 223 The report recommended that guidelines be negotiated for non-Defense-funded research and, if necessary, for nonfederally-funded research that could potentially be subject to the IT AR
and EAR. 224 At the same time, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy, Richard Perle, threatened to terminate
United States defense contracts with allied nations in order to persuade
the allies not to export their technology to Soviet bloc nations. 225 By
emphasizing that "[ t ]he age of the technology is irrelevant," 226 Perle
extended the critical technologies approach to technology that was not

gress, the Executive Branch, or the Judiciary, as well as at the local level-sometimes
does impose restrictions on its citizens' rights to have or to use information. Examples
abound. One of the most interesting is that, in many locations, courts do not publish the
names of juvenile offenders.
Inman, One Vim• of National Securit)' and Trchnical Information, I IEEE TECH. & Soc'y
MAc. 19, 20 (Sept. 1982).
The idea for voluntary prior restraint is not new. During World War II, the National Academy of Sciences established a Joint Advisory Committee on Scientific Publications to review papers submitted for publication in certain scientific fields to determine if the papers contained militarily significant information. The fields included nuclear physics, microwave radio development,
and medical research. See ~merally Sokal, From the Archi<•es: Cattell and World War II Cmsor.1hip, 10 SCI., TECH., & HUMAN VALUES 24, 24 (Spring 1985).
220. Inman, Imparl Hearings, supra note 219, at 230, 234.
221. Hi~h Trchnology Hearings, supra note 25, at 249 (statement of Admiral Bobby Inman,
Deputy Director, CIA).
222. Id.
223. OFFICE OF THE UNDf:R SECRETARY OF Dt:Ft:NSE, Rt:St:ARCH AND ENGINEERING, REPORT oF THE DEFENSE Scn:NcE BoARD TAsK FoRcE oN UNIVERSITY RESPONSIVENESS TO NATIONAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 5-4 (1982).
224. Id. at 6-2.
225. Mann, L'.S. Presses 2 Nations on 1-.'xf}()r/ of Teclwolof!:\'. 116 AVIATION WF.EK &
SPACE TF.CH. 27 (Feb. 1, 1982). Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Policy, told a subcommittee of the President's Export Council that "'[i]n the real world, I
think it's the only kind of leverage that's likely to work.'" Id.
226. lrl.
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state-of-the-art.
Controls on science were also exerted from a new quarter. The
Administration published an executive order on security classification
that omitted a previous reference excluding basic research from classification.227 The executive order, which relaxed the criteria under which
information could be classified, 228 included cryptography as a classifiable category. 229 The executive order also authorized agencies to "safeguard" information pending a decision to classify. 230
Meanwhile, Secretary of Defense Weinberger submitted a budget
report to Congress that included an expression of concern about technology transferred during conferences and symposia. 231 The report included the broad categories of electronics, materials sciences, and life
sciences as examples of critical military technologies. 232 Further indicia
of technology transfer to the Soviets were contained in an unclassified
version of the CIA's report entitled Soviet Acquisition of Western Technology. 233 The report described the role of open literature, conferences,
and student scientific and technological exchanges as Soviet technologyacquisition mechanisms.
Against this evidence of the Soviets' acquisition of American science and technology, the Corson Panel published its Report on Scien227. Draft of Executive Order 12,356, rrprintrd in Exauti1•P Order on Saurity Classification: Hmrings Brji1rP a Subrom111. of thr Housr Cmmn. on Gol'frllii!Pnl Opnations, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 241 ( 1982). The provision was reinserted in the final Executive Order. Srr Exec. Order
12,356 § 1.5(b), 3 C.F.R. 170 (1983), rrprintrd in 50 U.S.C. § 401 note, at 51,53 (1982). It was
suggested that the provision excluding basic research had originally been omitted by the Administration because it proposed creating a new category of classified information based on the test of
" 'protection in the interest of national security.' " Letter from Frank Press, National Academy of
Sciences, to William Clark, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Feb. 26,
1982), rrjnintrd in Impart HParings, supra note 219, at 85-86.
228. Comprm Exec. Order 12,356, § l.l(a)(3), 3 C.F.R. 167 (1983), reprintrd in 50 U.S.C.
§ 401 note, at 51 ( 1982) (" 'Confidential' shall be applied to information . . expected to cause
damage to the national security.") u•ith Exec. Order 12,065, § 1-104, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,949, 28,950
(1978) (" 'Confidential' shall be applied to information . . . expected to cause idmtifiable damage
to the national security.") (emphasis added). Sa gmrrnlly Rosenbaum, Tenzer, Unger, Van Alstyne, & Knight, Acadnnir FrPrdom and thr Classifird Information Systnn, 219 Sci. 257, 257-59
(1983) (describing overbreadth of Exec. Order 12,356).
229. Exec. Order 12,356, § 1.3(a)(8), 3 C.F.R. 169 (1983), rrprintnl in 50 U.S.C. § 401
note, at 52 (1982).
·
230. !d.§ l.l(c), 3 C.F.R. 167 (1983), rrprintrd in 50 U.S.C. § 401 note, at 52 (1982). The
section states that "[i]f there is reasonable doubt about the need to classify information, it shall be
safeguarded as if it were classified 'confidential' " until a determination is made within thirty
days. !d. The Defense Directive implementing Executive Order 12,356 repeats this language. Srr
32 C.F.R. § 159.13(a)(2) ( 1987).
231. Report of Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to the Congress on the FY 1983
Budget, FY 1984 Authorization Request and FY 1983-1987 Defense Program 81 (1 982).
232. !d. at 74.
233. CENTRAL INTELI.IGt:NCE AGENCY, supra note 6, at 2.
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tific Communication and National Security. The report concluded that
universities and scientific communication account for "very little of this
technology transfer problem. " 234 It recommended that controls should
not be imposed on basic or applied technologies unless: (1) the technology was "developing rapidly;" (2) the technology "had identifiable direct military applications [or was] dual-use and involve[d] process or
production-related techniques;" (3) transfer of the technology would
"give the U.S.S.R. a significant near-term military advantage;" and ( 4)
"[t]he United States [was] the only source of information about the
technology, or other friendly nations that could also be the source "[had
comparatively secure] control systems . . . . " 2311 If a technology met all
four criteria, but was not sensitive enough to be classified, the panel
recommended that foreign nationals should be prohibited from direct
participation in research and that prepublication review by the federal
agency sponsoring the research should occur simultaneously with submission of papers to a publisher. Under no circumstances should the
ITAR and EAR be applied to these "gray areas." 236 The panel also
advised against extensive use of the voluntary pre-publication system
applied to cryptography and recommended that the MCTL be drastically streamlined. 237
Panel Chairman Dale Corson stated that he knew of no way to
obtain clear definitions of what was on the MCTL and that "people
who are going to be subject to heavy fines through the implementation
of [the ITAR and EAR] will not be able to know what it is that the
violation is based on." 238 Corson confessed he did not "know how to
protect against Pentagon intervention. " 239
The Administration initiated an interagency study of the panel's
proposals, but the study proved to be ineffectual. 240 The Working
234. CoRSON REPORT, supra note 205, at I. The panel received security clearance by the
CIA and FBI. Out of all the classified and unclassified documents viewed by it, the panel found
virtually no evidence of damaging technology transfer via university scientific laboratories or bilateral government agreements. Ot'fn'irw of lntanational Scinzcr and Trchnology Policy: Hmrings

Brforr thr Housr Comm. on Forrign Affairs and Its Subrol/11115. on lntrrnational Srcurity and
Scirnlljir Affairs and on lntrmational Oprratwns, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 77-78 (1983) (statement
of Frank Press, President, Academy of Sciences).
235. CoRSON REPORT, supra note 205, at 65.
236. /d. at 66.
237. /d. at 67. The panel did, however, recommend that the prepublication for cryptology be
considered as a future option. !d.
238. Corson, What Priu SNurity?, 36 PHYSICS ToDAY 42, 47 (Feb. 1983).
239. /d. at 45.
240. The interagency study group met for long sessions but failed to reach a consensus. The
study disbanded but subsequently formed again with a broader charter that included the study of
nongovernmental scientific research. Srr Stifling Scimttjic Communirations to Prolrrl US Trrhnology, 36 PHYSICS TODAY 41, 43 (june 1983).
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Group on Export Controls of the DOD-University Forum concluded
that it was probably necessary to impose some restrictions so that the
transfer of militarily critical technologies such as microelectronics,
cryptology, and computer software would be slow. 241 The group recommended contract provisions in Defense-sponsored research to allow for
simultaneous publication review in lieu of information control by the
EAR and the ITAR. 242 The group determined, however, that items
were included in the MCTL by using broader criteria than those specified in the Corson RPport and recommended that only "gray areas" on
the list be controlled. 243
The Corson RPport did little, however, to limit the growth of Defense's critical technologies approach. In 1982, Secretary Perle suggested to Congress that Defense needed additional authority to impose
export controls. 244 In his view, even though the EAA provided Defense
with extensive authority, that authority was restricted because of a narrow interpretation given to it by Commerce. 2411 At the same time, Perle
actively promoted the MCTL's incorporation within the Control List
and the Cocom List. 246 Defense determined that the technical data section of the EAR was "the major sieve through which our technology
had been leaking" 247 and drafted a proposed revision of the section
from the MCTL's lists of "arrays of know-how." 248 Defense recommended to Commerce that if technical data was included in the
241. Working Group of Export Controls, Controls to Delay the Transfer of "Sensitive"
Technology in University Settings, rrjnintrd in Tahnology Transfer Hrarings, supra note 10, at
258.
242. /d. at 260-61.
243. /d. at 260.
244. Sn Hearings on Military Po.1ture and H.R. 5968, Departmmt of Drfmse Authorization for .4pproprifllll!11.\ fur Fmal Ymr 1983 Brjorf thr Housr Comm. on Annnl Srn•irn, pt. 5,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 142 ( 1982) (statement of Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy). Secretary Perle stated, "We have tried to come to grips with [technology transfer J in the Department of Defense, although the statutory authority of the Department of Defense is, in my judgment, inadequate to play the full role I think we ought to plav in
developing government positions with respect to technology transfers." !d. Perle explained that
Defense's role was mostly advisory and that "[a]s a practical matter, it is difficult for the Department of Defense always to say no[,] and bargains are struck, accommodations are made, and the
final result is not nearly as careful and deliberate as one would hope." !d. at 143.
245. Sn TNhnology Transfer Hmrings, supra note 10, at 84, 90 (statement of Richard
Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy).
246. Srr id. at 195-96. Defense proposals on technical data were also forwarded to Commerce for incorporation into the EAR. Srr Mann, Proposal Would Tightm Data Export, 117
AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH. 115, 115-17 (Dec. 6, 1982).
247. High Trchnology Hearings, supra note 25, at 556 (statement of Michael Lorenzo,
Under Secretary of Defense for International Programs and Technology); Sf!' 15 C.F.R. pt. 779
(1990); 55 Fed. Reg. 25,086-89 (1990) (interim rule).
248. High TNiuwlogy Hearings, supra note 25, at 556 (statement of Michael Lorenzo,
Under Secretary of Defense for International Programs and Technology).
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MCTL, there should be a presumption that export of that data to Soviet nations was denied. 249 The revisions proposed controlling exports
of critical technical data to all destinations outside the United States. 250
The MCTL, which now included a section on cryptography, 251
did not narrow the Control List and Munitions List as intended by
Congress, 252 but rather added a new layer of controls with a wider
scope than the original controls. 253 The MCTL was now implemented
by an automated data service containing 10,000 pages of supplemental
information, including historical files of foreign military sales and
munitions licenses, country assessments, and weapon systems reference
lists. 254 Although the purpose of the MCTL was to supplement items
on the Control or Munitions Lists, 255 in practice the list was used by
some Pentagon officials as the basis for denial of export licenses. 256
Defense coordinated the different parts of its critical technologies
approach in January 1983 by establishing the internal Steering Committee on National Security and Technology Transfer. This committee
formulated Defense policy on export controls pertaining to "unclassified, but militarily sensitive technology." 257 Five subcommittees were
also formed. The Subcommittee on Contract Controls examined methods for using contracts "as a technology export control mechanism." 258
The Subcommittee on Visa Controls examined methods of controlling
foreign participation in American research, including a review of patent
processes. 259 The Subcommittee on Monitoring of Emerging Technolo249. Trrhnology Tran1[rr Hearings, supra note 10, at 156 (statement of Talbert Lindstrom,
Deputy l'nder Secretary of Defense for International Programs and Technology).
250. Mann, supra note 246, at 115.
251. Drfmse Drpartmrnt Authorization and 01•rrsight Hraring' on H.R. 2287, Drjwrtmrnt of Drfrnsr Authonwtion of Appropriations for Fisml Yrar 1984 awl O;•rrsight of Pm•iously Authorizrr/ Programs Brforr thr Housr Comm. on Annrd Sen•irr1, pt. 5, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 206 (1983) [hereinafter 1984 Drfrnsr Authorization HraringsJ (statement of Richard DeLauer, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering).
252. Srr Extrnsion Hrarings, supra note 29, at 421 (statement of Allen Frischkorn, Assistant Vice President, GTE Corporation); srr also supra text accompanying note 139.
253. Srr id. at 459; id. at 479 (statement of Rep. Banker).
254. High Trrhnology Hrarings, supra note 25, at 189-90, 556-57. The automated data
service is available to all agencies involved in technology transfer restrictions, including Defense,
State, Commerce, and Energy. 1984 Drfrnsr Authorization Hrrning1, supra note 251, at 210.
255. 1984 Drfrnsr Authorization Hearings, supra note 251, at 206.
256. Srr Debevoise, Tradr Rrstraints-Thr Lrgal-Politiml Dtrhotomy, 14 TOLEDO L. REV.
1299, 1309 n.43 (1983) (citing Debevoise's personal conversation with Pentagon officials).
257. Srr Trrhnology Tramjrr Hrarings, supra note 10, at 247 (statement of Leo Young,
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering).
258. !d.
259. !d. Subsequent to the subcommittee's proposal and an interagency review, State implemented a policy of denying visas to foreign visitors who had the potential to be a source of technology loss. The Department of Justice's Immigration Service (or the federal agency involved in
acquiring visas) was permitted to impose restrictions on conditional visas or to otherwise condition

293]

CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES APPROACH

329

gies attempted to establish a mechanism by which new technologies
could be screened for military significance. 260 The Subcommittee on
Scientific Conferences and Trade Shows formulated a directive to control participation and attendance by Defense employees and contractors
at meetings where unclassified but militarily sensitive technology was
discussed. 261 Finally, the Subcommittee on Publication and Presentation of Research Papers developed procedures to control information
being transferred through the publication and presentation process. 262
The steering committee incorporated the subcommittees' proposals
into recommendations which were subsequently included in Defense
Directive 2040.2, 263 which formulated Defense policy under the ITAR,
EAR, and various other Defense directives and instructions. This directive formally established a Defense International Technology Transfer
Panel (IT 2 ) 264 composed of representatives of Defense, DIA, CIA, and
the Armed Services. 266 The directive described defense-related techno!entry into the United States. See Wallerstein, supra note 12, at 464.
260. Tnhnology Trnnsjrr Hearings, supra note 10, at 247 (statement of Leo Young, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering). The subcommittee recommended
that the "region of emergence" should be based on whether research was classified 6.1 (basic
research) or 6.2 (exploratory development). All 6.2 research was to be subject to case-by-case
review for potential military usefulness. See Mann, U.S. Drafts Research Data Control.,, 120
AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH. 101, 101 (Mar. 19, 1984).
261. Tnluwlogy TrnnsjPT Hearings, supra note 10, at 247 (statement of Leo Young, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Development). In April of 1984, the Vice Chief
of Naval Material sent a memorandum to the Deputy Chief of Naval Material for Technology
and the Commander of Naval Sea Systems Command stating: "'The Chief of Naval Material
does not want Navy Material Command personnel actively participating in non-DOD sponsored
symposia, conferences or other similar forums on weapons and associated technologies related subjects.'" DOD Policy 011 Participation of Employees in Nun-DOD Sponsored Symposia and Conjermces, 3 AAAS BULL. Sci. FREEDOM & NAT'L SECURITY 2, 2-3 (Sept. 1984) (quoting Memorandum from the Vice Chief of Naval Material to the Deputy Chief of Naval Material for
Technology and the Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (Apr. 2, 1984)). The memorandum named as potential sources of technology loss four civilian Navy employees who were instructors in radar at a continuing education program at George Washington University. The university's programs were unclassified. Marshall, Do Seminars Leak Nm•y Secrets?, 224 Sci. 1409,
1409 (1984)
262. Tnhnology Transfer Hearings, supra note 10, at 247 (statement of Leo Young, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Development).
263. See id. Defense Directive 2040.2 was first issued in draft form as Defense Directive
2040.xx. The draft directive exacerbated an internal split between Policy and Research and Engineering. The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering refused to concur with
the directive unless authority for the final Defense position on munitions licenses were retained in
his office. See Mann, Task Force Urges Arms Policy Shifts, 119 AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH.
139, 139 (Oct. 3, 1983). The power struggle was eventually resolved in Policy's favor. See Tnhnology Trnmfer Hearings, supra note 10, at 174 (statement of Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Policy).
264. Department of Defense Directive 2040.2 (Encl. 2) (Jan. 17, 1984).
265. Stifling Scientific Communications to Protect US Technology, 36 PHYSICS ToDAY 41,
42 (June 1983 ).
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ogy as "a valuable, limited national security resource." 266 Transfer
mechanisms subject to controls included foreign exchanges involving
scientists, engineers, students, and other academicians, 267 international
symposia and meetings on advanced technology ,268 and the dissemination of technical reports and data. 269 The directive relied on the MCTL
for the list of critical technologies to be controlled. 270 Supplementing
the MCTL was a new list recommended by the Subcommittee on
Monitoring of Emerging Technologies. The Militarily Significant
Emerging Technologies Awareness List (METAL) listed technologies
that had not emerged from basic research. 271
The procedure recommended by another subcommittee, the Subcommittee on Publication and Presentation of Research Papers, came
under attack from the scientific community, however. This subcommittee had recommended that nonsensitive papers based on Defensesponsored research be submitted to Defense simultaneously with their
submission for publication. Defense could not deny publication of these
papers. Sensitive papers based on Defense-sponsored basic research
were to be submitted to Defense sixty days before they were submitted
for publication. Defense could deny publication of these sensitive
papers. 272
Many universities protested strongly to Defense about the prepublication review process, warning that they would not accept research
contracts containing the restrictions. 273 In response, Defense revised its
policy, excluding basic or fundamental research from restrictions. Ap-

266. Department of Defense Directive No. 2040.2 pt. D (Jan. 17, 1984)
267. !d. at Definitions (12)(b).
268. !d. at (12)(1)
269. !d. at (12)(o). The term "technical data" embraces "fc]lassified or unclassified information of any kind that can be used, or adapted for use, in the design, production, manufacture,
repair, overhaul, processing, engineering, development, operation, maintenance, or reconstruction
of goods or munitions; or any technology that advances the state of the art or establishes a new art
in an area of significant military applicability in the United States." !d. at (10).
270. !d. at pt. E(2)(b). "Critical technology" is defined to include technologies "that would
make a significant contribution to the military potential of any country or combination of countries
and that may prove detrimental to the security of the United States
." !d. at Definitions ( 1).
271. Srr Wallerstein, supra note 12, at 465-66 & n.ll. It is difficult to envision how a
technology that has not emerged from basic science may be differentiated from basic science itself.
"Emerging technologies" appears to be a euphemism for basic science, unless for some unknown
reason the subcommittee was attempting to draw a distinction between basic research and theoretical science.
272. Srr David, Prntagon iL/is for Strictrr Controls 011 Publimlion. 307 NATURE 401, 401
(1984).
273. Srr Prntagon R & D Chir)1 Frudin{!; on Campus Snrl'r), 14 Sci. & Cov'T REP. 1, 1-2
(May 1, 1984) (citing letter from Paul Gray, President, MIT; Marvin Goldberger, President, Cal
Tech; and David Kennedy, President. Stanford University to George Keyworth, Presidential Science Advisor, and Richard DeLauer, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Development).
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plied research was to be restricted only rarely, and all restrictions were
to be contractually agreed upon before the research was undertaken. 274
Defense's revised policy was eventually applied to all federal agencies with its publication in 1985 as a National Security Decision Directive. The directive cited the Corson Report's conclusion that scientific
communication of fundamental research was only a minor contributor
to the Soviet acquisition of militarily critical technology. The directive
stated that although the problem could become significant, "[n]o restrictions may be placed [by federal agencies] upon the conduct or reporting
of Federally-funded fundamental research that has not received national security classification, except as provided in applicable U.S.
Statutes." 2711
Although the directive permitted the continued application of the
export control laws, scientists generally viewed it as a sign that the
steady increase of controls on scientific information had ended. 276 A
Defense official assured the scientists that although the directive did not
eliminate the possible classification of ongoing research, such classification would be "a very, very remote possibility." 277 Unfortunately, this
assurance has not proven reliable. 278
Defense's strategy appeared to have changed from confrontation to

274. Memorandum Concerning Publication of the Results of DOD Sponsored Fundamental
Research, Reference DOD Directive 2040.2 (Oct. I, 1984), cited in Shattuck, FEDF.RAL RESTRICTIONS ON THt: fREt: FLOW OF ACADEMIC INFORMATION AND IDEAS 28 (Harv. Univ. 1984); see
Norman, Unil•rnitirs Prrmil on SrrrfCJ, 226 SCI. 418, 418 (1984). Defense's revised policy was
announced during a congressional hearing in March 1984. Scimtific Commlwiration.l and .\'a-

tiona/ Srruriti: Hraring Brforr the Subromm. on Scimcr, Rrsrarch, and Tahnology and the
Subro1nm. on lm•rstiwllions and Q,•rrsight of the Housr Comm. on Scimre and Trcluwlogy, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 138 (1984) [hereinafter Scientific Communications Hmring] (statement of Edith
Martin, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering).
275. National Security Decision Directive 189 (Sept. 21, 1985); sre Corson, What Is Federal
Polin on Srirnl!jir Communication?, 40 PHYSICS ToDAY 144, 144 (Jan. 1987) (determining that
the 1985 directive appeared to be similar to the policy advocated in the Corson Report).
276. Sff, e.g., Branscomb, Ensuring that Fundammtal R.esmrch Remains Unrl'strictrd, 38
PHYSICS TODAY 176, 176 (Nov. 1985); Corson, supra note 275, at 144; Goodwin, Rrflgan Issues
Order on Scima SrcrNy: Will It Br Obryrrl?, 38 PHYSICS ToDAY 55, 55 (Nov. 1985). The final
policy required enforcement of the directive "to the maximum extent possible. . ." Sff National
Security Decision Directive 189 (Sept. 21, 1985).
277. Sff Smith, White Housr Issues Srcrrcy Guidelinr, 230 Sci. 152, 152 (1985) (quoting
Colonel Donald Carter, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Advanced Technology).
278. Ser SHATTUCK & MoRISEY-SPENSk:, GoVERNMf:NT INFORMATION CONTROLS: IMPLICATIONS FOR SCHOLARSHIP, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (1988) (noting the tendency by federal
agencies to classify research-in-progress rather than classifying before research is commenced); ser

also Thr Computrr Security Act of 1987: Hmring Brforr thr Subcomm. 011 Sciena, Rrsrarch
and Trchnology and the Subcomm. on Transportation, A1'iation and Matrrials of thr Housr
Coli/Ill. on Scirnrr, SjHtCf, and Technology, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1987) (statement of Donald
Latham, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence)
(describing how an unclassified research program may become partially classified).
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conciliation. In September 1985, Defense had released an updated report of the Soviet acquisition of Western technology aimed at increasing
public awareness of the problem. 279 By demonstrating to scientists that
they were one of the targets of the Soviet program, Defense hoped that
scientists would practice self-restraint in keeping their ideas from the
Soviet bloc. 280
In 1984 and 1985, Congress again aided Defense in expanding its
critical technologies approach. Section 1217(a) of the Department of
Defense Authorization Act of 1984 exempted unclassified sensitive
technical data from public disclosure under the Freedom of Information
Act. 281 As part of Defense's implementation of this policy, all unclassified technical documents funded by Defense are labeled. Each category
of documents, except those cleared for unlimited distribution, may be
labelled with an export control warning if the Defense technical program manager determines that "export-controlled technical data" is
contained in the document. 282
279. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE, SOVIET ACQUISITION OF MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT WESTERN TECHNOLOGY: AN UPDATE (Sept. 1985). The report was produced by the Interagency Group on Technology Transfer, chaired by an Under Secretary of State.

Srr Implnnrntation of the Export Administration Art of 1985: Hrarings Brforr the Subromm. 011
Jntrmational Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign Afjairs, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 62, 70 (1985) (statement of Stephen Bryen, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Trade Security Policy).
280. See Memorandum to AAAS Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility from
Stephen Gould, Director, Project on Scientific Communication and National Security (Oct. 4,
1985).
281. Pub. L. No. 98-84, § 1217(a), 97 Stat. 614, 690 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 130 (1988));
srr DOD Directive 5230.25, 49 Fed. Reg. 48,040 (Dec. 10, 1984); Final Rule on Withholding of
Unclassified Technical Data from Public Disclosure, codified at 32 C.F.R. pt. 250 (1989).
The provision's purpose was to give "Defense the discretion not to disclose pursuant to a
Freedom of Information Act request certain technical information which is in the possession or
under the control of the Department of Defense." S. REP. No. 174, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 262,
rrprintN! in 1983 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NF.WS 1081, 1152.
The report of the Senate Committee on Armed Services described the section as authorizing
"Defense to withhold from public disclosure certain kinds of valuable technical data with military
or space application." Jd. at 260, reprinted in 1983 U.S. Com: CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 1150.
The report listed "blueprints and military specifications for weapons and other military equipment, drawings, plans, technical instructions and other similar unclassified technical data." /d.
(emphasis added). The report did not list scientific research, either in the form of publications or
presentations.
282. Department of Defense Directive 5230.24(F)(4)(d) (Nov. 20, 1984). In addition to a
distribution statement, export-controlled documents may bear the following notice at the discretion
of Defense officials: "WARNING- This document contains te<:hnical data whose export is restricted by the Arms Export Control Act (Title 22, U.S.C., Sec. 2751 et seq.) or Executive Order
12470. Violation of these export laws are subject to severe criminal penalties." /d. at (Encl.
3)(8)(a). Technical data is defined as "[a]ny blueprints, drawings, plans, instructions, computer
software and documentation, or other technical information that can be used or be adapted for use
to design, engineer, produce, manufacture, operate, repair, overhaul, or reproduce any military or
space equipment or technology concerning such equipment." /d. at (Encl. 3)(7)(a) (incorporating
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Pursuant to section 1217(a), Defense required scientific societies to
present export-controlled papers in separate sessions that deny entry to
foreign nationals. 283 Although several scientific societies refused to hold
the sessions, 284 Defense promulgated regulations establishing this
procedure. 2811
Section 1217 (a) has permitted Defense to control unclassified technical data that it considers to be "sensitive." Thus, Congress has aided
Defense in the creation of a new level of unclassified but restricted
data. The limits of the new level of restricted data are amorphous, although Defense stated that the restrictions would not be imposed on the
presentation of unclassified fundamental research. An exception exists,
however, for presentations that Defense believes will reveal data that is
"unique and critical to defense." 286 The regulations thus attempted to
reassure the scientific community that basic-research presentations
would be unrestricted, but in doing so they established an exception to
control such presentations.
In 1985, Congress renewed the EAA again. The Act had been due
for renewal in 1984, but Congress had been unable to agree on all the
Act's aspects. 287 A major point of contention centered on whether Defense's authority over export controls should be extended. 288 This obstaby reference Department of Defense Directive 5230.25 (Encl. 2)(6) (Nov. 6, 1984)); see also 32
C.F.R. pt. 250 (1989) (withholding of unclassified technical data from public disclosure).
283. The first implementation of section 1217(a) occurred in April 1985 when Defense required the Society of Photo-Optical Engineers to hold a closed session if the society wished
twenty-six scheduled papers to be presented. See Borrelle, DOD Disrupts SPJE Symposium, II
OPTICS NEws 10, 10 (May 1985). Entry to the session was by driver's license as proof of citizenship. See Klass, Defense Department Restricts Papers at SPJE Technical Confrrenre, 122 AviATION WEEK & SPACE TECH. 19, 19 (April 15, 1985). Canadian and United States scientists
could, alternatively, complete an Export-Controlled DOD Technical Data Agreement. Citizens of
other nations could only attend export-controlled sessions if their embassies requested the Pentagon to approve the registrant's attendance. See Borrelle, supra, at I 0.
284. See CHALK & GoULD, REPORT OF AN AAAS SURVEY OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL
MEETING POLICIES 5 (May 1986).
285. 32 C.F.R. pt. 249 (1989).
286. !d. § 249.3. The regulations also include a procedure for Defense to review voluntarily
submitted papers for national security concerns. !d. § 249.5(f).
287. A last minute attempt to renew the EAA failed due to disagreement between the Houses
on provisions concerning South Africa, the role of Defense in export administration(§ JO(g)), and
the effects of presidential foreign policy controls on current international contracts (e.g., agricultural commodities). See 130 CoNG. REC. Sl4,334 (daily ed. Oct. II, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Heinz); see also Gonzales, How to Increase Technology Exports Without Riskin[!; Sa tiona! Smuity-An In-Depth Look at the Export Administration Amendments Art of /985, 8 LoY. L.A.
INT'L & CoMP. L.j. 399, 412 (1986).
288. 131 CoNG. REc. H5062 (daily ed. June 27, 1985) (statement of Rep. Bereuter); .1ee
Zschau, supra note 145, at 14. The Senate bill contained many recommendations from Defense.
See id. The House was so adamant in its opposition to extending Defense's authority over export
controls that Zschau, a key Congressman in the debate, believes that the House would have forgone renewal of the EAA rather than pass a bill extending Defense's authority. See id. at 17.
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cle to the Act's renewal was removed when the President issued a classified order increasing Defense's export control authority to include
review of licenses for non-communist countries in addition to communist countries. 289 Defense had sought the authority so that Commerce
could no longer restrict its implementation of the EAA. 290
Hearings and debates on the EAA's renewal centered on the effects on commerce of export controls. In the face of growing concern
over the United States' competitiveness in high technology trade, 291 the
controls' effects on science became secondary once again. 292 A move to
statutorily adopt the Corson Report's criteria for determining militarily
critical technology failed. 293 The 1984 conference committee agreed,
however, that "scientists and other scholars [should be able] freely to
communicate their research findings . . . . " 294 House conference members insisted on a policy statement that "an overly broad interpretation
of the Export Administration Act may seriously limit, on grounds of
national security, the legitimate scientific communication process on
which scientific productivity in the United States depends." 2911 The
House conferees were convinced that classification powers and contract
and visa controls were "adequate to meet virtually all of our rrasonable
289. Str Zschau, supra note 145, at 19 & n.98; srr also Prrssurr Builds to Rnuu• Export
Controls Law, 43 CoNG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 320, 321 (1985); Gonzalez, supra note 287, at 41213.
290. Srr supra note 245 and accompanying text.
291. Srr Zschau, supra note 145, at 12-16; srr also FINAN, QuiCK & SANBERc;, THE U.S.
TRADE PosiTION IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY: 1980-1986, at 35-40 (prepared for the joint Economic
Committee of Congress 1986) (discussing the increasingly deleterious effects of export controls on
United States competitiveness in high-technology trade).
In December 1986, the National Academy of Sciences published a report concluding that
export controls had severely damaged American competitiveness in high-technology exports, and
had damaged relations with allied nations. Srr Norman, Acadrmy Ponrl Blasts U.S. Export Controls, 235 SCI. 424. 424 (1987). Defense, which had originally agreed to partially sponsor the
report, refused to pay the second half of its commitment and disavowed the report. Sre id.
292. SN supra text accompanying notes 127-30 (discussing primacy of concern over export
controls' effect on high-technology trade during 1979 renewal of EAA).
293. Representative Roth h<td offered the amendment which would have required the Secretary of Defense to consider removing technology from the MCTL if it met one or more of the
following tests:
(i) The transfer of goods and technology which would not lead to a significant nearterm improvement in the defense capability of a country to which exports are controlled
under this section.
(ii) Technology that is evolving slowly.
(iii) Technology that is not process-oriented.
(iv) Components used in militarily sensitive devices that in themselves are not sensitive.
Extrnsion Hrarings, supra note 29, at 1017; ser /(1. at 1075-76 (statement of Rep Roth).
294. Statement of the managers on proposed conference report on renewal of the Export
Administration Act, § 103-Policy, rrprintrd in 130 CoNG. REc. H12,150 (daily ed. Oct. 11,
1984).
295. !d.
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security needs. Any application of thf provisions of the Export Admin-

istration Act to traditional scifntific communication that dPviatfs from
the Pifws statfd hnf bears a hmvy burdm of justification to thf
Congrfss. " 296
Placing the strong language in the conference report rather than in
the Act diluted its value, however. The original policy statement
drafted for inclusion in the 1984 bill was not nearly as forthright. That
statement read: "It is the policy of the United States to sustain vigorous
scientific enterprise. To do so requires protecting the ability of scientists
and other scholars freely to communicate their research findings by
means of publications, teaching, conferences, and other forms of scholarly exchange." 297 In mid-1985, when the EAA was finally renewed,
the policy statement was greatly weakened. "Requires protection" was
replaced with "involves sustaining," and it was stated that research
findings could only be communicated "in accordance with applicable
provisions of law." 298
The EAA's half-hearted support of the freedom of American
scientists to communicate guaranteed nothing. The 1985 conference report did not mention the reasons for the policy statement because the
conferees limited the report to issues which divided the two Houses in
1985. 299 The strong statements against using export controls to restrict
scientific communications were repeated in Congress during considera296. !d. (emphasis added).
297. Srr Extnzsion Hfarings, supra note 29, at 1259. Laurence Brady, Assistant Secretary
of Commerce for Trade Administration, indicated that the administration would oppose the
amendment if it "would impede our ability to control the Oow of know-how, at the conference or
any other mechanism of that kind." !d. at 1263.
298. Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-64, § 103(5), 99 Stat.
120, 121 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(12) (Supp. V 1987)).
The President signed the Att on July 12, 1985. Trad1• Policy: Rmgan Signs Comjmmmr

Bill Rrauthorizinp; r:xport Administration Art, Daily Rep. Executives (BNA) No. 135, at L-3
(July 15, 1985). The Senate and House passed the Act agreed upon by the conference committee
on June 27, 1985. 131 CONG. Rn:. S8927 (daily ed. June 27, 1985); id. at H5063.
The EAA of 1979 had expired on September 30, 1983. Congress extended the Act several
times until March 30, 1984. The President then invoked the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, 50 U.S C. § 1702 (1982), to continue the EAA in force (current version at 50
U.S.C.A. § 1702 (West Supp. 1990)). 5ff Exec. Order 12,470, 49 Fed. Reg. 13,099 (1984). The
emergency controls were revoked by the President on the same day he signed the Act's renewal.
Srf Exec. Order 12,525, 50 Fed. Reg. 28,757 (1985).
299. Sn H.R. CoNF. REP. 180, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1985), rfjJnntfd in 1986 FS.
Com: CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws 108, 116; Iff also 131 CoNG. REc. S8'.123 (daily ed. June 27,
1985) (statement of Sen. Garn) (stressing that legislative history of Act's renewal spans two Congresses); id. at H5059 (statement of Rep. Bonker) (1985 Act is result of deliberations over two
Congresses). One commentator blames the lark of a strong statement against the use of export
controls on scientific communication on inadequate support of the statement hy the scientific and
academic communities. Srf Action on Export Controls, 128 Sci. NEWS 5, 5 (july 6, 1985).
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tion of the 1985 Act. 300 Their effect and the effect of the Act's weak
policy statement were even further diluted, however, by the 1985 conferees' reiteration of the prior committee's statement "not[ing] and emphasiz[ing] that educational institutions remain subject to the same controls and license requirements for technology transfers as all other
exporters." 301 This statement implies that export controls are appropriate on university campuses. Although the statement is contained in a
section of the report discussing universities' exemptions from reporting
agreements involving technical cooperation with foreign governments, 302
the language is broad enough to apply to all scientific communication.
More significantly, it appears to contradict the 1984 conference committee's statement that export controls should not be applied to academic science.
The Act requires the Secretary of Defense to review the MCTL
annually to remove technologies that are no longer militarily critical 303
and to integrate items on the MCTL into the Control List "with all
deliberate speed." 304 It also requires the Secretary of Defense to report
to Congress within a year on the integration and to remove controls on
goods and products as their respective technologies were controlled. 3011
Discretion for determining which technologies were militarily critical
remained in Defense. 306
Defense complied with the EAA by reviewing the MCTL to add
"newly developing technologies" with military significance, and to remove technologies that were no longer militarily critical. 307 Publication
of an unclassified version of the revised list was planned. 308

300. 131 CoNG. REC. 112005 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1985) (statement of Rep. Bonker).
301. H.R. REP. No. 180, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1985), rrprintrd in 1986 U.S. CoDE
CONG. & ADMIN. News 108, 118; srr 131 CON(. REC. H2007 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1985) (statement of Rep. Banker).
302. Srr H.R. CoNF. REP. 180, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 56, rrjnintrd in 1986 U.S. CODE
CoNG. &. ADMIN. NEWS 108, 118. The committee recognized that requiring universities to report
technical cooperation agreements could amount to prior restraint but reiterated its determination
that "colleges, universities, and other educational institutions . . must nevertheless obtain appropriate licenses before exporting any controlled technology, technical data, or goods." ld.
303. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(d)(5) (Supp. V 1987) (current version at 50 U.S.C.A. app. §
2404(d)(5) (West Supp. 1990)).
304. !d. § 2404(d)(4).
305. !d. § 2404(d)(6).
306. SPP id. § 2404(d)(5) (current version at 50 U.S.C.i\. app. § 2404(d)(5) (West Supp.
1990)). The Secretary of Defense was required to report to Congress within a year on the impact
of controlled countries receiving technolo~y or goods on the MCTL. Irl. § 2404(d)(7).
307. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, THE fY 1987 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROGRAM FOR
RESEARCH AND Dt:VELOPM~:NT Vl-19 (1986), rrprintrd in Drfmsr Drpartmmt Authoriwtion
and 01•rrsight: Hrarings on HR. 4428 Brforr thr Housr Co~run. on Annrd Srruicrs, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. 12, 134 (1986) [hereinafter Drjm1r /987 Authorization Hrarings].
308. !d. at Vl-20, Drjfnsr 1987 Authorization Hrarings, at 135.
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Integration of the MCTL and the Control List proved to be difficult because of the different natures of the two lists. The Control List is
a document compiled and used by Commerce to control, for nationalsecurity and foreign-policy reasons, the export of certain dual use products and technology. The MCTL, meanwhile, is a document containing
products and technology that Defense considers to be militarily critical.
Some, however, consider the MCTL to be "an exhaustive list of all
technologies with military utility . . . . " 309
The MCTL was not intended to be a control document. Commerce's attempts to translate the MCTL into technical data regulations, therefore, have been difficult to accomplish. Commerce first formulated an intermediate Critical Technical Data List 310 composed of
"MCTL arrays of know-how" that were defined ''with sufficient specificity" to be included in the Control List. 311 Controls were then to be
applied to the completed unclassified list "pursuant to the Bucy Report."312 One Commerce official suggested that the end result could be
regulations with nonexistent benefits. 313
It is not merely that integration of the MCTL and the Control
List is impractical-total integration was never possible. Defense often
requests State to place "volatile" technologies listed on the MCTL on
the Munitions List. This practice insures that the MCTL cannot be
integrated with the Control List because the Control List and the
Munitions List are mutually exclusive. 314
309. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SciENCt:S PANEL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL
SECURITY CONTROLS ON INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 27 (1987) [hereinafter
PANEL REPORT] (executive summary), rtjJrintrd in National Aradenn of Srimas Rrj;or/ on

Jntnnational TNhnology Trrl!lsjn; Hrarin[; Biforr thr Howr Comm. on Sritnrr, Spna, and
TNimalogy, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 33 (1987).
310. Srr Hmring' on H.R. 5167, supra note 3, at 1218 (statement of Edith Martin, Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Advanced Technology); .\PI' also Srimtifir Communications Hrarin[;, supra note 274, at 167 (statement of William Archey, Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Trade Administration).
311. Srr Srimtifir Communications Hraring, supra note 274, at 167 (statement of William
Archey, Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Trade Administration).
312. AMETAC Meeting of 25 July 1984, Memorandum for the Record 3 (july 26, 1984)
(statement of Monty Baltas, Office of Export Administration, Commerce).
313. Srr U.S. and Multilatnal Export Controls: Hear·ing Brfore the Subcomm. on International Eronomir Policy and Trade of tlu House Comm. on Forfign Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
29 ( 1985) (statement of William Archey, Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Trade
Administration).
314. See Export Contro/.1: Rrslrirtions on the Export of Critiml Terhnolo{;ifS, 22 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 411,416 (1981). The commentator noted that placing MCTL items on the Munitions
List circumvented Congress's mandate to integrate the MCTL into the Control List. Congress
contradicted itself at least once by ordering Defense-sponsored VHSIC technology research to be
placed on the Munitions List. Technology relating to VHSlC devices is listed in the MCTL. See
DEPARTMENT OF Dt:FENSE, supra note 11, at 2-2.
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While Congress was endorsing Defense's critical technologies approach, Defense had begun applying the approach to a new type of
information. As a corollary to prohibiting the export of sophisticated
computers to Soviet bloc nations, Defense and State attempted to restrict foreign access to certain supercomputers in the United States. The
efforts were aimed at preventing researchers from Soviet bloc nations
and China from learning the architectural structure of the supercomputers and using the computers as tools to break American codes or to
conduct defense-related research. 315
The supercomputers at issue were the first four supercomputers to
be placed on university campuses under an NSF program designed to
upgrade American scientific research. 316 Ironically, one reason for the
program was the discovery that American scientists often had to complete research on supercomputers overseas because of the limited academic access to supercomputers in the United States. 317 Thus, the barring of access to the NSF supercomputers did not prevent foreign
nationals from using the same technology in other locations because Soviet bloc nations and China could purchase time on supercomputers
located overseas 318 or owned by private industry in the United States. 319
When the NSF proposed insertion into the universities' contracts
of a clause denying both Soviet-bloc and Chinese citizens access to the
supercomputers, the universities refused to acquiesce. 320 Not only

315. Srr Goodwin, A.PS OjJJ;osrs Proposrd Hrstrirlions 011 .VSF Supnmmputns, 38 PHYSICS ToDAY 53, 53 (Dec. 1985); rj. Park, Suprrromfmlrrs and Suprrsrrrrry, 38 PHYSICS Ton A Y
144, 144 (Dec. 1985) (questioning whether Soviets would jeopardize their secret weapons research
by entering information on American supercomputers).
The issue of whether the supercomputers could be used to solve an adversary's defense
prnblems began changing in 1986 to whether an adversary's scientists and engineers should be
educated in the use of supercomputers. 5ff Willenbrock, Information Control and Trrhnolo[!;iral
Progrr'''· 3 IssuEs IN Sci. & TECH. 88, 94 (Fall 1986).
116. Frdrral SujHrromjmtn Pro,;rams and Polirirs: Hrarin{!; Brforr thr Suhcomm. on Enfr[;_\· Dfl•elopmrnt and A.jijilications and thr Suhromm. on Srinzrr, Rrsrarch, and Trchnolor;r of
thr Hou_,,, Co IIlii/. nn Srimrr and Trrluzolo[0', 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 ( 1985) [hereinafter
SuprrmmjJuta Hrnring1] (statement of Mary Good, Chairperson, Programs and Plans Commit-

tee, STET). The STET program included plans for supercomputers· on other university campuses
as well as for a national network to access the supercomputers. Srr Goodwin, supra note 315, at
54.
317. Sujincomputrr Hrnrinr;s, supra note 316, at 3 (statement of Rep. Boehlert); id. at 40
(statement of Mary Good, Chairperson, Programs and Plans Committee, NSF).
31 R. Sn Goodwin, sufna note 315, at 54.
319. Srr SuprrromfJutn Cnztrr.1: U.1r Facrs .Vational Srrurity Controls, 63 CHEM. & ENG'G
NFWS 4, 4 (July 1, 1985). About 135 supercomputers were in use in the mid-1980s, mostly in the
United States, Western Europe, and Japan. Srr Acadnnir Frrrdom, Washington Times, Sept. 6,
1985, at 3.
320 Sre :-.;orman, SufJrrromjmlrr Rrstrirtions Posr Proh/nn1 for XSF, l.inil•rrsitit.s, 229
SCI. 148, 148 (1985). The University of California at San Diego and Princeton University signed
the contracts agreeing to accept forthcoming federal policy on access to the supercomputers. Cor-
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would acquiescence have required the universities to police the activities
of some of their students and academicians, but it also would have set a
precedent of accepting federal controls on access to their research facilities and tools. 321 After months of negotiations, the NSF and the universities reached a compromise: controls over access were to be exercised
through visa restrictions, with access to the supercomputers closely
monitored. 322
In the meantime, however, the dispute spread overseas. Commerce
insisted that the University of London agree to bar the access of Soviet
bloc and Chinese nationals to an American-manufactured supercomputer that the university was purchasing. The supercomputer at issue
was a secondhand model already located in Great Britain at the time of
its purchase by the University of London. 323 The controls on supercomputers introduced a new dimension to the critical technologies approach: the denial of access to foreign nationals of specified academic
facilities and tools.
In late 1986, the Executive Branch attempted yet another information control. Knowledge of the control's existence did not become public, however, until a Defense official revealed that post-publication controls had been imposed on automated databases by an order of the
President's National Security Advisor. 324 The order controlled the ac-

nell University and the University of Illinois signed the contracts on condition that an agreement
on the controversial provision could be reached. Norman, 1/linoi,, Cornr/1 Sign Supncomputn
Crm/mrt,, 229 Sci. 538, 538 ( 1985).
321. Srr Goodwin, supra note 315, at 54; Knight & Park, Who Will Control thr Suprrcomputrrs, Washington Post, Aug. 17, 1985, at A19, col. 1.
322. Turner, Uni1•rnitirs Srrk Excrptions to Rulr Barring So1•iP!s from Suprrcomputrrs,
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 19, 1986, at 25, col. 1.
323. Srr Anderson, A.ngrr m•rr Suprrcmnputrr Vrto, 322 NATURE 401, 401 (1986). In 1988,
Congress ordered Commerce to amend the EAR to provide a definition of the term "supercomputer" for national security controls. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, § 2414, 50
U.S.C.A. app. § 2404(a)(6) (West Supp. 1990). Commerce proposed a definition in 1988, Fed.
Reg. 48,932 ( 1988), and after receiving comments, proposed a revised definition in 1990. 55 Fed.
Reg. 3019 (1990). According to the proposed revised definition, various levels of security safeguards may be imposed on the export of a supercomputer as a condition of export authorization.
The level would depend on the country of destination. !d. at 3020 (proposed rule at 15 C.F.R. §
776.10(d)(3))
324. Goodwin, Making Wm•rs: Poindrxtn Sails into Srimtifir Databases, 40 PHYSICS ToDAY 51, 51-52 (Jan. 1987). The order was issued without publication on October 29, 1986; its
existence was acknowledged on November 11, 1986, during an Information Industry Association
convention. !d.
In January 1985, a report by the Interagency Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee
recommended that the National Security Council direct agencies to stop the public release of potentially damaging scientific and technical data. Srr Gould, NTIS "Gi1•r-A.wa;o'' of Srimtific and
Trrhnical Information, 5 AAAS BuLL SCI. FREEDOM & NAT'L SECURITY 1, 1 (Mar. 1985). In
addition, the Secretary of Commerce criticized the National Technical Information Service
(NTIS) for operating a give-away program for the Soviets of American scientific and technical
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cess of foreign nationals to "sensitive information" in the databases.
Sensitive information was defined broadly to include unclassified data
involving national security and foreign affairs, as well as governmentderived information involving such subjects as economtcs and
agriculture. 3211
This national security order had a long history. In 1981, Defense
and the NSA had been concerned that adversaries were gaining easy
access to "the flood of unprotected telecommunications and automated
data processing information afloat in [the United States]." 326 A policy
was therefore formulated to control the processing and communication
of "sensitive information" in computer and automated databases. 327 In
1984, the policy survived the opposition of other federal agencies to
become National Security Decision Directive 145. 328 The directive subdivided sensitive information into two categories: ( 1) "classified national
security information" and (2) "other sensitive, but unclassified, Government or Government-derived information, the loss of which could
adversely affect the national security interest." 329 The Directive provided Defense with authority "to encourage, advise, and, where appropriate, to assist" private industry in identifying "sensitive nongovernment information." 330 The vulnerability of private systems was
to be evaluated, and measures for their protection were to be
suggested. 331
In late 19RS, Defense aided in the publication of a report identifydata. Some private automated databases purchase reports directly from the NTIS. Srr id.
325. Sn Computrr Suurity Policirs: Hraring Brforr thr Subcomm. on Transportation, A1•iatwn, and Matrria/.1 of thr Housr Comm. on Scirna and Tuhnology, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 51
( 1985) [hereinafter Computrr Srcurity Hraring] (statement of Donald Latham, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence). Sensitive data is defined by the order as
information the disclosure, loss, misuse, alteration or destruction of which could adversely affect national security or other Federal government interests. National security
interests are those unclassified matters that relate to national defense or foreign relations .
. Other government interests are those related but not limited to the wide
range of government or government-derived economic, human, financial, industrial, agricultural, technological and law enforcement information as well as the privacy or
confidentiality of personal or commercial proprietary information provided to the U.S.
government by its citizens.
Str Goodwin, suj;ra note 315, at 51.
326. Computrr Suurity Hraring, supra note 325, at 71.
327. /d. The Secretary based the policy on Presidential Directive 24, issued in 1977 by President Carter. He broadened the policy's goal of protected telecommunications to include computer
security and automated information systems security. /d. at 71-72.
328. /d. at 72; Sff id. at 31 (observing that "[i]t was a very difficult job pushing this [Directive] through the Government").
329. !d. at 72.
330. SPP id.
331. /d.
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ing private automated databases as a target of Soviet acquisition. 332 According to the report, the Soviets were able to attain sensitive information by aggregating information accessible through the various
databases. 333 A little over a year later, the National Security Decision
Directive was issued controlling access to the databases. Alerted by rumors that the controls would be imposed, 334 scientific societies, industries, and academia reacted angrily. As a result, the directive was withdrawn for further study ,3311 and defense officials assured scientists that
access would not be restricted to existing public databases. 336
In 1987, Congress reacted to Defense's (and NSA's) attempt to
control unclassified information in computer databases. The Computer
Security Act of 1987 provides that nothing in the Act or any amendments to it "shall be construed . . . to authorize any Federal agency to
limit, restrict, regulate, or control the collection, maintenance, disclosure, use, transfer, or sale of any information" in any form if the information is privately-owned, disclosable under the Freedom of Information Act or any other law that requires or authorizes public disclosure,
or is in the public domain. 337 The House Report accompanying the Act
clearly expressed distrust of Defense's and NSA's intentions in asserting control over civilian databases. 338 The Report noted that "[t]he apparently insatiable desire of the military for controlling information-whether classified or unclassified, whether government or
private-is the most convincing argument for [the Act]." 339
While the Computer Security Act was passing through Congress,
the Executive Branch introduced a new rationale for controlling infor-

332. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE, SoVIET ACQUISITION OF MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT WESTERN TECHNOLOGY: AN UPDATE (Sept. 1985); Sff Smith, Sm•iets Trzrgrt Campuse.l for lntelligrnce Operations, 230 SCI. 49, 49 (1985). The Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee is an interagency committee chaired by the CIA. See Memorandum to AAAS
Committee, supra note 280.
333. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER INTELLIGENCE CoMMITTEE, supra note 332, at 17; see Willenbrock, supra note 315, at 93-94; Re{{ulating Acass to Computa Databases, AAAS BuLL. ON
ACCESS TO Sci. & TECH. INFO. 4, 4 (Summer 1986 ).
334. SN Turner, Pmtagon Planning to Restrict Access to Public Databases, CHRONICLE oF
HIGHER EDUC., jan. 21, 1987, at I, col. 2.
335. See Engelberg, Administration Rescinds Plan to Restrict Computer Data Flow, The
Oregonian, Mar. 18, 1987, at A I 0, col. I. The FBI had begun implementing the order by inquiring into the use of automated databases at the State University of New York at Buffalo by an
Iraqi student. SN id.; Turner, effort to Limit Access to Unclassified Databases Drnu•s Criticism,
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 4, 1987, at 12, col. J.
336. See The Sa{{a of NSDD 145, The Poindexter Memorandum, and HR 145 (and a
Classified Air Forrr Stud;•), 10 AAAS BuLL. AccESS TO SCI. & TECH. INFO. 5, 7 (Spring 1987).
337. Pub. L. No. 100-235 § 8, 101 Stat. 1724, 1725.
338. H.R. REP. No. 153(11), 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1987 U.S. CoDE CoNG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 3157, 3159, 3165-66.
339. ld. at 18, reprinted in 1987 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3170.
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mation. In opening the Federal Conference on Commercial Applications of Superconductors, President Reagan proposed an amendment to
the Freedom of Information Act which would have permitted the withholding of "commercially valuable scientific and technical information"
by laboratories owned and operated by the federal government. 3 ·w
Thus, information would be subject to restriction for purely economic
reasons with no requirement of a national security justification.
Pursuant to the President's proposal, the Justice Department began drafting a legislative proposal to amend the Freedom of Information Act. 341 Enactment of such a proposal could jeopardize the success
of American research in superconductivity because many scientists involved in the research are foreign graduate students and researchers. 342
Their forced withdrawal from research would thus be detrimental to
America's interest rather than advantageous. 343
In 1988, Congress amended the EAA under pressure from the
business community. Under the amendments, the Secretary of Defense
reviews goods and technologies on the MCTL on an ongoing basis,
instead of annually, to determine which goods and technologies may be
removed from the list. 344
The 1988 amendments also altered the procedure for referrals to
the President by the Secretary of Defense. If the Secretary of Defense
disagrees with the Secretary of Commerce on an item on the Control
List, the Secretary of Defense has twenty days after receiving notification from the Secretary of Commerce to refer the matter to the President for resolution. 3411 Similarly, if the Secretary of Defense disagrees
with the proposed export of "any goods or technology to any country to
which exports are controlled for national security purposes," the Secretary has twenty days to recommend to the President and the Secretary
of Commerce that the export be approved, conditionally approved, or
disapproved. 346 The President need no longer report to Congress if he
340. See Relax Controls on Srimtific Communication, 4 IssuES IN Sci. & TECH. 9, 10
(Winter 1988) (letter of Robert Park, Executive Director, American Physical Society).
341. Sn id. Private parties who have submitted "confidential commercial information" to the
United States Government may object to disclosure of that information before an agency discloses
it pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request. "Confidential commercial information" is
material that arguably contains information exempt from the Freedom of Information Act because
"its disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause substantial competitive harm." Exec. Order
No. 12,600, 52 Fed. Reg. 23,781 (1987), rfprintfd in 5 U.S.C. § 552 note (Supp. V 1987).
342. Sn McDonald, Srimtists Opposf Rmgan's Plan to Limit ForPipurs' Acrrss to Data
Ojijiosfd by Scinzllsts, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER Eouc., Sept. 9, 1987, at 1, col. 2.
343. 5ff {ifllfrally PANEL REPORT, supra note 309, at 17 (noting that foreign scientists in
American laboratories help rather than hinder the national interest).
344. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2404(d)(5) (West Supp. 1990).
345. !d. at § 2404(c)(2).
346. Jd. at § 2409(g)(2).
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modifies or overrules the Secretary of Defense's recommendation. 347 In
other provisions of the EAA amendments, Congress emphasized that
export controls must be effective by stressing multilateral controls over
unilateral controls and by providing authority for the President to negotiate with fellow governments in Cocom to achieve more effective
controls. 348
Controls over scientific information tend to draw less public attention today than they did during the early and mid-1980s. However, as
noted in a 1988 report by the Association of American Universities, the
controls continue to expand. 349 Despite regulations defining the power
to control scientific information more narrowly than in the early 1980s,
there is no indication that Defense and other agencies intend to halt the
continued expansion of information controls enforced by them. Indeed,
the list of agencies involved continues to grow. 3 ~° Congress demonstrated its resolve to restrict the use of export controls that were ineffective in preserving the United States' national security when those controls hurt the United States' competitiveness as an exporter. Congress
should similarly restrict the use of ineffective and destructive controls
on scientific communication.
347. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 2425(a)(4),
I 02 Stat. II 07, 1360.
348. Srr 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2404(1) (West Supp. 1990); m also 55 Fed. Reg. 25,083 (1990)
(interim rule amending EAR to reduce licensing requirements on trade with cocom countries); id.
at 12.635 (removing validated export licensing requirements for east-west export of certain low
capacity hard disc drives)
349. S. & :-.1 Spence, Gmnn111n1t !nfonnation Contro/.1: flnjJ/imtiom fin Srholarship, Sci.
& Tech. (1988); srr Walsh, Grou•th of !nforlllation Mruw{(l'llltnl hy Gm•rrnment Pillorird in
Rrport, 240 SCI. 595, 595 (1988).
350. Srr 32 C.F.R. § 24<J.4(h) (1989) ("[r]efrain from interfering with the planning and
organizing of meetings sponsored and conducted by nongovernment organizations"); 15 C.F.R. pt.
779 & Supp. 5 ( 1990) (requiring validated licenses for scientific information only in specified
instances, but establishing the applicability of export controls on university campuses).
The National Security Advisor aided an attempt to control unclassified data in private
databases. Srr, !'.[;., sujna note 324 and accompanying text. The FBI then attempted to enforce
the "'ational Security Advisor's directive by subpoenaing an employee at the State University of
New York at Buffalo to provide information on searches of databases by a foreign student. Sn
H.R. REP. :\o. 153(1I), IOOth Cong .. 1st Sess. 15, rrprintrd in 1987 U.S. CooF. CoNG. & ADMIN. :-.iEWS 3157, 3167. Even though the directive was subsequently withdrawn after strong opposition, the FBI continued to play a role. In 1988, the FBI published a report to persuade librarians to report on foreign nationals who checked out technical books. Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Library Awareness Program Report (1988); Iff Spyinp; in thr Stacks, Time, May
30, 1988, at 23.
Before Defense and its NSA had been prevented by Congress from controlling unclassified
information in private databases, the National Security Advisor and the FBI had not played such
a prominent role in controlling scientific information.
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LEGALITY OF THE CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES APPROACH

Defense's Authority to Control Scientific Communications

Evolution of the critical technologies approach has resulted in a
synergistic concentration of massive power in Defense. 3111 The MCTL
has become the basis of both the Cocom export control list and the
Control List (the MCTL has a ninety-five percent correlation with the
Control List). 3112 There seem to be no limitations upon Defense's authority over export of Munitions List items (such as the VHSIC program) or its advisory authority over dual-use items. When items are
removed from the IT AR, their control is transferred to the EAR. 3113
Similarly, civilian technology that approximates military technology is
subject to the EAR. 3114
Scientific information from any Defense-sponsored research falling
under any export control law can be suppressed by Defense, 31111 and any
information that may potentially be subject to classification can be
"safeguarded" for thirty days, even if the information is not subsequently classified. 3116 Similarly, scientific information developed in private research is subject to export control laws. 3117 Defense's power over
exports is not limited to exports to communist countries, but extends to
America's allies as well. 3118 The penalties of imprisonment and heavy
351. Ser Department of Defense Directive No. 2040.2(A)(I) (Jan. 17, 1984).
352. Transfrr of Technology Hearings, supra note I, at 195-96 (attachment to letter from
Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, to Senator Sam
Nunn (July 16, 1984)).
353. See High TPChnology Hearings, supra note 25, at 163 (statement of Ernest Johnston,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs). Mr. Johnston stated, "If
an item is taken off the munitions list, and occasionally there are bills in Congress which do this,
we pick them up on the list that is administered by the Department of Commerce." /d.
354. See 48 Fed. Reg. 28,633 (1983) (providing that VHSIC and related technical data not
meeting !TAR criteria are subject to EAR).
355. See 32 C.F.R. §§ 250.1 to .9 (1989). The directive states:
[T]he Secretary of Defense may withhold from public disclosure, notwithstanding any
other provision of law, any technical data with military or space application in the
possession of, or under the control of, the Department of Defense, if such data may not
be exported lawfully without an approval, authorization, or Iic~nse under E.O. 12470
or the Arms Export Control Act. However, technical data may not be withheld under
this section if regulations promulgated under either the Order or Act authorize the
export of such data .
/d. at § 250.4(a).
356. See Department of Defense Directive No. 5200.1, DOD 5200.1-R, DOD Information
Security Program, Regulation, 32 C.F.R. § 159a.IO(a)(2) (1989). Security classifications pursuant
to Defense Directive 5200.1-R do not preclude use of distribution statements under Defense Directive 5230.24. See Department of Defense Directive No. 5230.24 (Encl. 2)(4) (Nov. 20, 1984).
357. The EAR and the !TAR do not differentiate between governmem-sponsored and private technical data.
358. See Announcement Concerning Licensing and Enforcement Procedures, 20 WEEKLY
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fines contained in the ITAR 369 and EAR 360 appear to be superimposed
over all controls exercised by Defense. 361 The MCTL, which is only a
guide, has been used on at least one occasion as a control 362 and the
MCTL's integration with the Control List assures its use as a control.
Controls beginning in Defense have a tendency to extend to all
other federal agencies. 363 Once established, controls may be reduced in
the face of a hostile reaction from scientific societies and academia, but
they do not generally disappear. 364 They are thus cumulative as well as
pervasive.
The controls expand by various means. Sometimes a control focuses on a specific means of scientific communication, such as foreign
graduate students 366 or supercomputers. 366 Other controls focus on a
process by which science is communicated such as symposia 367 or the
CoMP. PRES. Doc. 420, 420 (Mar. 23, 1984).
359. SPr 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (Supp. IV 1986); 22 C.F.R. § 127.3 (1990).
360. Sff 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987); 15 C.F.R. §§ 787.1 to .14
(1990); 55 Fed. Reg. 25,086 ( 1990) (interim rule amending 15 C.F.R. § 787.13).
361. SPr 32 C.F.R. § 250.9(b) (1989). The notice to be attached to controlled data states in
pertinent part:
(a) Export of information contained herein, which includes, in some circumstances, release to foreign nationals within the United States, without first obtaining approval or
license from the Department of State for items controlled by the International Traffic
In Arms Regulations (ITAR), or the Department of Commerce for items controlled by
the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), may constitute a violation of law.
(b) Under 22 U.S.C. 2778 the penalty for unlawful export of items or information
controlled under the ITAR is up to 2 years imprisonment, or a .fine of $100,000, or
both. Under 50 U.S.C., Appendix 2410, the penalty for unlawful export of items or
information controlled under the EAR is a fine of up to $1,000,000, or five times the
value of the exports, whichever is greater; or for an individual, imprisonment of up to
10 years, or a fine of up to $250,000, or both.
/d. at § 250.9(a)-(b). SPP [!;fllfrally Chalk, SPcurity and Scimtific Cmnmunicalion, 39 BuLL.
ATOM. Scr. 19, 20 (Aug.-Sept. 1983) (describing individual scientists being advised of possibility
of violating the IT AR).
362. Srf gmaally Rfstrirtions on TPchniwl Papprs Raisf Concerns, 118 AviATION WEEK
& SPACf: TECH. 22, 22 (1983) (describing reference to MCTL on summary of proceedings of
conference held by National Bureau of Standards Center for Materials Science).
363. SeP supra notes 322-34 and accompanying text (sensitive data on automated databases).
364. SPP supra notes 282-84 (establishing the existence of export-controlled sessions at scientific meetings). Comparr .1upra note 277 and accompanying text (noting that classification of
ongoing research would be "a very, very remote possibility") with S. SPENCE & M. SPENCE,
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION CONTROLS: IMPLICATIONS FOR SCHOLARSHIP, SCIENCE, AND
TECHNOLOGY (1988) (noting the growing tendency by federal agencies to classify ongoing
research).
365. Srr supra note 195 and accompanying text.
366. Srr supra note 322 (controls on access to supercomputers); sff also Norman, Sm•irts
Disi1witfd to Join Drilling Prof!:ram, 236 Sci. 659, 660 (1987) (reporting that Defense disinvited
Soviet participation in oceanographic research program because of technologies aboard research
vessel).
367. Sff supra notes 268, 283-86 and accompanying text.
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publication of research in scientific journals. 368 Other controls expand
the scope of controlled information, for example, an expansion of controlled research to include "sensitive" technical data 369 or creation of a
new rationale for controlling scientific information. 370 The result is that
the controls that first affected only a small percentage of scientists have
become broad enough to affect almost the entire scientific
community. 371
Throughout the history of Defense's critical technologies approach
to suppressing scientific information, Congress has encouraged rather
than stemmed the controls. Defense and other agencies have been allowed to infer from the statutes creating the IT AR and the EAR authority to control transfer of what they determine to be critical scientific
information and technology. Congress has statutorily adopted the critical technologies ·approach 372 and has granted Defense additional powers
to control scientific information. 373 Although Congress has at times expressed concern over the extent of controls asserted by Defense, it has
never reduced the power of Defense to control scientific communication.
Defense's influence and power have continued to expand.
As a result of both congressional action and inaction, Defense has
gained the authority to control scientific communications whenever it
perceives a threat to the national security. Having been severely criticized by Congress in 1978 for its narrow definition of "national security ," 374 Defense has responded by broadening the definition
infinitely. 37 ~

368. See sufna note 272 and accompanying text.
369. Sn supra notes 335-36 (treatment of sensitive data on automated databases).
370. Sn supra note 230 and accompanying text (permitting agencies to "safeguard" information pending a decision to classify); supra note 340 and accompanying text (proposing control
of information for economic reasons).
371. Sn Long, Scimtific Frndom: Focus of National Saurity Cr111trols Shifting, 63 Cm:M.
& ENG'G NEws 7, 10 (july 1, 1985).
372. Ser 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(d) (1982 & West Supp. 1990).
373. See supra notes 281-82 and accompanying text(§ 1217(a)); notes 192-93 and accompanying text (VHSIC program).
374. Srr supra notes 103-07 (Dresser export licenses).
375. Sn 130 CoNG. REc. H7716 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983) (statement of Rep. Courter)
(recommending adoption of definition of "detrimental to national security" for EAA). Emerson.
Commmt on "Arrr;s to Classifird Information: Constitutional and Statutory Dimensions," 26
WM. & MARY L. REV. 845, 846 (1985) (arguing that the "term 'national securitv' is virtually
without limitation"). See gnzrrally Relyea, /ncrmsrd Natimwl Snurity Controls on Scinztijic
Commummtwns, 1 Gov'T INFO. Q. 177, 181-82 (1984) (describing national security as phrase of
convenience for federal lawmakers that is subject to broad interpretation by executive officials). Cj.
Relyea, Shrouding thr EndiPSs Frontirr-Scimtific Communication and National Security: Considrrationsfor a Policy Balance ShPPt, 1 Gov'T INFO. Q. 1, 7 (1984) (suggesting that the "underlying principle of any policy permitting the government to apply national security restrictions to
the communication of scientific research findings or knowledge should be to maintain the security
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Constitutional Analysis

The critical technologies approach and the EAA's regulation of
scientific speech must be analyzed in the context of their constitutionality.376 In order to make a proper assessment of the constitutionality of
government action, a general theory of the constitutional clause at issue
must be established. This, of course, will be especially difficult in the
area of free speech and free press; because these notions have been subjected to such divergent centrifugal forces, an architecturally coherent
and principled approach to first amendment litigation is commonly
thought impossible. Some scholars, for example, maintain that it is
impossible to discern, much less to reconstruct or create, a general principle that will integrate and harmonize the myriad of disparate Supreme Court opinions on free speech during the past fifty years. 377 But
this does not preclude a working definition of the political free speech
principle. One of these scholars who despairs of finding an overarching
principle of free speech recognizes that political speech constitutes the
of scientific progress").
376. To review the statutory and administrative structure that can lead to restrictions on
scientific speech, see supra text accompanying notes 8-9, 12-13, 22-24, 28, 41-70, 135-149, 16970, 176-77, 189-92, 196, 203, 227-30, 263-71, 275, 281-82, 285-86, 298, 303-306, 354-61, 372.
377. Sff Magee, Book Review, 4 CoNST. CoMMENTARY 422, 423 (I 987) (reviewing L.
BoLLINGER, THE ToLERANT SoCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ExTREMIST Srn:cH IN
AMERICA (1986)) (concluding that "[t]he highs and lows of the Court's roller coaster adjudication
of free speech claims of the last five decades would seem to foreclose any possibility of theoretical
integrity in that realm.
. "); BeVier, Thf First Ammdmmt and Politiwl Spfah: An Inquiry
into thf Substana and Limits nfPrinciplf, 30 STAN. L. REv. 299, 300 (1978) (stating that "[a]
carefully articulated conception of the basic purposes of the amendment is essential to first amendment adjudication and commentary" and that the various "tests" fashioned by the Supreme Court
need to be informed by normative speech principles or they will not be capable of effectively
guiding judicial decisionmaking); Freund, Thf Grmt Disorda of Spfah, 44 AM. ScHOLAR 541
(1975); Schauer, CatfgoriPs and thf First Ammdmrnt: A Play in Thrff Acts, 34 VAND. L. REv.
265, 266 n.5 (I 981) (stating that we should be concerned with the normative content of the first
amendment, for without an appreciation of its "substantive underpinnings," it is difficult to structure a coherent body of free speech jurisprudence); Sunstein, Pornograph)' and thf First Ammdmmt, 1986 DuKE L.J. 589, 605-06 (I 986) (stating that "it would be difficult to imagine a sensible system of free expression that did not distinguish among categories of speech in accordance
with their importance to the underlying purposes of the free speech guarantee" and that "any
attempt to distinguish among categories of speech must start with an effort to isolate what is
uniquely important about speech in the first place").
Justice Antonin Scalia has indicated that the new multiplicity of categories of speech protected by the first amendment has played havoc with the "prediction theory" of law. Scalia, A
Housf u•ith Mmn Mansions: CatfgoriPs of Spnch Under thf First Ammchnmt, in THE CoNSTITUTION, THE LAW, AND FRU:DOM OF EXPRESSION 1787-1987, at 9, 18 (j. Stewart ed. 1987).
Moreover, the difficulty of prediction (or the unlikelihood of any regularity of analytical result) is
compounded because "the dfgref of 'heightened' or 'reduced' protection that the various categories
entail is entirely unspecified and inherently unspecifiable . . . . The calculation is indeed so ineffable that it may seem more to resemble a jury determination on a matter such as whether negligence was proven than a court determination of what the Constitution requires." Jd.
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original defense of freedom of speech. 378 If the political speech principle
cannot unify the disparate decisions, it can at least provide a compass
for adjudication and aid the categorization approach used by the modern Court to address novel free speech claims. 379 This approach categorizes different varieties of speech and assigns a requisite level of protection based on the importance of that variety of speech to the purposes
promoted by the first amendment. 380
The analysis of this article is based upon the premise that has for
many American scholars been the touchstone of constitutional construction, viz., that an expositor of a constitutional document should, first
and foremost, attempt to discover and apply the original intent of its
framers and adopters. 381 The authors subscribe to the theory of
378. Magee, supra note 377, at 424. Briefly, the "political speech principle" rubric expresses
the historical attachment to public debate on political topics as the special, if not exclusive, object
of first amendment protection. For a discussion of the political speech principle, see infra notes
391-97 and accompanying text.
379. For a discussion of the taxonomization or categorization approach to first amendment
analysis, see generally Scalia, supra note 377.
380. See generally Schauer, supra note 377.
381. The authors of this article adhere to the traditional touchstones of constitutional interpretation: "the intent of those who framed and ratified the instrument and the meaning attached to
the constitutional language at the time the instrument was adopted." Peebles, A Call to High
Debate. The Organic Constitution in Its Fonnath•e Era, 1890-1920, 52 U. CoLo. L. REv. 49,
49 n.1 (1980); sn Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitutwn, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1331,
1357 (1988) ("In analyzing [a] constitutional issue, the starting point is .
the language and
history of the Constitution."). To employ the currently accepted, but somewhat confusing, rubric,
this article proceeds from the theory of interpretivism, which is essentially the academician's
phrase for the approach to constitutional decisionmaking commonly known as "strict construction"
or "original understanding." See Brest, The Misconcei;•ed Quest for the Original Unrlerstrmrlin[!;,
60 B.U.L. REv. 204, 204 & n.1 (1980) (maintaining that interpretivism "describe[s) essentially
the same concept" as originalism, viz., "the familiar approach to constitutional adjudication that
accords binding authority to the text of the Constitution or the intention of the adopters"). For a
deft evisceration of the confusing interpretivist-noninterpretivist terminology, see L. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION XV (1988).
We reject the recent theory of constitutional interpretation known as "noninterpretivism."
This theory is usually advanced as a necessary departure from text and history in order to safeguard some implicit or underlying constitutional right or value. See gmerally Grey, Do \\'e Hm•e
an Unwrittm Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. R~:v. 703 (1975).
Of course, this approach entirely ignores the necessity of linking judicial decisionmaking to
grants of authority from "We the People." See Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power
of the judiciary, 7 HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 87 (1984).
One problem hardly ever addressed, much less resolved, by noninterpretivists is why and on
what grounds the citizenry should respect and follow a modern judge's language and constitutional
meanings more than the formulations and meanings left by our Founding-Era forbearers embraced within the Preamble's "We the People." See Anastaplo, On Speech and Lau• in a Free
S()(ift_Y, 3 WINDSOR Y.B. OF AcCESS TO jUST. 436, 449 (1983) (reviewing F. HAIMAN, SPEECH
AND LAW IN A FREE SociETY (1981)). In short, why should a modern judge's understanding be
preferred to the original understanding~ One of the few noninterpretivists to address this problem
is John Hart Ely, who contends that a judge's adherence to tradition is undemocratic because it
allows "yesterday's majority . . . [to) control today's." J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
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"originalism;" 382 thereby, we satisfy the requirement that any argument about the meaning of a particular constitutional provision "must
be both guided and confined . . . by an overarching general theory
about the criteria for legitimate constitutional decisionmaking." 383 Pur-

THEORY OF jUDICIAL REVIEW 62 ( 1980). But the legitimacy of judicial review in a democracy
hinges on the judge's application of the highest expression of the people's will in a written constitution. Alexander Hamilton's early defense of judicial review, see THE FED~~RALIST No. 78, at
524 (A. Hamilton) (j. Cooke ed. 1961), and Chief Justice John Marshall's similar defense in
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176-78 (1803), implicitly assume that the ratifying
citizens of 1787-1788 formed a super-majority that established an Urtext, namely, our national
Constitution.
Moreover, as William E. Nelson has demonstrated, the original understanding of judicial
review based on a written constitution was not an anti-democratic notion. Although judicial review
has been regarded as essentially a countermajoritarian device since the Civil War, during the early
years of the Republic it was not so regarded. Prior to 1820,
[t]he concern of judges in . . constitutional cases was with the potentiality of conflict
between legislators and their constituents~with the possibility that faithless legislators
might betray the trust placed in them by the people. The perceived purpose of judicial
review was to protect the people from such possible betrayals, not to interpose obstacles
in the path of decisions made by the people's agents in due execution of their trust.
Nelson, Chan[;ill[; Conrejilions oj judirial Re<•if11': The E<•olution of Constitutional Theory in the
Stales 1790-1860, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 1166, 1177 (1972). Thus, prior to the Civil War, the
citizens regarded courts as an institution necessary for striking down legislative acts when the
legislature had failed to represent the true interests of the people or when it had acted contrary to
the principles of civic virtue by succumbing to powerful special interests rather than to the people's requests that it advance the general good of the polity. !d. at 1177-81. Pursuant to this
"original understanding," judicial review can be seen as an entirely democratic process; therefore,
Professor Nelson's findings recall to us a lost heritage whereby the actions of courts, even in
striking down the acts of popular legislatures, can be seen as a proper part of the democratic
process.
Likewise, Alexander M. Bickel's rubric of judicial review as a "countermajoritarian" device
and his call for judges "to immerse themselves in the tradition of our society and of kindred
societies that have gone before," A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: TH~: SUPREME
CouRT AT THE BAR OF Poi.ITICS 236 (1962), have been commonly regarded as anti-democratic;
but this characterization is accurate only if, pace Professor Ely, one regards our society as consisting only of those presently living. On the other hand, if one follows G.K. Chesterton's "social
compact" argument for an intergenerational republic, a "democracy of the dead," whereby the
relevant community is expanded to include those who have come before as well as those presently
living, then judicial review based on text and history should be regarded as democratic in the sense
of a society's fullest participation, across time, in its own governance.
Moreover, those who protest against the rule of men long dead never level their protests
against such basic decisions of the Founders as the idea that we should be governed by a tripartite
government of separated and balanced powers. Instead, the protest is almost exclusively leveled
against the Bill of Rights as an exclusive list of rights that can be protected by the federal judiciary. But the "mortmain" protesters only want the Bill of Rights to be applied expansively; they do
not at all want federal judges or other officials to ignore or "cut back" on the liberties and protections contained in the Bill of Rights. On that point, even the protesters are quite content to be
bound by the intent of the long-dead Framers. See Bork, The Constitution, Ori[;inal 1ntmt, and
Economic Ri[;hls, 23 SAN DIEGO L. R~:v. 823, 827 (1986). See also infra note 390.
382. Ser supra note 381 (discussing interpretivism and originalism).
383. BeVier, An lnfimnnl Public, an Informing Prrss: Thr Search j{ir a Constitutional
Principle, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 482, 499 (1980) (footnote omitted). Sre ir/. at 499-500; BeVier,
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suant to the "originalist" theory of constitutional adjudication, constitutional rules are legitimate only if they are anchored to principles that
are derived from the text or history of the document or from the structure of government it prescribes. 384 Since the turn of this century the
Supreme Court has increasingly used history and original intent in its
constitutional decisionmaking, 3811 often recognizing that an understanding of Colonial and Revolutionary-Era history are relevant and important to a proper elucidation of the Constitution, 386 including the first

sujna note 377, at 304-05 (concluding that confining the premises of constitutional adjudication to
history, text, and structure is mandated by the quest for constitutional legitimacy in view of the
Court's countermajoritarian power of judicial review); Bork, Nrutml PrinrijJlrs and Somr First
Amnulmmt Problrms, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971) (basing constitutional principles on text and original
intent out of a concern for constitutional legitimacy, which concern must inform all constitutional
decisionmaking). For other commentators who advocate an "original understanding" approach to
constitutional adjudication and analysis, see Grano, judicial RfJ'ifw and a \Vrittnz Constitution
in a Dnnocratic Somty 28 WAYNE L. REv. 1 (1981); Kay, Adlzanzrf to thf Original Jntnztions
zn Con,titutzonal Adjudirntion: Thrff ObjPCtions and Rrsponsrs 82 Nw. U.L. REv. 226 (1988);
Maltz, Forruwrl: Thr Appral ofOriginalism 1987 UTAH L. REv. 773,774 (maintaining that the
case against original intent as a theory of constitutional meaning is "weaker" than its proponents
allow and that originalism is itself "a perfectly plausible approach to constitutional adjudication");
Maltz, Thr Failurr of Attacks on Constitutional Originalism, 4 CoNST. CoMMENTARY 43
(1987); Maltz, Somr Nrw Thoughts on an Old Prohlnn-Thr Rolr ofthr hztmt ofthr Framrrs
in Constitutional Throry, 63 B.U.L. REV. 811 (1983); Monaghan, Our Prrfrct Constitution, 56
N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 374-87 (1981) (arguing that the nature of the Constitution, as our highest
organic law, itself mandates adherence to the text and the intent of its Framers and Ratifiers);
Nelson, History and Nrutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 1237 (1986);
Rehnquist, Thr Notion of a Li1•ing Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REV. 693, 694-706 (1976); Van
Alstyne, Congrrssional Powa and Frrr Sprrch: Lr1'y's Legacy Rruisitrd (Book Review), 99
HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1986).
Professor Van Alstyne rebuts the Rralpolitik views of noninterpretivists-i.e., the arguments
that judges are not bound by history and that the first amendment means what the judges say it
means-by making several common-sense observations about human nature once it dons the robe:
"judges are human and will generally prefer to think that what they say is not a falsification of
the document they are called upon to apply, but is at least in reasonably close keeping with its
spirit. On this basis alone, history is scarcely avoidable. Unless one takes an interest in what the
first amendment was meant to do,
. one cannot know whether the interpretation
comes
reasonably close to the spirit of the thing." !d. at 1099.
384. Srr sujna note 381. We endorse a theory of constitutional interpretation grounded in
the popular sovereignty and legislative supremacy accepted by the entire political spectrum in our
Founding Era. Srr R. BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FoUNDERs' Dt:SIGN 14 (1987) (describing the
legislative branch as the "darling of the Founders"); G. Woon, THE CREATION oF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 18-19, 24-26, 139, 162-63, 446-68, 453, 598-600 (1969); Presser,
A Talr of Two Judgfs: Richard Prtrrs, Sam uri Chasr, and thr Brokrn Promisr of Frdrralist
jurisprudnza, 73 Nw. U.L. REv. 26, 27-30 (1978) (remarking on the virtually universal adherence to popular sovereignty in the early national period); Scheiber, Fnlrrali.11n and thr Constitution: Thr Origmal Undrrstanding, in AMERICAN LAW AND THE CoNSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HisTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 85, 98 (L. Friedman & H. Scheiber eds. 1978) (stating that in the late
1780s there existed an "ideological consensus in favor of self-government on libertarian, republican principles that marked Federalist and Antifederalist thought alike").
385. Note, Of History and Dur Proms, 63 IND. L.J. 369, 386 (1987).
386. Srr, r.g., United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441-46 (1965) (using English and
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amendment. 387
The final, and perhaps the most important, reason for adhering to
the interpretive theory of originalism is the attachment of the American
people to this view of the Constitution. Even a leading advocate of the
orthodoxly expansive reading of the speech and press clauses of the
First Amendment appeals to the original intent and understanding of
the Framers and Ratifiers, 388 for otherwise "his position will be dismissed by the 'sober majority' as an irresponsible shift of meaning and
authority." 389 It is one thing to argue that scholars and judges should
ignore the deep cultural sentiments of the American people when these
are clearly out of step with republican principles, or when their beliefs
stand athwart a clear command of the Constitution; it is quite another
thing, however, to ignore the sober sentiment of the American people
when it is dedicated to a fundamental "social contract" belief like the
idea of "original understanding." Indeed, a good case can be made that
the "contractarian" sentiments of the vast majority of Americans are
more keenly attuned to the original justifications for judicial review
contained in Thf FPdPralist No. 78 and in Marbury v. Madison 390
American mnstitutional history to aid in the interpretation of article 1, section 9, clause 3 of the
Constitution, the bill of attainder clause); SPP also j. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 181, at 135 (abridged ed. 1833) ("The first and fundamental
rule in the interpretation of all instruments is, to construe them according to the sense of the
terms, and the intention of the parties.").
387. Str, P.fi.• New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964) (relying on L.
LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 258 ( 1960)).
388. Sn F. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAw IN A FREE SociETY 176 (1981) (referring to how
the first amendment "was intnzrlrrl to be treated" (emphasis added)); irl. at 234 (describing "the
public dialogue the First Amendment was drsignrd to secure" (emphasis added)).
389. Anastaplo, supra note 381, at 448.
390. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 ( 1803). For a discussion of Alexander Hamilton's justification of
judicial review in a constitutional republic, see Barber, judicial Rr1•irw and thr Frdaalist, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 836 ( 1988). The orthodox approach to constitutional judicial review, at least since
Frrlaa/ist No. 78, has been that the legislative branch should make law and policy, while the
judiciary should only stand athwart that popular process "when the Constitution fairly can be
interpreted (in light of its text, structure, history, and purposes) as foreclosing the course of action
adopted by representative institutions." McConnell, Frdrrali.1m: ENiluatin[; thr Foundas' Dr'ifi11 !Book Review), 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1487 (1987).
This traditional understanding of the purpose and legitimacy of judicial review can be justified by the same argument that supplies the best answer to the rhetorical question beloved of
noninterpretivists: "How can a constitution that was written over 200 years ago properly be said
to govern our different world today?" Srr Dry, Frdrralism and thr Cmzstitutirm: Thr Foundrrs'
Dr;~[;n and Contt)l(porary Constitutional Law, 4 CoNST. CoMMt:NTARY 233, 233 (1987). The
justification and solution of both problems are exactly the same. The Constitution should be enforced by the courts as the supreme legal command of an Un•olk, "a past extraordinary majority"
that has made certain basal judgments for their nation and their posterity. Morgan, S\•mpo.sium-Coll.ltitutional Srholarship: What Nrxt?, 5 CoNST. CoMMENTARY 64, 66 (1988). This is
precisely Hamilton's justification for judicial review where there are clear conOicts between Acts
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than are the noninterpretivist notions of some modern constitutional
scholars. 391

of Congress and the commands of the Constitution, first proffered in the New York ratification
controversy. SPf THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 524 (A. Hamilton)(]. Cooke ed. 1961) ("Limitations [of the Constitution on legislative power] can be preserved in practice no other way than
through the medium of the courts of justice; whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to
the manijfst tenor of the constitution void." (emphasis added)) and later adopted by Marshall in
Marbury l'. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 176-78; srr also Morgan, supra, at 66 (stating that
"no other justification [of judicial review J can be reconciled to the primary commitment to selfgovernment on which our constitutional edifice rests"); srr also supra note 381.
391. As historians have often noted, the motifs of popular entertainment and mass communications are designed to perfectly track, and therefore are to that extent a reliable index of, the
sentiments and beliefs of the majority, although such motifs may not at all describe what obtains
in practice. Srr, P.g., Griffen, Thr Progrpssivr Ethos, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN AMERICAN
CuLTURE 144, 157-58 (S. Coben & L. Ratner 2d ed. 1983); Welter, On Studying thP National
Mind, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 64 (j. Higham & P. Conkin
eds. 1979). For exemplars of the historigraphical technique that uses popular entertainment and
culture in order to capture the mentality of the nation, a state, or a region during a particular era,
see D. DAGAVARIAN, SAYING IT AIN'T So: AMERICAN VALUES AS REVEALED IN CHILDREN'S
BASEBALL STORIES 1880-1950 (1988); S. DAVIS, PARADES AND POWER: STREET THEATRE IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY PHILADELPHIA (1986); B. WYATT-BROWN, SOUTHERN HONOR: ETHICS AND BEHAVIOR IN THE OLD SOUTH (1982).
An instance of how this analysis of popular beliefs can edify about public attachment to
original understanding is provided by a popular NBC News Special hosted by Ms. Connie
Chung, Guns, Guns, Guns, which was broadcast nationwide on NBC affiliates on the evening of
July 5, 1988. In the peroration of this program, Ms. Chung observed that thousands of Americans
insist on their right to keep and bear arms as guaranteed to them in the second amendment. "It is
unclear," she concluded, "if our Founding Fathers meant this to apply to handguns. The Supreme
Court has never made a definitive ruling on this." This sentiment, stated as the conclusion to a
news program on a topic of vital interest to many Americans, manifests the strong effect "originalism" has on the American mind as the proper way for the Supreme Court to analyze difficult
constitutional questions.
Further evidence of the importance of "originalism" to our 1•olk constitutionalism is provided
by a letter to the editors of the Florida Bar journal, written by a nonlawyer:
Although I am not an attorney, I do occasionally read the Bar journal. I would
like to take issue with Judge Hatchett's article, "The 'Living' Constitution." There is
nothing "elastic" or "living" in the United States Constitution. It is an agreement between people that was carved in granite .
For a judge to rule on the law of the land on the basis of his individuality should
be an impeachable offense .
Letter of Richard S. Levy to the Editors, 63 FLA. B.J. 7 (Jan. 1989). Sn also A Nro•suwk Poll:
Bark, tlu Court and thf /ssurs, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 14, 1987, at 26 (describing a September 1987
Gallup Poll which concluded that 52'7o of Americans believe that Supreme Court justices should
"apply the intentions of the original authors of the Constitution," while only 40% thought that the
justices should "apply their own values as well" as the original intentions of the authors).
Trained lawyers, high and low, manifest attachment to this same !•ulk constitutionalism. For
example, retired Justice Lewis F. Powell presented the following originalist interpretation of the
second amendment during an interview broadcast on ThP MacNril JLPhra Nro•' Hour:
Lrh ra:
So . . . the Constitution does not guarantee the right to bear arms:> Explain
that.
Powfll:
Have you read the second amendment:>
Lfhra:
Well, I think I have, but . . . be my guest.

CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES APPROACH

293]

353

What exactly, then, does the history of the first amendment tell us
about its purposes? An initial observation is that history must provide
guidance, because the text itself, despite its brevity, provides only Delphic instruction. 392 Nevertheless, Leonard W. Levy, the dean of first
amendment historians, insisted that the first-amendment language establishes an abstract "principle" of free speech. 393 Among the several
commentators who have questioned any presumption of a self-defining
"principle" contained in the terse phraseology of the first amendment,
none has stated the criticism more cogently than William W. Van Alstyne. The bare words "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech" 394 say nothing about any free speech principle. Indeed, "[t]he amendment does not speak to the issue at all." 395
Thus, the language of the first amendment speaks only of protecting from abridgement the freedom of speech and not all speech; Congress may abridge, regulate, or ban altogether any variety of speech not
comprehended within the freedom of speech. Moreover, the language
does not speak about free speech in "unqualified" terms, as Dr. Levy
alleges. 396 Rather, as he himself recognizes elsewhere in his book,
"abridging" is hardly a word like "respecting" in the religion clause of
the first amendment, which connotes no ability to legislate on the topic
This Court decided a case . . - I think it is UnitPd Staffs against
Mil/a-decided back in the late '30s, in which the question involved a
sawed-off shotgun. I won't go into the details of the opinion, but in essence
the language in that [opinion] suggests what I believe, and that is that the
second amendment was never intended to apply to handguns or indeed to
sporting rifles and shotguns.
Thr Mac,Vril / Lfhrrr NPws Hour: IntPrl'iPw of justia Lwis F. PowPll (rPlirnl) (P.B.S. Television Broadcast, Jan. 2, 1989) (Transcript on file at the B.Y.U. Journal of Public Law office.).
Much the same sentiments were expressed recently by an attorney from the Bronx. After
congratulating the editors for running an article on Alexander Hamilton's views of the Constitution, Michael Gask concluded that:
Mr. Hamilton would today be a "moderate constructionist" and favor court interpretations that would follow the express and implied principles and the purposes of the
document, but not go beyond its words and meaning. To want to follow original intent,
you don't have to be narrow or strict. But I'm sure that Mr. Hamilton and the other
founders would want the intent of the constitution honored, and brought forward to the
present, rather than for the Justices to make the constitution to be what they please.
Letter of Michael Gask to the Editors, 60 N.Y. ST. B.J. 8 (July 1988).
392. BeVier, supra note 377, at 306; SPP also A. BICKEL, supra note 381, at 88-89 (observing that the plain language of the first amendment does not provide the solution to constitutional
analysis since the amendment describes neither what varieties of speech cannot be abridged nor
what constitutes an abridgement).
393. L. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 349 (1985) (concluding that the Framers
"gave constitutional recognition to the principle of freedom of speech and press in unqualified and
undefined terms").
394. U.S. CaNST. amend. I.
395. Van Alstyne, supra note 383, at 1095 n.18.
396. L. LEVY, supra note 393, at 349, quotPd in supra note 393.
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of religion whatsoever. 397 Rather, abridging means something like restraining "the freedom of speech" (itself a limited category of speech, as
explained above), and thus suggests that "Congress may regulate without abridging, whereas 'no law respecting' would have barred any laws
on the subject. " 398 Hence, the traditional touchstone of textual analysis
according to canons of interpretation will provide but scant guidance
for assessing the constitutionality of government regulations of
speech, 399 other than the insight that Congress may "regulate" or "control" many classes of speech not contained within "the freedom of
speech" (e.g., obscenity) and that even as to the "covered" class, it may
legislate concerning it without necessarily abridging it. The present inquiry must, therefore, turn for clarifying guidance to the history and
the values expressed in the movement that culminated in the adoption
of the first amendment. In this task, every first amendment scholar
must begin with the work of Dr. Levy.
In his recent revision and enlargement of his own pathbreaking
history of freedom of speech and press first published in 1960, 400 Dr.
Levy makes it clear that he has not changed his original revisionist
target, viz., the thesis of Zechariah Chafee that the Framers and Ratifiers intended to eradicate the common law of seditious libel and
thereby to render impossible any prosecution for criticism of the government or public officials. 401 Dr. Levy explained that the principal
revisionist thesis of his original work remained unchanged: "I still aim
to demolish the proposition . . . that it was the intent of . . . the
Framers of the First Amendment to abolish the common law of seditious libel." 402
397. !d. at 270-71.
398. !d. at 270.
399. For a brief discussion of the antipodal results that have been reached in American history by applying the standard canons of construction to the constitutional text, see L. LEVY. 1Ujna
note 381, at 9-11.
400. 1. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PR~:ss IN EARLY
AMERICAN HISTORY (1960).
401. Sn Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 21 (1941); Chafee, Frnrlom of
Spm1t in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REv. 932, 947 (1919); w also r;rnnally D. SMITH,
ZECHARIAH CHAFF.E, JR.: DEFENDER OF LIBERTY AND LAW (1986); Prude, Porlrat/ of a Ci1•if
Libntrnia n: The Faith and Frn r of bchariah Chafer, Jr., 60 J. AM. HIST. 633 (1971 ); Rabban,
Thr Emnr;ma of Modern First Ammdmmt Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205 (1983) (discussing views of Holmes, Brandeis, and Chafee).
402. L. LEVY, supra note 393, at xii; see id. at viii (remarking that the first version of his
study of the original understanding of the first amendment had, 1\ke the 1985 revision, also contradicted the liberal opinion of Professor Chafee); L. U:vY, sujna note 400, at 3 n.7; irl. at 237
("What is clear is that there exists no evidence to suggest an understanding that a constitutional
guarantee of free speech or press meant the impossibility of future prosecutions of seditious utterances."); 11'1' also L. LEVY, supra note 393, at 269 (repeating 7•abatim the same conclusion).
Years before Dr. Levy first published the results of his research, Edward S. Corwin had
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Historians continue to disagree with Levy's premise regarding the
intent of the drafters of the first amendment. 403 There is little doubt,
however, that not all forms of expression were "speech" within the
meaning and intent of the first amendment. Libel, slander, obscenity,
perjury, and other sorts of speech were almost universally "abridged"
or restrained by state laws in the late eighteenth century. 404 This naturally leads to the following question: What sort of speech was intended
to be protected by the first amendment? Many modern commentators
recognize that Supreme Court jurisprudence has regarded political
speech as the most protected category of discourse. 4011 One recent study
has called attention to the overlooked importance of the petition-ofgovernment clause of the first amendment as further corroboration of
the centrality of political speech to the historical meaning of the speech
and press clauses. 406
similarly concluded that the speech and press dauses of the first amendment had extremely limited
purposes and did not intend the complete banishment of seditious libel but instead reflected the
contemporary Blackstonean understanding of what freedom of the press meant. SN THE CoNSTITUriON OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, S. Doc. No. 170, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 769 (E.
Corwin ed. 1953) (concluding that "it was no intention of the framers of Amendment I to change
the [Blackstonean common] law" of no prior restraints but plenty of posterior prosecutions for
seditious libel); Corwin, Freedmn of SjJPah and Press Under the First Amendmntt: A Resume,
30 YALE L.J. 48 (1920) (arguing that the first amendment was a states' rights, not a civil rights,
measure, for it was not intended to obliterate seditious libel but to reserve such prosecutions to the
states).
Surprisingly, Professor Chafee, in opposition to his own libertarian view of the first amendment, proleptically adopted the Levy thesis in 1949:
Especially significant is the contemporaneous evidence that the phrase "freedom of the
press" was viewed against a background of familiar legal limitations which men of
Not only
1791 did not regard as objectionable, such as damage suits for libel.
were private libel suits allowed, but also punishments for criminal libel and for contempt of court.
The truth is . . that the framers had no very dear idea as to what they meant by
"the freedom of speech or the press," but we can say [several] things with reasonable
assurance . . . In thinking about it, they took for granted the limitations which had
been customarily applied in the day-to-day work of colonial courts.
Chafee, Book Review, 62 HARV. L. Rt:v. 891, 897-98 (1949).
403. See, e.g., j. SMITH, PRINTERS AND PRESS FREEDOM: THE IDEOLOGY OF EARLY
AMERICAN jouRNALISM (1988) (challenging the Levy thesis by arguing that late-18th-century
Americans repudiated the idea of seditious libel); Anderson, Thr Orip;in.~ of the Prrss Uause, 30
UCLA L. REv. 455 (1983); Mayton, Srdilious Librl and the Lost Guaran.tn of a Freedom of
Expres>/011, 84 CoLUM. L. REv. 91 (1984).
404. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 975 n.3 (11th ed. 1985).
405. Sn, r.g., W. VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMt:NDMENT 40-42
( 1984 ); BeVier, supra note 377, at 302 (observing that although no wide-spread agreement exisls
on the proposition that the first amendment's protection is limited to political speech, most first
amendment scholars freely concede the overwhelming importance of political speech as a first
«mendment value); Blasi, Thr Cherkinp; Valur in First Amendmnzt Theory, 1977 AM. B. FouND.
RES. J. 521, 554-57.
406. See Gottlieb, The Speerh Clausr and the Limits of Neutrality, 51 ALB. L. REV. 19, 43
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An even more important and overlooked clause in the Constitution
of 1787 suggests the actual original purpose of the speech and press
clauses of the first amendment, namely, the Congressional
"free"
speech and debate clause of article 1. 407 As George Anastaplo 408 and
David A. Bogen 409 have both observed, the first amendment is intimately related to the bundle of rights known as parliamentary privilege. In the eighteenth century, the most important right in this bundle
was the cherished privilege of legislators to debate freely upon public
affairs and suffer no interference from king or royal governors. 410 This
privilege enhances the functional value of the speech and press clauses
for the citizen, and it also delimits the scope of the first amendment's
protection, at least as originally conceived.
Professor Anastaplo ably demonstrated that the historical prototype for the people's constitutional guarantee of free speech was the
legislature's parliamentary privilege. This prototype indicates the political nature of the speech described and protected by the first amendment.411 Furthermore, Professor Bogen concurs in Dr. Anastaplo's
(1986); Sfl' al.1o Higginson, A Short History of thr Rifihl to Prtition Gm•rrnmrnt for thr Rrdrrs.1
ojGrin•ancP.I, 96 YALE L.j. 142 (1986).
407. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 6, cl. I (providing that "for any Speech or Debate in either
House, [the Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place").
408. Sn {;fllfrally G. ANASTAPLO, THE CoNSTITUTIONALIST: NoTES ON THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1971).
409. Srr {;fltrmlly D. BoGEN, BuLWARK OF LIB~xrY: Tm: CouRT AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT ( 19R4 ).
410. Sn Levv, Parliamrntary Pri1•ilrgr, in 3 ENCY<:l.OI'FiliA oF THE AMERICAN CoNSTITCTION 1365 (L. Levy, K. Karst & D. Mahoney eds. 1986). On the development of parliamentary privilege in England, see Hulme, Thr Winnin{; of FrrN!om of .'ijNwh by thr Hou.1r of Commons, 61 AM. HIST. REV. 825 (1956); on its development and medning in America, see M.
CLARKE, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES (1943).
411. Sn G. ANASTAPLO, supra note 408, at 15-16, 115-18; Anastaplo, .IUjna note 381, at
449 (arguing that "a salutary way to approach the freedom of speech and press provisions of the
First Amendment is by recalling the risks, purpose, and effects of the freedom of speech provided
in the Constitution for members of Congress while transacting the public business" and that "the
First Amendment [isJ best understood as primarily an assurance that the people at large would he
able to discuss, virtually without limitation, the doings of their government and of their community
and would thereby be equipped truly to govern themselves"); Iff a/1o Berns, Frn Sprah and
Frn Gmnlllllfltl (Book Review), 2 PoL. Sci. REVIEWER 217, 236 ( 1972) (reviewing L. LEVY,
LEGACY OF SuPPRESSION ( 1960)) ("To protect freedom of expression, after all, [the Framers]
added an amendment to the Constitution.
. What is [the first amendment] for' The Founders
regarded it as an essential institution of free government, because only with freedom of expression
could there take place the necessary deliberation, without as well as within the legislative chambers, upon public policy.")
Two juxtaposed sections in the Declaration of Rights of the Vermont Constitution of 1786
indicate the intellectual ronnexity of parliamentary privilege and the "freedom of speech" necessary to a self-governing citizenry:
XV. That the people have a right of freedom of speech and of writing and publishing their sentiments, concerning the transactions of government ~ and therefore the
freedom of the press ought not to be restrained.
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judgment on the importance of parliamentary privilege to our understanding of the purposes and scope of the first amendment:
The major contribution of parliamentary privilege to the concept
of freedom of speech is a recognition that the protection of speech is
mandatory for the successful operation of the political process and for
the preservation of self-government. The relationship between free
speech and self-government . . . was embedded in an understanding
that arose about the parliamentary privilege of debate.' 12

Hence, the freedom of speech described in the first amendment was the
public's version of parliamentary privilege and was just as crucial for
the proper working of representative government. And this "selfgovernance" purpose prescribes the content of the speech intended for
protection by the first amendment.
Dr. Levy now implicitly supports the view of Anastaplo and
Bogen. In his latest work, Dr. Levy concludes that "freedom of the
press had come to mean that the system of popular government could
not effectively operate unless the press discharged its obligations to the
electorate by judging officeholders and candidates for office." 413 In
short, popular government would not function properly or successfully
unless the press were free to criticize candidates and officeholders with
the same immunity afforded representatives and senators when they
spoke on the floor of Congress.
It is beyond the scope of this article to fully address, much less to
resolve, the debate over the primary purpose of the first amendment;
but we believe this article presents enough evidence and argument to
justify casting our ballot with the numerous defenders of "political
speech" as the central value of the first amendment's speech and press
clauses. This form of expression 414 generally concerns the public debate
XVI. The freedom of deliberation, speech, and debate, in the legislature, is so
essential to the rights of the people, that it cannot be the foundation of any accusation
or prosecution, action or complaint, in any other court or place whatsoever.
VT. CoNsT. (1786), chap. 1, §§ 15-16, reprinted in 9 SoURCES AND DocuMENTS OF UNITED
STATES CoNSTITUTIONS 499 (W. Swindler ed. 1979).
412. D. BoGEN, sujna note 409, at 10. See F. HAIMAN, supra note 388, at 418-19 (explaining that the congressional immunity of speech and debate established by t~e Constitution was
designed "to insure that government policymakers could engage in frank and uninhibited Giscussion of the public's business").
413. L. LEVY, supra note 393, at xii. See id. at xiv (referring to several works of Dr. Anastaplo's as among those that influenced his decision to rethink and revise LEGACY OF
SUPPRESSION).
414. It is appropriate at this point to mention briefly some of the leading definitions of the
speech comprehended by the political speech principle. Lillian R. BeVier defines political speech
as speech that participates in "the process of forming and expressing the will of the majority
according to which our representatives must govern." BeVier, supra note 377, at 309; Sff also id.
at 300 (defining political speech as expression that "participates in the processes of representative
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of those important social and political issues that are to be handled by
public institutions. One of the first objections to the political speech
principle is that there is no clear way to separate political from other
forms of speech and, therefore, that it would be a vain task to place
only political speech within the protective ambit of the first amendment.4111 Aside from the "slippery slope" fears, which seem to be the
"mark of an excited or of a stupid head," 416 most people find it relatively easy to distinguish between "political" and "nonpolitical"
speech. 417 Professor Anastaplo correctly observed, "The distinction between 'political' and 'nonpolitical' is, in everyday terms, fairly easy to
make. We use it, for instance, with respect to employees of the general
government regulated by the Hatch Act and with respect to income tax
exemptions and deductions." 418
Another common objection to the political-speech reading of the
first amendment is that the amendment, on its face, encompasses many
sorts of speech. Many scholars and historians, in addition to those already cited, 419 have argued, however, that the protection of political
democracy"); BeVier, supra note 383, at 502 (stating that political speech involves the debate and
discussion of political issues and the dissemination of information about the affairs of government).
Robert Bork defines political speech as "speech concerned with governmental behavior, policy or
personnel .
. Explicitly political speech is speech about how we are governed, . . includ[ing]
a wide range of evaluation, criticism, electioneering and propaganda. It does not cover scientific,
educational, commercial or literary expressions as such." Bark, sujJYa note 383, at 27-28. Antonin
Scalia defines political speech as "the advocacy of particular courses of action with regard to the
government." Scalia, supra note 377, at 12. The Supreme Court's own discussions suggest that
political speech can be fairly defined as public discourse and debate on matters of public affairs,
representative self-government, and community definition. Srr Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 1415, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam).
415. Srr, r.g., Posner, Frn Sprrch in an Economic Prrsprctii'f, 20 SuFFOLK U.L. REV. 1,
10 ( 1986) (contending that "there is no clear demarcation between political speech and other
speech, once the purpose of protecting political speech is understood to be preservation of political
competition," and then, astonishingly, classifying "the public advocacy of a right of abortion" as
nonpolitical speech).
416. For Lord Cockburn's insistence upon reason's ability to make a distinction between the
political and the nonpolitical, see 1 H. CoCKBURN, EXAMINATION OF THE TRIALS FOR SEDITION
WHICH HAVE HITHERTO OcCURRED IN SCOTLAND 68 (1888) (stating that to "see no difference
between political and other offenses is the sure mark of an excited or of a stupid head"); cf also
Ely, Thr Enigma of Political Crimr (Book Review), 21 LAw & Soc'y Rt:v. 875, 876-77 (1988)
(arguing that it is possible and, moreover, necessary to distinguish between common crime and
political crime).
417. G. ANASTAPLO, supra note 408, at 126.
418. !d. at 561 n.149; .w Bark, supra note 383, at 27 (maintaining that there is no great
difficulty in "drawing a line between political and non-political speech").
419. Sn supra notes 405-14 and accompanying text; Iff also A. SuTHERLAND, CoNSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA: ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL IDEAS (1965):
Popular self-government is intimately connected with the capability of political expression, individual or organized; with the right to petition for the redress of grievances;
with an opportunity to persuade otherwise indifferent neighbors that grievances exist
. Free expression thus becomes an integral part of popular government. In mod-
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speech was the leading purpose of the free speech and press clauses of
the first amendment. Of course, it is far from clear that the first
amendment's purpose, as of 1791, went very far beyond preventing the
sort of English licensing system criticized by Blackstone. 420 Nevertheless, what might be called the Madisonian view of the first amendment's purposes, "in its emphasis on political speech, has history on its
side." 421 As Gordon S. Wood correctly noted, the Revolutionary Era's
dominant assumption in favor of popular rule was premised on the
conviction that the people, through political discourse, could perceive
the common good and act upon that perception. 422 Thus, the primacy
of political speech on the scale of first amendment values goes back
further than 1791 or even 1787; rather, it is intertwined from the first
with our dedication to republican and representative government as the
best guarantor of the commonwealth.
Even Dr. Leonard Levy offers argumentation in support of the
political speech thesis of the first amendment. He now concedes, ternern states aspiration to liberty of expression about politics tends to be mingled with the
claim to liberty of expression on all subjects. Freedom from moral and religious censorship is discussed in the same terms as freedom from censorship from political dissent,
although the latter has an extra claim for it includes the means to all freedoms.

!d. at 116-17.
420. Sre supra notes 402-04 and accompanying text.
421. Sunstein, GOl'ernmmt Control of Information, 74 CALIF. L. RF.v. 889, 910 (1986)
(footnote omitted) Madison and other leaders of the Early National Period emphasized the political function and purpose of free speech in a republican form of government. Srr, P.[t, 1\,fadison,
Hepar"! Oil thr t'i>p;inia Rr.,o/utwns, in THE MIND OF THE FoUNDER: SOURCES OF THE PoLITICAL THOUGHT OF jAMES MADISON 231, at 244, 258 (M. Meyers rev. ed. 1981) (maintaining
that the Sedition Act unconstitutionally abridged "that right of freely examining public characters
and measures, and of free communication thereon, which has ever been justly deemed the only
effectual guardian of every other right" and that the "nature of governments elective, limited, and
responsible . . may well be supposed to require a greater freedom of animadversion, than might
be tolerated" by other, less republican forms of government); "X," On Frerdom of SjJPPCh and thr
Pm.1, rrprinted in 2 THE WORKS oF DR. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 285, 285 (j. Sparks ed. 1834)
("Freedom of speech is a principal pillar of a free government; when this support is taken away,
the constitution of a free society is dissolved, and tyranny is erected on its ruins." (anonymous
essay attributed, probably incorrectly, to Franklin; see 2 THF. PAPt:Rs OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN
184 (L. Labaree & W. Bell eds. 1960))); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Charles Yancey (Jan.
6, 1816), rrjlrintrd in THE Pol.ITICAI. WRITINGS OF THOMAS jEFFt~RSON 93 (E. Dumbauld ed.
1955) ("There is no safe deposit for [the citizenry's liberty and property] .but with the people
themselves, nor can they be safe with them without information. Where the press is free and every
man able to read, all is safe."); Letter of Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington (Jan. 16,
1787), rrprinted in id. at 94 ("The basis of our governments being the opinion of the people, the
very first object should be to keep that right; and were it left to me to decide whether we should
have a government without newspapers or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate
a moment to prefer the latter.").
422. G. WooD, sujmJ note 384, at 52-58; see Schmitt & Webking, Rl"l•olutionaries, Antifrdnalists, and Frdrrali1t.,; Commmts on Gordon Wood's Undrrstrmding of thr Amrrimn Founding, 9 PoL. SCI. Rt:VIt:Wt:R 195, 203 (1979).
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pering somewhat the harshness of his original work, 423 that in late
eighteenth-century America, a general belief had emerged that a free
press was essential to the definition and the continued existence of a
republic.
[Freedom of the press] meant . . . that the press enjoyed a preferred
position in the American constitutional scheme because of its special
relationship to popular government. The electoral process would have
been a sham if voters did not have the assistance of the press in learning what candidates stood for and what their records showed about
past performance and qualifications. A free press was becoming indispensable to the existence of a free and responsible government. 424

Dr. Levy then observes that the Founders' belief in this "essentiality"425 of free speech to popular government meant that their understanding of what speech is most essential in view of first amendment
protection closely parallels the view of modern court doctrine; that is,
the Founders believed that public debate on public affairs defined the
"freedom of speech" protected by the first amendment:
It does not necessarily follow [from the belief that a free press
was essential to a republican government] that the Framers decided to
give the utmost latitude to expression. The First Amendment did not
embody an absolute because not all speech is free speech, or, to put it
another way, there are several classes of speech or of publication,
some of which were not intended to be categorized under the rubric,
"the freedom of speech" or freedom of the press! 26

Furthermore, the view that speech should be protected because, and to
the extent that, it is related to the formation of community identity and
opinion has been supported by important political theorists and historians in works not directly concerned with the history of the first
amendment. 427
423. L. LEVY, supra note 400.
424. L. LEVY, supra note 393, at 273.
425. /d.
426. /d. Although Dr. Levy then went on to say that the Framers "did not provide answers"
to the question of exactly what sorts of speech were protected and which were not, id. at 274, the
tenor of his entire work is that political speech was virtually the exclusive concern of the speech
and press clauses, no matter how broadly or narrowly those clauses were regarded. Moreover, the
arguments of Dr. Anastaplo and Professor Bogen, Sff supra notes 411-12 and accompanying text,
persuasively establish that freedom to discuss political matters was the central, and perhaps the
exclusive, variety of speech originally covered by the first amendment.
427. Sn, r.g., H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 115-40,227-28 (Pelican ed. 1977); J. PococK,
THE MACHIAVELLIAN MoMENT: FLORENTINE PoLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 516-26 (1975); R. FAULKNER, RICHARD HOOKER AND THE POLITICS OF
A CHRISTIAN ENGLAND 101 (1981); G. Wooo, supra note 384, at 46-90.
Frederick Schauer, arguing philosophically rather than historically, has also derived the pri-
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By far the most famous political theorist to argue for the "protection of political speech" meaning of the first amendment was Alexander
Meiklejohn. 428 His original thesis was that the first amendment applies
"only to speech which bears, directly or indirectly, upon issues with
which voters have to deal." 429 According to Harry Kalven, the Sulli·van
defamation decision 430 placed Supreme Court jurisprudence back on the
correct free speech track, largely because of Dr. Meiklejohn's pathbreaking studies. The Court's opinion proposed that "analysis of freespeech issues should hereafter begin with the significant issue of seditious libel and defamation of government by its critics rather than with
mary of political speech under the Constitution:
The argument from democracy views freedom of speech as a necessary component
of a society premised on the assumption that the population at large is sovereign. This
jJolitirnl basis for a principle of freedom of speech leads to a position of prominence
for speech relating to public affairs, and even more prominence for criticism of
governmental officials and policies. Such freedom is held to be necessary for two purposes. First, freedom of speech is crucial in providing the sovereign electorate with the
information it needs to exercise its sovereign power, and to engage in the deliberative
process requisite to the intelligent use of that power. Second, freedom to criticize makes
possible holding governmental officials, as public servants, properly accountable to their
masters, the population at large.
F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 35-36 (1982). Sfi' a/so Schauer, Codifyin{; thr First Amnzdmml: New York v. Ferber, 1982 Sup. Ct. Rev. 285, 285 (footnot~s omitted):
Words and pictures may be the instruments with which a political pamphlet wages a
change in government policy, but they may also enable the child pornographer to disphotographs of children engaged in sexual activity. The former is unquesplay
tionably at the core of the First Amendment's protection of freedom of speech and
press. The latter is equally clearly some distance from that core.
Some legal scholars have also extolled the "checking value" of the first amendment and have
observed that this value essentially concerns political speech, for it involves speaking about and to
public officials in regard to their handling of political duties and public affairs. Thus, Vincent
Blasi has demonstrated that eighteenth-century political thinkers thought that a free press was
essential as a means of checking "the inherent tendency of government officials to abuse the power
entrusted to them." Sn Blasi, supra note 405, at 538; Sff also L. LEVY, supra note 393, at xii
(arguing that in the late 18th century "the press had achieved a special status as an unofficial
fourth branch of government, 'the Fourth Estate,' whose function was to check the three official
branches by exposing misdeeds and policies contrary to the public interest").
428. Frank, Huf,;O L. Blark: FreP SpPPrh and thP DPclaration of lndrfJrndnzcr, 1977 U.
ILL L.F. 577, 577 (footnote omitted) (stating that "[b]y 1960, Black was the foremost judicial and
Meiklejohn the foremost philosophic exponent of free speech").
429. A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 94 (1948).
Dr. Meiklejohn eventually modified his theory of coverage in response to the criticism that his
narrow definition of political speech would leave much ancillary speech totally unprotected from
government restriction. Srr Bollinger, Frfr SpPPrh and lntPllrrtua/ Va/urs, 92 YALE L.J. 438,
444 (I 983). By 1961, Meiklejohn had expanded his definition of political speech to include education, philosophy, science, and literature because the content of such speech elps voters to gain the
intelligence necessary for the sane and objective judgment necessary to the proper use of the
franchise. SrP Meiklejohn, Thr First Ammdmmt Is an Absolutr, 1961 SuP. Gr. REv. 245, 25657.
430. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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the sterile example of a man falsely yelling fire in a crowded theater."431 In other words, the Court had rediscovered the fundamental
proposition that "the central meaning of the First Amendment," 432 is
the protection of political speech. 433
With the Sullivan opmwn, therefore, the Court effectively
adopted the Meiklejohn theory of free speech, 434 significantly altering
subsequent first amendment jurisprudence. 4311 The Meiklejohn view
and name have been invoked frequently enough in Burger Court speech
cases to establish that political speech is still considered to warrant special constitutional solicitude. 436 In sum, then, the view that political
speech enjoys primacy of position in the first amendment scale of values
has been incorporated within "the vocabulary and analytical framework of both Supreme Court justices and constitutional
commentators. " 437
431 Kalven, Thr Nrw York Timrs Casr: A Notr on "Thf Cl'nlml Mmninr; of thr Fint
Amnulmrnt", 1964 SuP. Gr. REv. 191, 205.
432. Sul/i,•an, 376 U.S. at 273.
433. Heck & Ringelstein, Thr Burr;rr Court and thr Primary of Political h'xjJrr11ion, 40 W.
PoL Q. 413, 413 (1987).
434. Srf id.; sn also S. KRISLov, THE SuPREME CouRT AND Pol.ITICAL FRt:t:DOM 33-36
(1968).
435. Heck & Ringelstein, supra note 433, at 414. One crucial way the Meikeljohn theory
has influenced free speech analysis in the Court has been through the increasingly-employed categorization approach to first amendment analysis, Sff {';flltral!y Schauer, wjJra note 377; for the
value-oriented theories of the first amendment-which all start from the premise that the level of
constitutional protection varies with the kind of speech at issue-invariably assign the maximum
degree of protection to political speech. Ser Heck & Ringelstein, .llijna note 433, at 414; Iff also
F. CANAVAN, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: PURPOSE AS LIMIT 30 (1984) (stating that "[t]he primary purpose [of free speech and press] is to serve the political needs of a representative democracy which depends on free discussion of public affairs");]. ELY, .IUJ!ra note 381, at 93-94; W.
VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 405, at 40-42.

436. Heck & Ringelstein, supra note 433, at 415; Iff NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,
458 U.S. 886, 911 (1982) (relying upon the political speech principle to protect a boycott by which
the NAACP "sought to bring about political, social, and economic change" in a small Mississippi
town and describing the boycott as protected "political activity"); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,
466-67 ( 1980) (citing Meikeljohn in support of the postulate that "public issue picketing . . has
always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values"); First Nat'! Bank
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,776 (1978) (citing Meikeljohn for the proposition that political speech on
a public referendum measure "is at the heart of the First Amendment's protections''); Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (plurality opinion) (stating that the social
interest in adult movies "is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate"); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15, 19, 39, 48-49 (1976) (per
curiam).

437. Heck & Ringelstein, suj>ra note 433, at 416; Sff Anastaplo, 1\'i//iam H. Rrhnquist and
thr First Ammdmmt, 22 INTERCOLLEGIATE Rt:V. 31 (Spring 1987); Bollinger, supra note 429.
at 439; Schauer, Thr Rolf of thf PfDpiP in First Ammdmmt ThPory, 74 CALIF. L Rt:v. 761,
773-74 (1986) (footnote omitted) (pointing out that modern first amendment jurisprudence treats
speech not equally but hierarchically and that "time and again in recent cases, speech that relates
to matters of public concern is granted special protection"). Nevertheless, some have expressed
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Of course, since first amendment scholars agree on little except
their favorite topic of study, it is not surprising that although there is
almost universal recognition of the importance of political speech, no
such widespread agreement exists on the thesis that the amendment's
protective ambit extends only to political debate and discourse. 438 Some
first amendment scholars have embraced "self-fulfillment," "personal
growth," and "self-realization" as purposes of the first amendment. 439
The self-realization or self-fulfillment theory of the first amendment
maintains that a person "should be free to express himself or herself on
all matters in order to develop all of his or her intellectual faculties." 440
This theory has received scant attention, however, in Supreme Court
first amendment jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has been wise to
largely ignore, except in scattered dicta, the self-realization argument,
for it proves too much. 441 Other human activities besides personal
speech or writing can also develop personal potential or confer selffulfillment. In other words, speech is indistinguishable from other
forms of human activity when viewed from the vantage of selfrealization.442 Because many other human activities besides personal
speech can develop a person's potential or confer self-fulfillment, the
speech and press clauses of the first amendment must have had some
doubt over just how dedicated the Burger Court has been to the "primacy of political speech"
principle, beyond the rhetorical level. For example, Lee Bollinger observed in 1980 that the Burger Court's free speech decisions manifested great ambivalence about the primacy of political
speech. Bollinger, Elitism, thr Massrs, and thr Idm of SrlfGm•rrnmnti: Amhi1•alnur About thr
"Cmtra/ JJraning of t!zr First Atnnu/tllfllt," in CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA
99, 100 (R. Collins ed. 1980).
More recently, two political scientists, after conducting a survey of Burger Court free speech
cases, concluded, "Neither the Court as a whole, nor any justice, exhibited a pattern of supporting
freedom of expression claims in an rxtrmlfly high percentage of political expression cases, while
supporting claims for protection of nonpolitical expression at a signijirantly lower rate." Heck &
Ringelstein. supra note 433, at 422 (emphasis added). The italicized adverbs are the operative
words in this conclusion, for the survey data indicate a higher level of protection in political speech
cases than in non-political speech cases, and that is all that is required to establish the primacy-not exclusiveness-of political speech as a first amendment value and purpose. Srr id. at
421 (stating that the survey offers "limited support" for the "primacy of political speech" hypothesis in that the data show that the Burger Court decided in favor of the rights of litigants in 50.0%
of the political speech cases, compared to a favorable disposition in only 37.8% of the nonpolitical
speech cases).
438. Sn BeVier, supra note 377, at 302; Sunstein, supra note 421, at 909.
439. Srr, r.g., T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 ( 1970); M. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 30-58 ( 1984 ); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITCTIONAL LAw§ 12-1, at 788 (2d ed. 1988); Redish, Srlf-Rraliwtimz, Dnnorracy, and Frndom of Etpmswn: A Rrply to Projfssor Bakn, 130 U. PA. L. Rt:v. 678 (1982).
440. Nahmod, Artistic Exprrssion and Aesthrtic Theory: Thr Bmutzjul. th1• Suhlimr, and
thr First Ammdment, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 221, 235.
441. For more detailed criticism of the self-realization theory of the First Amendment, see
BeVier, supra note 377, at 320-22.
442. Srr id. at 315-16 & n.62.
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other central purpose in mind:
[Theories of free speech based on self-fulfillment or self-realization J
founder because they do not distinguish speaking from a wide range
of other self-expressive activities that fall outside the purview of the
first amendment. A satisfactory theory of free speech must explain
why speech is distinguishable from other distinctly . . . self-expressive activities, such as riding a motorcycle or appearing naked in pub-

lic . . .

443

Moreover, self-realization theories cannot be reconciled with modern
first amendment jurisprudence, which treats speech not equally but
hierarchically .444
Thus, the following question remains: If self-realization and selffulfillment can be achieved equally well or better through Godivaesque
parading, street-corner mime, or motorcycle-riding, why were spmking
and writing singled out for constitutional protection ?4 411
The answer is provided by history and Supreme Court jurisprudence, both of which demonstrate that political speech and writing
serve a goal not served by such other forms of self-expressive activity as
mime, motorcycle-riding, or even by other forms of speech. That constitutional end is self-government. Free speech is singled out for constitutional protection because it fosters the robust discussion of public affairs
necessary for the people to decide how to vote and to assess how their
443. Schauer, 111jno note 437, at 772.
444. fd. at 773.
445. Irl. at 772; ·'~''' BeVier, Librrty Fund, lnr.: Sympo.1ium o11 thr First Amnl!lment ond
Snuritifl Rrgulation, 20 C:oNN. L. REV. 383, 413 (1988) (Transcript of Symposiom):
[T]he notion that the amendment was intended to guarantee self-fulfillment
1s
unsound. It's also a notion that goes too far, because the first amendment protects freedom of speech, not freedom of action .
. Speech is self-expression and so is action.
It's hard to differentiate speech from actions in their ability to contribute to self-fulfillment. But the first amendment doesn't cover action; it's not a basic charter of liberty.
The attachment of some commentators to the purpose of self-fulfillment as the core purpose
served by the first amendment reflects what historian Eugene Genovese identified almost two decades a~~;o as the characteristic trait of modern American liberalism, viz., "the extreme egotism of
the pretension that self-expression is life's highest value." Genovese, Thr Fortlmf.l of tht• Left. 22
NAT'! RFV. 1266, 1267 (1970).
Even its staunchest defenders have recognized that the self-fulfullment theory is unconfined
and •·ven undifferentiated; that is, even liberal free speech theorists like Thomas Emerson have
recognized that the self-fulfillment value is not confined merely to speech activity but could just as
well justify any sort of conduct that a person could regard as self-fulfilling and that, therefore, it is
difficult to discern a self-fulfillment value as a peculiar concern of the "speech and press" clauses
of the first amendment. Srr Emerson, First Amrndmrnl Dortrinr 1111d thr Bur[!;rr Court, 68
C:.\UF. L. Rrv. 422, 425 ( 1980). Therefore, to the extent that "self-fulfillment" is protected at all
in first ~mendment jurisprudence, it is as an unintended benefit from the protection afforded the
"collective" political and social values of the political speech and marketplace of ideas theories. For
a discussion of the ''search for truth/marketplace of ideas" theory, see mfra text accompanying
notes 447-50.
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representatives have voted and performed on important public issues. 446
Another oft-cited purpose of the first amendment is the "marketplace of ideas/search for truth" rationale! 47 This phrase resonates with
attractiveness as an explanation for the first amendment's protection of
free speech and, perhaps for that reason, the Supreme Court has often
supported this rationale in its opinions! 48 There are, however, several
problems with a broad endorsement of the "marketplace" theory, not
the least of which is that most of these statements appear in dirt a.
More importantly, however, the "marketplace" theory originally
arose in the context of political speech, 449 and is most persuasive in the
context of a search for truth on topics of public concern. Its connection
to debate on topics of public concern reveals the fundamental flaw of
the theory, however. Even Justice Brandeis's original presentation of
the "search for political truth" rationale actually bears little relation to
the self-government purposes of the first amendment since popular sovereignty, not truth, is the basis of representative democracy. In other
words, popular sovereignty necessarily entails the authority of the people to make mistakes in their self-governance: its end is the Lockean,
not the Platonic, polity. 450
446. Sn Anastaplo, Human Nature and the First Amendment, 40 U. PrrT L. REv. 661.
684 (1979); Posner, supra note 415, at 50.
447. The "marketplace" trope derives from Justice Holmes's famous Abrams dissent. Ser
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,]., dissenting) ("the best test of truth
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market"). The exact
phrase "marketplace of ideas" was coined by Justice Brennan. Sn Lamont v. Postmaster General,
381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring); see also H. ABRAHAM, Tm: JumciAt. PRoCESS 302 (5th ed. 1986) (identifying Lamont as the "first [Supreme Court] decision voiding an .\ct
of Congress on the ground that it violated the freedom of speech guarantee of the First
Amendment").
448. Sn, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 4R5. sen
(1984) (stating that "the freedom to speak one's mind . . . is essential to the common quest for
truth"); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 534, 537-38 (1980);
Linmark Assoc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95-98 (1977); Gertz v. Robert Welch.
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1'!69)
(stating that "the purpose of the First Amendment [is] to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail").
449. Holmes's "marketplace of ideas" purpose of the first amendment is closely related to the
Brandeisian "discovery of political truth" theory of free speech. Whitney v. California, 274 1_;.s.
357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (maintaining that the leaders of our revolutionary ?;Cneration "believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth").
450. For a discussion of the true nature of political speech as a means to guarantee rule by
the people, not rule by accurate information or truth, see A. BICKEL, THE MoRALITY or CoNSENT, 62-63 (1975). As Professor Bickel cogently observed, the Constitution allows the votes of the
majority to govern "whether or not [they are] wise or [are] founded in truth." !d. at 62; srr
BeVier, supra note 377, at 318 n.70; Schneider, Free Speech and Corporate FreNiom: A Comment on First Nat'! Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 59 S. CAL L. REv. 1227, 1270 (198(,) ("in a
democracy people have a right to participate in governing the country however useless their ideas
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Perhaps the best reason for adhering to the "political speech" understanding and application of the first amendment is provided by the
Supreme Court's own jurisprudence. As Frederick Schauer, one of the
leading scholars of modern first amendment law, concluded, "time and
again in recent cases, speech that relates to matters of public concern is
granted special protection." 451 Even a quick review of Supreme Court
case law will confirm Professor Schauer's observation, for the Court
has often declared that a core purpose of the first amendment is to
protect the discussion of public and political affairs. 452
This long train of support by the Supreme Court for the political
speech principle should not be surprising, for despite continual reiteration that the first amendment protects other forms of speech besides the
political, "the Court has in fact delineated relatively few other categories of protected speech. . . ." 453 Indeed, from a survey of press-clause
cases involving governmental regulations that restrict publication, Lillian R. BeVier concluded that "[t]he first amendment doctrine that
emerges from the cases rests on a broad consensus that political speech
is at the core of the amendment's concern. " 454 As Justice Antonin

are").
451. Schauer, ;upra note 437, at 77 4 (footnote omitted).
452. Sn Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,218 (1966); .Iff oil() Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,
317 (1988); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761-63 (1985)
(plurality opinion) (declaring that public speech on matters of public concern will be afforded the
greatest first amendment protection); Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 145-47 ( 1983); NAACP
v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 li.S. 45, 53-54
(1982); Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295-300 ( 1981 ); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 534 (1980); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455,467 (1980); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838-39 (1978); First
Nat'! Bank v. Beilotti, 435 U.S. 765, 771, 776-77 (1978); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425
U.S. 748, 765(1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,339-41 (1974); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. IS, 24 (1971); Monitor
Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 512 (!969); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 26(,, 270 (1964); Garrison
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64,74-75 (1964); Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 US. 353,365 (1937) (declaring
that free speech supports and encourages public debate "to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people"); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 ( 1936).
453. BeVier, supra note 377, at 346 (footnotes omitted); .Iff al1o irl. at 346 n.210 ("Indeed,
with the notable . . exception of commercial speech, the Court's first amendment rules
-if
not its rhetoric-are surprisingly congruent with [the political speech LhesisJ.").
454. BeVier, sufml note 383, at 485 (footnote omitted). Despite the beliefs of contemporary
theorists such as Kent Greenawalt and Thomas I. Emerson that a "central purpose/political
speech" approach slights the multitude of values comprehended by "free speech," see T. EMERSON, supra note 439, at 6-9 (proffering several values and purposes of free speech); Greenawalt,
Spnrh and Crime, 1980 AM. B. FoND. RES. J. 645,785 (wntending that "[aJnyone who supposes
that the protection of the First Amendment can be reduced to one justification is either deluded or
willing to sacrifice a great deal in the interests of theoretical neatness and artual or apparent
simplicity of administration"). Professor Emerson has himself recently acknowledged that the
"central purpose-political speech" approach to first amendment analysis has become increasingly
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Scalia observed, "It is generally agreed . . . that . . . 'political speech'
. . . is entitled to the highest degree of protection from official interference" because "its protection is utterly central to the [self-government]
purposes of the First Amendment. . . . " 455
If scientific speech serves the same purposes as "political speech,"
it must receive the heightened first amendment protection afforded political speech. Thus, the threshold question for purposes of this paper is
whether to categorize scientific speech as "political speech." Before answering that question, however, we must first define the political system supported and succored by the political speech principle. The Supreme Court itself committed a common error when, in the Bellotti
case, 456 it confused direct or plebiscitary democracy with the Constitution's republican or representative democracy. The Bellotti Court remarked that in a democracy the people, not the government, "are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative
merits of conflicting arguments." 457 More correctly, however, in a representative democracy, the agents of the people (i.e., elected officials)
assess the merits of particular issues and arguments, act on those assessments, and then the people, through the franchise, "grade" their
representatives' performance. 458 Unfortunately, the mistaken view of
the Bellotti Court is rather widespread. And this view's concomitant,
flawed version of the political speech principle is based on a "Jeffersonian" model of free speech, a model whose fundamental (and inaccurate) postulate is that "the purpose of free expression is to ensure . . .
that the citizenry will make informed decisions on public issues. . . .
The Jeffersonian model thus views [citizen] deliberation as a critical
potent and pervasive in the work of both judges and scholars. Anastaplo, Notps Toward an ApoloINTERPRETATION 319, 345 (1982) (recording the recent admission of Professor Emerson to Dr. Anastaplo that the Anastaplo-Meiklejohn thesis that the first amendment is
limited to protection of political speech had garnered far more support by the early 1980s than
Emerson would have thought possible twenty years earlier).
455. Scalia, supra note 377, at 12. SPP Blaustein, ThP First Ammdmml and Prh>acy: ThP
SuprPIIIf Courtjustirr and tllf Phi/osophPr, 28 RUTGERS L. REv. 41, 51 (1974) (stating that the
first amendment's structural connection with representative democracy was correctly advanced by
Dr. Meiklejohn as warrant for his proposition that constitutional protection should be extended
almost exclusively to speech that is relevant to the processes and purposes of self-government);
Converse, Powtr and thP Monoply of Information, 79 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 1 (1985) (observing
that political speech has wisely and widely been regarded as the central concern and highest valued speech under the first amendment because of the logical and historical connexity between free
government and free speech).
456. First Nat'! Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
457. !d. at 791 (footnote omitted).
458. Sn BeVier, supra note 377, at 309 (concluding from the Constitution's establishment of
representative democracy that "the [first] amendment protects the process of forming and expressing the will of the majority according to which our representatives must govern").

gia pro 1•ita sua, 10
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element in the system of self-government." 4 ~ 9
This attachment to deliberation by the citizenry is not, of course,
the view that prevailed in our Founding Era. The Framers of the Constitution saw to it that political deliberation and decisionmaking, as opposed to ultimate responsibility and control, would inhere in the people's elected representatives rather than in the people themselves. 460
According to Madison's and other Federalists' conception of governance, the people's representatives, not the people, should be responsible
for daily deliberation and decisionmaking. This insistence on representative government marked the Federalists departure from classical theories of government and also describes the difference between a representative and a plebiscitary democracy. 461 Hence, our Madisonian
Constitution fundamentally rejects the plebiscitarian view that a democratic government must precisely and accurately embody "the people's
will" in every jot and tittle of the law. To the contrary, representative
democracy "consists of holding regular elections and hence providing a
popular veto on recent legislative action." 462
The many imagined difficulties for governmental regulation of scientific speech dissolve once it is recognized that our Madisonian democracy and its concomitant reliance on political speech for its proper functioning are toto caelo different from Dr. Meiklejohn's understanding of
self-government and political speech. The Meiklejohn view is fundamentally flawed as a description of our constitutionally-structured system, for his observations are more suited to a direct than a representative democracy:
The First Amendment's purpose is to give every voting member of the

459. Sunstein, supra note 421, at 890-91. One can see this Jeffersonian model in the work of
Meiklejohn. Sre supra note 429.
460. Srr Sunstein, supra note 421 at 890 n.7; BeVier, sujmz note 383, at 505-06 (maintaining that the Constitution actually prescribes "a considerably more attenuated role for citizens in
the actual decision of public issues'' than is commonly understood today, for the Constitution
mandates that public issues shall be decided by our representatives and that the Constitution was
intentionally designed to cure the excesses of the plebiscitarian model of democracy that existed in
the States during the Confederation Period).
461 Srr E. MoRGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RisE OF PoPUL.\R SovEREIGNTY IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1988); G. WOOD, sujna note 384, at 162-96, 344-89, 483-506, 532-36,
593-600; Sunstein, supra note 421, at 893-94 (observing that the Madisonian, unlike the Jeffersonian, view of free speech recognizes that we have not a plebiscitary but a representative democracy); Sunstein, /ntrrest Groups iu American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29, 38-43 (1985)
(explaining that Madison and other important Federalists of the Confederation and Early National Periods contended for and established systems of deliberation and legislation by representatives rather than by the entire citizenry).
462. Riker & Weingast, Constitutional Rrr;ulatwn of Lfr;is/ati1•f Choirr: Thr Political Con\rqumas of Judicial Drfrmur to Lfr;i.,/a!urrs, 74 VA. L. Rt:v. 373, 397 (1988) (footnote
omitted).
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body politic the fullest possible participation in the understanding of
those problems with which the citizens of a self-governing society
must deal. When a free man is voting, it is not enough that the truth
is known by someone else, by some scholar or administrator or legislator. The voters must have it, all of them. 463

The Meiklejohn-Jeffersonian understanding of our constitutional democracy calls for direct, particularistic information and expertise-rich
decisionmaking by each citizen. The problem with this understanding is
that it does not accurately describe our system of self-government under
which the representatives of the people, not the people themselves,
gather the expertise and information necessary for making the daily,
specific decisions concerning the business of the polity, the rrs

publica. 464
Furthermore, Dr. Meiklejohn is simply wrong to say that the basic American agreement on self-government is that "public issues shall
be decided by universal suffrage." 466 Our most basic agreement, as expressed in the government structured by the Constitution, is that public
issues shall be decided by elected representatives. 466 In short, the Constitution establishes a national system of self-government in which the
citizenry does not directly make or implement the daily decisions about
public affairs but instead holds the ultimate authority to establish the
general direction of public policy through the election of
representatives.
This accurate understanding of our constitutional system helps resolve a paradox suggested by the Meiklejohn view that popular sovereignty, in the plebiscitarian sense of that term, justifies the primacy of
political speech and first amendment doctrine. The paradox entailed in
the Meiklejohn view is that in a system where the people are sovereign,
the agents of the people should not be able to decide what ideas and
information the principal (i.e., the people) receive. 467 But popular sovereignty and restraints on speech only present an anomaly when we
confuse, as Dr. Meiklejohn did, our representative democracy with a
plebiscitary or direct democracy. Those who shaped our republican
form of government most certainly realized the impracticalities, in addition to the dangers, of direct or "Athenian" democracy. 468
463. A. MEIKLFJOHN, supra note 429, at 75.
464. Sn BeVier, sujna note 383, at 505.
465. A. MEIKLEJOHN, sujml note 429, at 27.
466. 5ff BeVier, sufna note 383, at 505.
467. 5Pf A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 429, at 26-27.
468. Sff, f.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 374 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) ("In all
very numerous assemblies, of whatever characters composed, passion never fails to wrest the sceptre from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates; every Athenian assembly would still
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In other words, in our representative democracy, the people are
protected by the first amendment's political speech principle to the extent that they must receive the ideas and information necessary to control and choose those who represent them in the chambers of government.469 Hence, to define political speech as the fundamental concern of

have been a mob."). The historical evidence indicates that the concerns of the Federalists centered
more on the dangers of direct democracy than its impracticalities. The general theory of a constitutional polity advanced by the Federalists maintained that the quick and hasty decisions of a transient majority would often be unwise decisions and that the decisions made under a longer, more
deliberate view of the topic, which the men of "continental vision" elected as national representatives would likely take, should more accurately reflect and implement the national good. Thus, the
Founders envisioned and established a system of mediating representatives-Congressmen, indirectly-elected President and Senators-giving expression to the long, deliberate will of the people.
Srr G. Wooo, supra note 384, at 471-518; Lutz, Brrnard Bailyn, Gordon S. 1\'oorl, and WhigPolitiml Throry, 7 PoL. SCI. REVIEWER Ill, 124-25 (1977) (concluding that for the Federalists,
more than for the earlier Real Whigs and Commonwealthmen, the deliberate sense of the community is discovered not so much through direct decisionmaking and debate by the citizenry as
through an indirect political process in which delay is important "because it takes time to produce
mechanistically the fair sense of the community. [and] also because in the short run many people
will be slow to recognize what is a fair balancing of interests," and that therefore, although the
Federalists adhered to the fundamental American political tenet that government should be based
on the deliberate sense of the community, the Federalists became far more insistent that the process be slow and indirect in order that it might better reflect true deliberation and the true "deliberate sense of the community"); Schauer, supra note 437, at 775; Sunstein, wpm note 461, at 3243.
A consequence of this Federalist understanding of our constitutional system is that firstamendment protection of speech should be regarded as a constitutional decision of the Founders
that the first amendment will not permit a current majority to decide to exclude certain voices or
viewpoints from political debate; it is only through a delayed and complete debate-that is, one
which includes all voices and interests-in the national forum that the national representatives can
come to discern and implement the national good. SPP Lutz, supra, at 123-24. On the importance
of the requirement of viewpoint neutrality to a determination that a government regulation is
constitutional, SPf F. ScHAUER, supra note 427, at 38-39, 43-44 Uustifying the special free-speech
protections with reference to the chance that government will be acting for illegitimate, partisan
reasons in its attempts to restrict speech).
Furthermore, Professor Schauer's philosophical conclusion is supported by numerous Supreme Court opinions providing that "the First Amendment forbids the government to regulate
speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others." Members of City
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984). Srr Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Public Uti!. Comm'n, 475 U.S. I, 6-7 (1986) (striking down an order of the state commission
because it penalized certain points of view expressed in political editorials inserted by PG&E in its
montbly billing statements); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788,
806 (1985) (holding that the government can validly restrict access to a nonpublic forum based on
speaker identity and the subject matter of the speech as long as the restriction not only is reasonable in light of the forum's purpose but also is viewpoint-neutral). Thus, under the Court's modern
approach, a more stringent scrutiny is applied to government regulations that appear to take political or ideological sides on public issues-a failure of viewpoint-neutrality-and a more important
governmental interest is required to uphold viewpoint-based restrictions. Srr Welkowitz, Smokr in
thr A.ir: Cc!mmrrical Sprrrh and Broadcasting, 7 CARDOZO L. REv. 47, 53-54 (1985).
469. Srr Posner, supra note 415, at 50-51. In contrast to the Federalists of the founding
generation, who viewed indirect democracy as the necessary means of controlling a piebald human
nature and the natural factionalism of a heterogeneous American populace, srr supra note 41J8,
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constitutional protection provides the method for dissolving the paradox
of popular sovereignty and governmental restrictions on nonpolitical
speech; that is, once the nature of the "politics" served by political
speech is correctly understood, it no longer appears "undemocratic" to
recognize, as many commentators have, that government has a legitimate and necessary interest in regulating "scientific information with
actual or potential military applications. " 470
Therefore, the argument that the EAA is unconstitutional under a
first amendment theory derived from the Meiklejohn view of selfgovernment is fundamentally flawed, for our republican form of government does not describe or arise from a view of popular sovereignty
that contemplates direct, particularistic citizen involvement in the making or implementation of laws. 471 Because ours is a representative, not
a direct, democracy, the constitutional system does not require full information disclosure to the citizenry in order for there to be a proper
working of the political process. Citizen deliberation and electoral control of officials functions quite effectively without full disclosure of the
the representative democracy established by those Federalists is nowadays most often justified in
terms of the impracticalities created by the structure of modern society; that is, the average individual in a complex and complicated modern world can seldom, if ever, conduct informationgathering expeditions, since most citizens are consumed by the daily cares of raising families and
earning a living wage, and even if they could, there is no agora large enough to contain their
assembly. This fact was remarked by political and legal commentators as early as the 19th century. Srr. q.;., F. LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT (1853), rtprintrd in
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM HAMILTON TO THE WARREN CoURT 378 (H. Nelson ed. 1967)
("We do not assemble in the markets as the people of antiquity did. The millions depending upon
public information, in our national states, could not meet in the market .
."). Hence, it is now
commonly recognized that the people cannot be expected to govern, but they do choose the governors; so "American government officials . . are really our public servants: they may tell us what
to do, but we decide u·lw they are and, in the last analysis, what thry are to do." Anastaplo, supra
note 446, at 667; 1j Roche. Book Review, 40 CoRNELL L.Q. 633 (1955), rrjnintrd in J. RoCHE,
SHADOW AND SUBSTANCE: ESSAYS ON THE THEORY AND STRUCTURE OF Poi.ITICS 222, at 224
(1964) ("democratic government is founded upon a rigorous doctrine of responsibility: the elected
official is held responsible and 11111.11 be held responsible, if democratic political theory is to have
any meaning").
470. Sunstein, supra note 421, at 894. Srr DuVal, Thr Orcasions of Srrrrry, 47 U. PITT. L.
REV. 579, 591 (1986) ("There is little dissent from the notion that our society needs to protect the
secrecy of at least some kinds of military information."). Indeed, even anti-secrecy zealots admit
the existence of "essential secrets." Srr, f.[;., A. Cox, THE MYTHS OF NATIONAL SECURITY 193
(1975); M. HALPERIN & D. HoFFMAN, ToP SECRET: NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE RIGHT TO
KNow 65-67 ( 1977) (listing classes of national-security and foreign-policy information that should
be treated as "presumptively secret"). And the authors of the Corson Rrport acknowledged that
"some things must, by their very nature, be kept secret." Corson Rrj}()r/, supra note 210, at 48.
For examples of the sorts of information that, if kept secret, would enhance our national security,
see id. at 19 ("The Panel has no reason to doubt government assertions that . . acquisitions [of
technology] from the West have permitted the Soviet military to develop countermeasures to Western weapons, improve Soviet weapon performance, avoid hundreds of millions of dollars in R&D
costs, and modernize critical sectors of Soviet military production.").
471. Sre BeVier, wjml note 383, at 506.
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sort of minutiae that the representatives themselves would need in order
to write a statute. The electorate will only want and need to verify
whether the statute has achieved its goals satisfactorily. 472
Vincent Blasi, 473 among others, 474 has observed that it is fanciful
to suppose that citizens deliberate, or much want to, on the quotidian
and detailed issues of public policy. 475 The important datum, as Professor Blasi points out, is that the people retain ultimate theoretical and
practical authority through the franchise to check abuses of power by
their agents and to score their performance in office. 476 Under the
proper republican understanding of the "political speech" principle,
one can see that the "marketplace of ideas/search for truth" notion that
truth will be discovered best by a free-for-all among contending ideas
does not describe the American polity or political process. Judge Posner
correctly observes that the "most important aspect of freedom of political speech is simply the right to criticize government officials and policies-that is, the right to disseminate information that may affect how
people vote in the next election." 477
Under this standard, it is clear that the EAA permits robust attempts to have the EAA repealed, as evidenced by the law review criticism478 and the hostile scientific-journal commentary cited throughout
this article. 479 No one can plausibly contend that the EAA regulations
of scientific speech will suppress, much less that they aim to eliminate,
the sort of scientific-policy debate that would necessarily be a prelude
to the repeal, as it was to the enactment, of the EAA. Therefore, under
472. Srr Sunstein, supra note 421, at 894.
473. Blasi, supra note 405.
474. S!•f. e.g., Posner, supra note 415, at 50 ("The evaluation of policies does not always,
and perhap' does not typically, require access to the same information that the policymakers have.
!\lost people are less interested in whether government policies are made in what appears to be a
rational and well-informed manner than in whether the policies work, and the latter question is
answered by observing the effects of the policies .
. [V]erification is a more persuasive test of
truth than debate is."); Riker & Weingast, supra note 462, at 397.
475. Srr Blasi, supra note 405, at 539, 541-42.
476. Irl. at 542; srr Anastaplo, How to Rrad thr Constitution of the United States, 17 Lov.
U. CHI. L.J. 1, 41 (1985) ("We, the people, do make the vital political decisions here, both by the
choice of officers of government and through the influence of public opinion. The power we require. therefore, is not only that of the ballot but also that which comes in the form of the right to
discuss fully and freely the public business of the country."); Anastaplo, supra note 446, at 667,
quoin/ sujna note 469; Schauer, supra note 437, at 780.
477. Posner, supra note 415 at 11.
4 78. Srr, r.g., Alexander, Presen•ing High TNhnology Secrets: National Srcurity Controls
on l'nn·rnity Rrsearrh and Trachinr;, 15 LAW & PoL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 173 (1983); Ferguson,
Scientijir and TPChnvlogical Expression: A Problrm in First Amrndmmt Throry, 16 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 519 (1981); Comment, National Security Controls on the Dismnination of
Pri1•ote/y Gnterated Scinztific Infonnation, 30 UCLA L. REv. 405 (1982).
479. Sl'f, e.r;., commentary cited supra notes 18, 28, 195, 315.
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the political speech principle outlined herein, the EAA's regulation of
pure scientific speech should not be regarded as a first amendment
violation. 480
480. On the "political speech" principle, see sujna notes 413-19 and accompanying text.
The characteristics of "pure" scientific speech make it more akin to "commercial speech" than to
political speech. As explained in the text, SPP infra text accompanying notes 483-93, unlike political speech, scientific speech does not directly contribute to the self-governing and political-speech
purposes underlying the first amendment. When it does, however, contribute to these self-governing functions, pure scientific speech should be afforded the same high level of protection as
political speech. SPP infra notes 483-88 and accompanying text. Since 1976, the Court's opinions
have emphasized that, on account of the mercantile and self-serving nature of commercial speech,
its first amendment protection would be far more limited than that of political speech. SPP Wolfson, Thr First A111nzdmmt nnd thr Sf:C, 20 CoNN. L. REv. 265, 268 ( 1988). The Court has
defined commercial speech as expression that proposes a commercial transaction ..II'P Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 447 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1980), which, in plain
English, usually means an advertisement. The justification usually offered for the intermediate
level of protection granted commercial opinion is that commercial claims are thought to be more
easily verifiable than political opinion, less likely to be deterred by regulation, and less central to
first amendment values than political speech. Sn Scalia, sujna note 377, at 13; Sl'l' a(\0 Emerson,
sujno note 445, at 460. Hence, the Court recognized that it was illegitimate. under the central
meaning of the first amendment and its political speech principle, as well as impoliti<· in view of
the government's historical function of regulating the economy, to extend full first amendment
protection to commercial speech. Indeed, commercial speech is so far removed from the context of
political debate and the social importance of the advertised transactions are so low as to make the
speech virtually irrelevant to true first amendment values and concerns. SN BeVier, .111pra note
377, at 353; SPf also Jackson & Jeffries, Commnria/ SpPNh: Erono111ir Dul' Pru1P1S nwlthr F1n/
Ammd111ntt, 65 VA. L. Rt:v. 1 (1979) (pointing out the misleading and incorrect nature of the
Court's underlying rationale that informed commercial choice may be as important to society as
informed political choice).
\Vhen the Court moved commercial speech from the "totally uncovered by the first amendment" category of speech, srr Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), and brought it within
first amendment coverage, SPP Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), the general rationale for "some" but not "full" first amendment protenion was that commercial speech, spurred by economic self-interest, is hardier than
noncommercial speech and hence is less likely to be significantly deterred by government regulation. Sn id. at 771 n.24; .11'1' also Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 181 (1977). This discn·te
categorization of commercial speech as a less-protected variety of speech suggests that the scientific, technical nature of the material in the category of scientific speech should affect the degree of
its protection and the intensity and scope of permissible regulation. SPP Kamenshine, f:mbarron
on Fxport.' of Irlm.1 nnd Information: First Ammdmmt Iss uPs, 26 WM. & MARY L. Rt:v. 863,
865 (1985); sn ol.1o Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 508-11 (1981) (p!uralitv
opinion) (indicating deferential review of restrictions of commercial speech).
The Supreme Court's modern trend toward categorizing speech as either covered or uncovered by the first amendment and of then assigning each category of speech its own particular
degree of protection, .11'1' f{PnFrally Schauer, .1upra note 377, is a question not just of balancing
abstract costs against general "free expression" values, but of balancing the .wrirtl costs against the
individual 11 nd social benefits of the speech viewed in light of the first amendment's central purpose. Scientific speech, like commercial speech, is hardier than political speech, due largely to its
methodology, the dedication of its adepts, and its community environment of academic and institutional support. Hence, pure scientific speech should be afforded the same intermediate degree of
protection that the court has extended to commercial speech. Under this level of protel"lion, even
more clearly than under the highest "political speech" level of protection, pure scientific speech is
not unconstitutionally infringed by the EAA and its critical technologies regulations. Srr inf)'(t
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Moreover, the American people can robustly evaluate the policies,
purposes, and successes of the critical technologies approach and the
EAA without having disclosed and divulged to them all the scientific
details contained in the various scientific theories, presentations, and
papers regulated under the EAA and other information control laws. 481
Because the citizenry does not need to have high scientific theory and
data within its ken in order to evaluate the wisdom and effectiveness of
the EAA, the restricted presentation of such theory and data at regulated scientific colloquia does not detract from the political purposes
central to first amendment protections. The voter does not need to
master the intricacies and details of scientific theories and axioms in
order to evaluate and debate the effectiveness of the EAA regulations,
or other national laws, as a guarantor of our national security and the
national good. 482
Some, of course, will continue to argue that without access to the
technical and scientific details contained in the scientific speech restricted under the EAA, the citizenry will not be equipped to assess
national defense and foreign affairs policies. But in a representative democracy, the electors do not need access to the particular details of the
regulated scientific speech in order to evaluate the government's policies
and performance on defense and diplomacy. 483 The voters will have

notes 490-95 and accompanying text.
481. Sri' Posner, supra note 415, at 50. This means, with regard to the regulation of scientific speech, that voters do not need to know every bit of theoretical detail and every scrap of
sensitive scientific information in order to decide whether that general sort of scientific data, if
known by our adversaries, would contribute to the weakening of our national security. Nor do
citizens need to know every scintilla of conceivably relevant technological information in order to
make effective use of the franchise. The efficacy of the EAA in achieving its goals will be assessed
by the voters through an examination of our scientific progress and the vigor of our military
defense J•is-rH•is our adversaries. Cf BeVier, supra note 383, at 507.
482. Cf Posner, suprn note 415, at 51. Robert Bork defines political speech narrowly, srt
Bork, .1ujna note 383, at 27 -28; but his definition makes taxonomical sense when one realizes that
he is talking about purr forms of speech. Thus, when Bork concludes that scientific, literary,
educational, and commercial expressions should not be defined as "protected" speech, .Iff id.,
quotnl supra note 414, he does not exclude the possibility that, say, science or literature can be
used in a public affairs context to make a political point and hence should there be categorized and
protected as "political speech." Professor Sunstein explicitly recognizes the possibility of this categorical metamorphosis of scientific theory into political speech. Srr Sunstein, supra note 421, at
908 n.75. But "pure" scientific speech does not generally convey public policy or social opinion; it
is ideologically value-free, perhaps even more so than commercial speech. For this reason, as for
the others argued above, srr supra notes 480-81 and accompanying text, the EAA restrictions
should easily survive any constitutional challenge. Srr supra notes 478-81 and accompanying text;
1j. also Attanasio, Dor.\ Thr First Amrndmrnt Guarantrr a Right to Conduct Scirntifir FxjJfnmfnts?, 14 J.C. & U.L. 435, 453-56 (1987) (arguing that scientific experimentation warrants
reduced constitutional protection because of its similarities to commercial speech).
483. Srr Fein, A.rrfss to Classifird Information: Constitutional and Statutory Dimrn.lwns,
26 WM. & MARY L. REv. 805, 814 (1985); srr also supra note 476.
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access to massive amounts of information about the effectiveness and
wisdom of the EAA and other national security acts and policies.
Through such information and political commentary, the electors "can
make an intelligent assessment of the
national security
484
programs. "
Indeed, the primary concern of the citizenry is the effectiveness of
the various acts and policies protecting the national security; and for
this determination, the particular details of the scientific data and theories "are, at best, of secondary interest." 4811 Moreover, of course, in responding to the desires of the electorate that the effectiveness of the
various national security policies and acts be evaluated from time to
time, Congress, the actual policymaker in a representative democracy,
can gain access to the restricted scientific theory and data in closed executive sessions, and debates on the floor of Congress can be held in
secret. 486
On the other hand, when scientific data or theories are necessary
to make a public policy point, then the "politicized" scientific speech
should be afforded the same high level of protection as any other political discourse. 487 For example, newspaper advertisements or handbills
promulgated by the Union of Concerned Scientists about the dangers of
a "nuclear winter" would be protected like, and regarded as, political
speech, even if they contained theoretical and technical data. 488 Thus,
political debate about the use of laser technology for national defense
and the wisdom of the Strategic Defense Initiative would most certainly
be protected as political speech even though formal academic papers on
the scientific theories and know-how of laser science could be censored
to protect the national security. 489
484. Fein, .\Upm note 483, at 814.
485. !d.
486. See id. at 816.
487. Kamenshine, .1ujna note 480, at 874; SPf wjna note 482. Just as with the prosecution
of a war and emergency wartime measures, so too with national security measures: the political
speech principle of the first amendment guarantees the freedom to discuss whether the measures
were or are wise and whether they should be continued or repealed. After all, it is the people, and
only the people, who can authorize public officials to pass such measures and to execute them;
hence, the freedom to assess them must be commensurate with the power to authorize them. Sfe
Anastaplo, The Occasions of Frffdom of Spfffh, 5 PoL. Sci. REVIEWER 303, 398-401 (1975).
488. Kamenshine, sujna note 480, at 87 4; sre .111pra note 482; Sff also Sunstein, supra note
377, at 624-25 (suggesting a "whole document-general effect" approach to protection and categorization of speech).
489. Cf. BeVier, supra note 377, at 353 (arguing that even though the advertising of prescription drug or attorneys' prices should not be protected under the first amendment, "political
debate about such topics would [nevertheless! unquestionably be protected"); rf also id. at 354
(noting that "on [each protected commercial speechj topic a political commentator would have had
no difficulty casting his speech in a form that would have avoided regulation").
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Most scientific speech, however, bears little or no connection with
political discourse or the discussion of public affairs by the citizenry. 490
To extend the maximum level of "political speech" protection to scientific sp,~ech might result in the judicialization of foreign policy and national security policy. 491 Stringent categorical protection of the Brandenburg492 or Pentagon Papers 493 variety would force the courts to
490. Kamenshine, sujna note 480, at 874; see United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F.
Supp. 990, 994 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (there is "no plausible reason why the public needs to know the
technical details about hydrogen bomb construction to carry on an informed debate on the issue"),
mandamus dmied sub nom. Morland v. Sprecher, 443 U.S. 709, dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th
Cir. 1979); see also .1upra notes 480-82.
491. See generally Banks & Straussman, Bowsher v. Synar: The F:merging judicialization oj
the Fisc, 28 B.C.L. REV. 659 (1987). The transformation of constitutional adjudication into a
form of legislative choice introduces certain disadvantages into the political system. The chief disadvantage is that fundamental questions about the proper functioning of the political system and
its policy decisions are answered on an ad hoc basis in cases involving the accidental collisions of
private persons in all-too-petty cases. Mahoney, The First Monday lll Ortobrr, 2 CLAREMONT
REv. BKs. 15, 15 (Oct. 1983). As Richard Neely, Justice of the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals has observed, courts face a serious, often fatal, shortcoming when they attempt to reject
legislative policy by rulings of unconstitutionality: viz., a characteristic ignorance of the wealth of
data and argumentation presented to the legislature and its committees. SeeR. NEELY, juDICIAL
jEOPARDY 14-15, 147-48 (1986).
This wealth of legislative data and policy argument concerning the EAA and the critical
technologies approach to the protection of national security is reflected in, roughly, the first 375
footnotes of this art ide. A judicial decision of invalidity, contrary to the legislative decision of
necessity, might appear to be fair and proper in the particular case at bar, given the narrow
record on appeal; but such a particularistic decision could cause untoward, or even tragic consequences, when applied generally within the field of scientific research, secrecy, and the national
security. Thus, separation-of-powers and competency concerns argue against a judicialization of
foreign policy and national defense. Such questions are for the legislature, not only because the
Constitution grants the national legislature those duties and powers, not only because the first
amendment does not prevent a latitudinarian maneuvering with those powers, but also because
Congress and the administrative apparatus it creates are better equipped than courts to deal with
the empirical and technical issues that defense and foreign affairs entail.
4?2. Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that "the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to . . proscribe advocacy
of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite . . such action"). The Brrmdmbu rg version of the
clear-and-present-danger test has been described as applying the highest level of constitutional
protection, an extremely stringent protection, for political speech, even subversive political speech.
See Attanasio, supra note 482, at 440-41; see also Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 ( 1973) (per
curiam); L. TRIBE, supra note 439, § 12-9, at 848-49.
493. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,730 (1971) (Stewart, .J., concurring) (declaring that the government can restrain the publication of information if disclosure "will
surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people"). Srr
Sunstein, .1upra note 421, at 903 (pointing out that the Pmtagon Papers standard of strict scrutiny of "secrecy" would likely "foreclose government regulation of the communication of technical
data to foreign nations, notwithstanding the potential of such communication to enhance the military capability of perceived and actual enemies"). Perhaps more pertinent than the Pmtagoll
Papers standard for the sorts of troublesome national security cases that might arise under the
EAA is the "disclo>ure of troop movements" dictum in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 691, 716
(1931) (listing six exceptions to prior restraint protection, including the publication of troop trans-
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ignore national security threats that do not satisfy those doctrinal standards, since many such threats cannot, because the threatened harm is
somewhat uncertain or accumulates over time. 494 It would therefore be
unwise-based on the history of political speech and the first amendment (as outlined in this article) and also on grounds of the importance
of national security and the lack of institutional competence of the
courts to properly understand national security-to afford pure scientific speech the same high degree of protection as political speech." 911
port sailing dates and the publication of locations and numbers of troops). This dirtum strongly
supports the constitutionality of the censorship of scientific papers which might otherwise divulge
sensitive national security information through open seminars and colloquia.
494. Gf Attanasio, sujmz note 482, at 442 (making essentially the same point in regard to
extending stringent constitutional protection to scientific research activities).
495. See supra note 480. Another possible untoward consequence of affording full "political
speech" protection to scientific speech is doctrinal dilution: like oil on water, the vigor of constitutional protection thins as it expands. There is a real possibility that first amendment doctrines will
lose some of their strength because of the number of unacceptable consequences their application
would generate when these rules (such as the Brandenburp; clear-and-present-danger test or the
prior-restraint doctrine) are extended beyond their political speech context to categories of newlycovered speech, such as commercial speech. See Schauer, Crmmzrrrial Speerh a11rl the Arrhiterture
of the First Aznelldmnll, 56 CIN. L. REv. 1181, 1194 (1988). As the unacceptable applications
begin to accumulate, courts will be faced with the choice of allowing the unpleasant results to
multiply or of modifying and diluting the old rules to make them better accommodate social expectations in the new categories. See id. at 1195; see also Anastaplo, supra note 381, at 455 (observing that "we face the prospect of reducing the 'absoluteness' of First Amendment protection even
as (and bec<~use') we expand the coverage of that protection"); Anastaplo, sujna note 476, at 39
("Will political discussion come to be curtailed as, say, advertising can obviously be' The First
Amendment does not distinguish among the things it does protect: if its absolute-sounding language can permit advertising to be regulated, why should it not permit political discussion to be
regulated as well'"); Rubin, Sa:i.1, Skokie and the First Amezzdmrnt as Virtur (Book Review),
74 CALIF. L. REv. 233, 239 n.20 (1986); Schauer, supra note 377, at 271-72 (contending that if
certain categories o[ speech are not given less than the maximum level of protection, there will be
an inevitable dilution of the strong protection historically afforded political speech); Sunstein,
1upra note 377, at 605 ("Any system that recognizes the need for some regulation but does not
draw lines could be driven to deny full protection to speech that merits it-because the burden of
justification imposed on the government would have to be lightened in order to allow regulation of,
for example, commercial speech, conspiracies, and private libel. By hypothesis, that lighter burden
would have to be extended across-the-board. The alternative would be to apply the standards for
political speech to all speech, and thus to require the government to meet a test so stringent as to
preclude most forms of regulation that are currently accepted."); Sunstein, supra note 421, at 909.
The Supceme Court has itself recognized the danger of doctrinal dilution, and this concern
"led the .
Court, first in footnote 24 of Virginia Pharmacy and then in the four-part test of
Central Hudson Cas & Elec. Corp. t'. Public Sen•. Comm 'n, to treat commercial speech in a
strikingly different fashion from 'core' first amendment speech." Schauer, supra, at 1197. And in
recognizing the normative rlifferences between political and commercial speech, the Court has
made sound distinctions that also provide good "architectural" arguments for assigning intermediate-level status to scientific speech:
To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial
speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a levelling process, of the force of the
Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech. Rather than subject
the First Amendment to such a devitalization, we instead have afforded commercial
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Contemplation of Congress's authority to suspend the great writ of
habeas corpus 496 should awaken us to the constitutional legitimacy of a
superintending power to be exercised, on behalf of the people, for the
serving of the common good and the preserving of the national security!97 Furthermore, even a quick survey of the general fear of foreign
domination during the 1780s, which contributed to the movement for a
more energetic central government that would contain this sort of superintending power, should remind us of the government's duty, and its
concomitant authority, to secure national sovereignty and security. The
fear of foreign aggression and the desire to proudly join the ranks of
strong and independent states in the community of nations contributed
powerful motives for the establishment of a more vigorous and effective
national government. That meant transferring more authority, and the
leeway to maneuver with that authority, to public officials, so that they
could safeguard our independence and sovereignty! 98 Surely, then, our
republican form of government would be better served if the energy and
effort expended in criticizing the courts for not invalidating the EAA
were directed to Congress for the EAA's reform vis-a-vis scientific progress and national security! 99 Our criticisms and suggested statutory
amendments therefore follow in the next section of this article.

speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in
the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing modes of regulation that might be
impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). See Emerson, supra note 445, at 460
(concluding that the inclusion of formerly uncovered speech within the scope of first amendment
protection "tends to dilute and devitalize first amendment doctrine").
Thus, if "pure" scientific speech is treated like political speech, there will be a natural tendency to dilute the stringency of maximum level protective standards in order to avert untoward
national security consequences. Attanasio, supra note 482, at 442; see id. at 456; rf. sujJra note
493. This weakening of standards will undermine their capacity to safeguard the speech "central"
to the constitutional system, political speech, in the times and situations when political speech
would most need the maximum level of protection afforded by those undiluted standards. See
Blasi, The Pathological PaspPCtit•e and the First Amendment, 85 CoLUM. L. Rt:v. 449 (1985)
(arguing the thesis that when adjudicating first amendment cases, the Court's overriding goal
should be to fashion free speech standards that can best protect dissenting and unorthodox political
viewpoints during periods of intolerance such as the post-World War I Red Scare and the McCarthy Era).
496. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
497. See Anastaplo, Freedom of Speech and the Silence of the Law (Book Review), 64 TEX.
L. REV. 443, 449 (1985).
498. See A. McLAUGHLIN, THE CONFEDERATION AND THt: CoNSTITUTION 1783-1789, at
70-81 (Collier ed. 1961 ); Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Acl ofl789: A Badge
of Honor, 83 AM. ]. INT'L L. 461 (1989); Marks, Power, Pride, and Purse: DijJ/omatic Origins
of the Constitution, 11 DIPLOMATIC HIST. 303 (1987); see also generally C. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL REASON OF STATE (1957); Vagts, "Reason of State" in Amerika, 15 jAHRBUCH
FUR AMERIKASTUDU:N 237 (1970).
499. See Mendelson, Learned Hand: Patient Democrat, 76 HARV. L. REv. 322, 333 (1962).
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EFFECT OF THE CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES APPROACH

Scientists argue that national security is injured rather than enhanced by controlling the flow of scientific information. 1100 This argument has merit. Soviet scientists outnumber American scientists 501 and
are equally as capable, 502 but the closed Soviet society retards the free
flow of scientific ideas. 503 By controlling the dissemination of scientific
ideas, Defense is removing potentially broad areas of science from the
positive control of peer review-a system on which American science
depends for its vitality. The cost to the United States of this loss, however, is unassessed.
Scientific secrecy is self-defeating. 504 It is both theoretically and
practically impossible to restrict science. Defense accepts the theoretical
impossibility of permanent restrictions, and seeks instead to restrict access to American scientific advances for a sufficiently long period to
maintain the United States' technological lead. The flaw in this system
is that practical controls do not exist outside of classification and contract provisions. Export controls may prevent foreign nationals from
500. Sff, r.g., Carey, Srin11r and thr National Srcunty, 214 SCI. 609, 609 (1981) (arguing
that restrictions on science are counterproductive); Unger, A Proposal to Limit G!!l'nnmrnt lm·
posNl Srcrrcy, 24 IEEE TECH. & Soc'v MAG. 3, 3 (Dec. 1983) (maintaining that restricting
Soviet access to American science necessarily restricts American science).
501. The Soviet Union graduates about 300,000 scientists and engineers annually, compared
to about 80,000 scientific and engineering graduates annually in the United States. SPP Hrarings
on H.R. 5167, supm note 3, at 1202 (statement of Edith Martin, Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Advanced Technology). A significant proportion of graduates from
American universities are foreign students who will not remain in the United States. Srr National
Science Foundation, Academic Science/Engineering: 1972-83, Final Report at 30 (1984).
502. Sff gmrmlly Carey, 111fna note 500, at 609 ("It is a profoundly disturbing mistake to
put out the notion that Soviet scientific capability is inferior to ours. We know better."); Toth,
Sm•irt Sparr Tnhnology Admnrrs Nou• Major Conrrrn to U.S. Offiriail, The Oregonian, Jan. 2,
1987, at A I 0, col. I (reporting that the "expert consensus is that the Soviets match or lead the
United States in the basic technology of lasers and particle beams~and perhaps even in converting
the technology into weapons").
Accounts of the capability of Soviet scientists, engineers, and technicians can be misleading.
For example, accounts of Soviets copying Western computer technology are usually interpreted as
a technologically-backward country copying more advanced technology. The internal layout of the
Western computers has been found to have been relaid in the Soviet versions, however, to make it
compatible with Soviet equipment. The skill involved in relaying the internal layout requires a
level of sophistication not generally acknowledged by Western observers. Sn Snell, Sm•irt
:vtirroprorrs.lors and ,\1irroru111fJU/rrs, in TECHNICAL PROGRESS AND SoVIET EcoNOMIC DEVELOPMENT 51, 60 (1986); SPf also Drfmsr 1987 Authorization HParings, sufJrn note 307, at 711
(statement of Donald Latham, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) ("[Ejverytime . . you look in depth at what the Soviets are doing they
surprise us technologically
. I find they are a lot better than people want to give them credit
for.").
503. Srr Imparl Hmrings, supra note 219, at 132 (statement of Edward Gerjuoy, American
Physical Society).
504. Srr Long, supra note 371, at 8.
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attending American conferences, but they also deter Americans from
attending and/or presenting papers. Scientific data heard by Americans
who attend conferences are restricted. The data will either stagnate (in
which case no further control will be necessary), or they will be incorporated within new research (in which case the information to be controlled expands). A foreseeable result is that scientists who attend restricted conferences will avoid using controlled data because of the
danger of attracting export controls to their own research.
If Defense sponsored only a small percentage of American scientific research, the effect of its information controls could be negligible.
In reality, however, Defense-related research accounts for nearly onefourth of the total research conducted in the United States. 1;o 5 This percentage increased in the 1980s. 506
Export controls can be enforced against scientific societies, universities, or individual scientists. All these mechanisms are fraught with
difficulties. A scientific society has neither the resources nor the power
to control all presentations and conversations made during conferences. 507 Societies will either restrict attendance regardless of information discussed, 508 or will cease organizing conferences. 509 The inevitable
effect will be to restrict the free discussion of new scientific ideas. 510
505. See DIALOG, .supra note 48, at 91 n.1.
506. E.g., Hmrings on HR. 5167, supra note 3, at 1166 (statement of Edith Martin, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Advanced Technology) (discussing research
funding for Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)). The entire SDI program is composed of Defense
category 6.3 research (advanced technology development), to which controls may be applied. Sre
Gollon, SDI Funds Costly for Srimtisls, 42 BuLL ATOM. SCI. 24, 25 (Jan. 1986).
507. Impart Hearings, supra note 219, at 138 (statement of Edward Gerjuoy, American
Physical Society). Dr. Gerjuoy mentioned as reasons for the impossibility of organizers controlling
conferences: copies of individual presentations not being available before conferences; digressions
by speakers from planned topics; unforeseen responses to audience questions; and the inability of
conference organizers to know whether speakers are disclosing prohibited information. Jd.
SOB. Sn, e.g., McDonald, Srimtific Organizations Mo1•e to Limit Conjrrmre Attmda 11re to
['.S. Citi:m.s, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER Eouc., Mar. 6, 1985, at 5, coL 2 (describing ban imposed
on foreign nationals in order to avoid last minute withdrawal of papers); Park, Intimidation
Lmd.s to Self-Cmsorship in Scima, 41 BULL ATOM. SCI. 22, 22 (Mar. 1985) (reporting that
Society of Manufacturing Engineers limited one of its meetings to United States citizens on society's own initiative).
One conference organizer reported that speakers had requested that a conference be closed
after being advised by Defense that information in their papers was restricted. McDonald, supra,
at 7, coL 3. An organizer of a meeting of the Society of Manufacturing Engineers was told by
Defrnse that if foreign nationals attended, security guards would have to be hired to check credentials or the meeting would have to be held at a federal facility. Jd.
509. Ser Vossen, Tuhnolo{!;y Export Curbs: "Unconstitutional", 8 OPTICS NEws 6, 6
(Sept.-Oct. 1982).
510. The restrictions may already be stifling some scientific speech. See Technology Tra liSfa: Hnmngs Bfjorf the Subcomm. on Scinza Research and Tahnology of thr Housr Comm. 1111
Sm11cr 1111d TNhnology, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 143 (1985) (statement of Russell Drew, on behalf
of the IEEE); see also Profrssional Socirty Mrrtings Rrstrirted to "U.S. Citiun1 Only", 5 AAAS
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Information control laws are antithetical to universities which are
by nature places for the dissemination of knowledge. Universities will
refuse restricted federal funds, 1111 discontinue research in high technology, 512 or they will jeopardize their graduate programs by accepting
contracts which restrict the access of a significant proportion of their
students. Controls on access by foreign graduate students has already
proven to be detrimenta\. 1113 Foreign nationals account for twenty-two
percent of all doctoral students in American universities. In 1982, foreign students received fifty percent of the doctorates in engineering, and
thirty-two percent of the doctorates in mathematics and computer sciences. Most of these students would be covered by the export control
laws; about seventy-five percent attend American universities on temporary student visas. 1114 Rather than harming America's national security,
these students aid America's interest by contributing their talents to
American science and engineering. 1m If controls are applied extensively
to foreign graduate students, the number of universities subject to controls could be substantial. Over sixty universities and institutes have
been identified as the targets of Soviet attempts to gain American scientific knowledge. 1116
Individual scientists will cease to invite foreign scientists to cooperate in their research from fear that the government will "disinvite"
their guests. 1117 Scientists from allied nations may refuse to accept offers
to conduct research for American sponsors such as Defense. 1H 8 American scientists will perhaps be restricted from attendance at foreign sci-

Bt:LL. Sci. fREEDOM & NAT'!. SECURITY 5, 5 (Mar. 1985) (describing self-censorship by scientific societies).
511. Srr, r.g., Srinztljir Communimtions Hraring, sujna note 274, at 49-50 (statement of
Dale Corson, President Emeritus, Cornell University) (recounting that Cornell refused Air Force
funds when contract invoked the !TAR).
512. Srr, r.g., id. at 49 (statement of Dale Corson, President Emeritus, Cornell University)
(maintaining that major research universities will probably cease research in areas where classifications are imposed); Gerjuoy, Unwisr Export Controls Can Hurt, 34 PHYSICS ToDAY 144, 144
(Oct. 1982) (stating that universities and laboratories will stop researching in areas that become
inconvenient and divisive).
513. Barber & Morgan, The Imjwrt of Foreign Graduate Studmt.1 on Fnginrering Edumin thr L'mtrrl Stalfl, 236 Scr. 33, 36 (1987).
514. National Science Foundation, supra note 501, at 30.
515. PANEL REPORT, wjna note 309, at 17.
516. Srr S. RFP. No. 522, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1986).
517. Srr Impart Hraring.1, .1ujna note 219, at 139 (statement of Edward Gerjuoy, American
Physical Society).
518. 5ff Walton, SDI: UK Srirntists Should Take Care, 322 NATURE 300, 300-01 (1986)
(expressing concern about possible prepublication controls on Star Wars basic research offered for
contract to British scientists); Wright, "No Srrrets" from British Srimtists ill Star Wan, The
Times (London), Aug. 7, 1985, at 28, col. I (reporting problem with Defense excluding from
meetings British scientists invited to conduct Star Wars research).
111!11
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entific conferences and would thus be unable to freely discuss theories
with American allies. Indeed, American scientists may also avoid attendance at export-controlled meetings because of the negative effect on
their careers of signing a nondisclosure form. 1119 As Admiral Inman
feared, a backlash has occurred that is effectively blocking technology
transfer in an area in which it is desired: between America and her
allies. 1120 The general effect of information controls on the scientific
community has been increasing unease about whether to publish in certain areas of science, and whether to interact with foreign nationals. 1121
The United States is becoming isolationist at a time when its leadership
in science is being successfully challenged by other nations, 1122 including
the Soviet Union. 1123 Isolationism in this context can only increase the
scientific lead-times of foreign nations; lead-times which have already
overtaken the United States.
Publication and recognition of achievements are impossible in a
controlled scientific environment. Defense's policy of restricting participation by its contractors and employees in unclassified scientific and
technical meetings is counterproductive. Not only does the policy prevent peer recognition of Defense contractors and employees, but it also
jeopardizes Defense programs by restricting the access of Defense
scientists to state-of-the-art presentations and discussions. 1124 In addition, the policy deters recruitment of scientists into Defense programs,

519. SPP Willenbrork, Trrhnolo{{\' Transfrr and National Saurity. 4 IEEE Tt:CH. & Soc'v
13, 14 (Sept. 1985).

MM;.

520. Inman, Trrhnology and Stratrgy, Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Inst., Sea Link Supp.
45, 50-51 (Dec. Supp. 1984); Ritter, Thr Critical llsur of thr Tmn.lfrr of Trrlwology, Nato's
Sixteen Nations 40, 43 (July 1983) (noting that scientists from allied nations are increasingly
denied access to American scientific conferences and research institutions).
521. SciENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL CooPt:RATION BETWEEN INntrSTRIAI.lZED Cot:NTRit:s: Tm: ROLE OF THF. UNITED STATES 216, 219 (M. Wallerstein ed. 1984).
522. Hemily, Graduatr Studrnts and Postdoctoral Intrmational Exrhrwws of U.S. Srimtists in Scientific and Trchnologiml CoojJrmtion Among Industrialiud Cmmtrirs: Thr Rolr of
thr UnitNI Stairs 189, 213 (M. Wallerstein ed. 1984).
523. For example, the Soviet Union leads the United States in important aspects of nuclear
fusion, high energy physics, and agricultural technologies. U.S.-Sm•irt Exrhrwgrs: A Confrrmcr
RrjJort 14, 19, 27 (Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, The Wilson Center 1985).
Defense estimates that the Soviet Union equals the United States in six of the twenty basic technologies judged to be the most important. The Soviet Union is also closing the gap between it and
the United States in four other technologies. Department of Defense, The FY 1987 Department of
Defense Program for Research and Development Il-11 (1986), rrjnintrd in Drfmsr 1987 Autlwriwtion Hraring.1, supra note 307, at 40.
524 . .Sn Letter from Richard T. Gowen, IEEE President, to Caspar Weinberger, Secretary
of Defense (Oct. 19, 1984), ritrd in 4 AAAS BuLL ScL FREEDOM & NAT'L SECURITY 5, 5 (Dec.
1984). The letter read in pertinent part, "the Defense Department has embarked on a course
that-as patriotic and well-intentioned as it may seem-may threaten the technological supremacy
of the U.S." /d.
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and causes those already hired to leave. 11211 Contractors who submit unclassified papers for prepublication review have been frequently denied
permission to present their ideas at scientific meetings. 1126
The public will suffer if scientific information is too restrictively
controlled. If military science is kept so completely secret that the public and their congressional representatives cannot discuss scientific
weapons, no opportunity will exist for public reaction to limit those
weapons. 1127 Controlling military science necessarily restricts civilian
science. Such a movement is contrary to America's interest in having a
scientifically literate populace. 1128
Defense cannot effectively control American science unless it
monitors thousands of publications, conferences, exchanges, and meetings. If Defense is effective in implementing such an extensive control
system, the acquisition of American science by its adversaries and potential adversaries will probably cease. 1129 However, the harm inflicted
on the United States' national security by the controls will also be substantial.1130 Instead of attempting to protect the national security by stifling creative American scientific ideas, America's national security is
served better by promoting scientific research. 1131
V.

CoNCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Defense views the critical technologies approach as an appropriate
way to control the access of the United States' adversaries and potential
adversaries to American sciences and technology. Congress appears to
endorse the approach by statutorily adopting the MCTL and by extending Defense's authority to control previously unrestricted informa525. Srr Smith, Srimtijir Srrmy: An Unhralthy Trmd, 228 SCI. 1293, 1293 (1985). The
chief scientist of the Air Force's Weapons Laboratory, located in New Mexico, criticized the
MCTL's expansion, stating that: "[t]he list is unwieldy and the topics are not sufficiently defined
Because it is subject to different interpretations, people are prone to err on the side of
conservatism. It has to be fine-tuned." /d. (quoting Arthur H. Guenther, Chief Scientist at the Air
Force Weapons Laboratory near Albuquerque, New Mexico).
526. Srr Wilson, A Thrmt to Srirntific Communication, 38 PHYSICS ToDAY 128, 128 (July
1985).
527. Teller. Srrrrn: Thr Road to Nowhar, 84 TECH. REV. 12, 14 (Oct. 1981).
528. /d. at 12.
529. Sn [!.fllfrrzil>· Denning, A Srirntist's Virw of G01•rrmnrnt Control Ol'fr Srinztific Publica tum, 1 IEEE TECH. & Soc'y MAG. 17, 18 (Sept. 1982) (arguing that scientific secrets cannot
be preserved, but can be undermined by excessive secrecy).
530. Srr. r fr·. Memorandum to the AAAS Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility, 111jm1 no:e 280 (noting observations of self-censorship by scientists).
531. Sre, l'.fr., F. RouRKE, supra note 6, at 30 (stating that "[s]cientific achievement is itself
regarded as the finest basis for national security"); New York State Bar Association, Toward
Lfgal Simplifiration: Rrport of thr Association Task Fora on Simplification of thr Law 20-21
(1987).
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tion whenever development of the approach demands it. As the critical
technologies approach broadened, Congress's criticism of Defense's export controls ceased. Periodic criticism leveled at Defense's expansive
interpretation of national security is, in reality, confirmation that Defense is fulfilling its mission of protecting America's security.
If scientific data were static, Defense's critical technologies approach would be praiseworthy. Unfortunately, the approach only addresses the effect of the controls on the acquisition of American science
and technology by adversaries and potential adversaries. It does not address the effect of the controls on the vitality of American science, and
on scientific communications between American scientists and between
those scientists and their counterparts in friendly nations. The scientists
of friendly nations are included in the controls, resulting in a rift between America and her allies. 532 The harm already suffered by American science may never be known; progress not achieved because of selfcensorship cannot be measured. The potential stigma of being suspected
of divulging militarily critical information may persuade scientists to
discontinue research in certain disciplines or to pursue other careers. In
a 1986 congressional report, the acquisition of American scientific information by the Soviet Union was discussed in the same context as
espionage and illegal exports. 533
To halt the increasingly detrimental effect on American science by
Defense, Congress should specify criteria for items in the MCTL. The
criteria should be those derived from the Corson Report. That is, a
good or technology should not be included in the MCTL unless it
meets at least one of the following criteria: ( 1) its transfer will lead "to
a significant near-term improvement in the defense capability of a
country to which exports are controlled under [the EAR]"; (2) the technology is evolving rapidly; or (3) the technology is process-oriented. 534
In addition, the EAA and the Arms Export Control Act should state
that export controls promulgated under them should not be applied to
university-based scientific research.
Congress should rescind its mandate to Commerce and Defense to
532. 5ff, f.g., A DP!icatf BalanCP: Scimfic Communication l'S. National SPCurity (Wallerstein & Gould eds.), 4 IssuEs IN Sci. & TECH. 42, 44, 48, 50, 51 (Fall 1987) (representatives
from the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, and Japan expressing concern over American
export controls on scientific communication).
533. 5ff Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Mffting thf Espimww• Challmgf: A Rfl'lfll' of UnitNI Statps CountaintflligmCf and SPCurity Programs, S. REP. No. 522, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. 29 (1986).
534. Extmsion Hmrings, supra note 29, at 1017. An attempt to include the provisions in the
EAA's renewal in 1985 failed. 5ff id. at 1075-76; Sff also supra note 293 (discussing
amendment).
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integrate the MCTL and the Control List. The MCTL was never intended to be a control document. Attempts to transform it into one are
impractical and ineffective. The tendency to continually add products
and technologies to the Control List should be halted in favor of a more
selective approach aimed at reducing the size of the list. 535 The size of
the Control List jeopardizes its effective administration. 536
If the research to be sponsored under a government contract is
unclassified but falls within the criteria set by the Corson Report, a
prepublication review clause could be agreed to in advance. Breach of
the contract should not trigger export controls, nor should post-publication review be applied to the research. If restrictions other than a prepublication review clause are considered necessary, the contract should
specify that the research will be classified. By notifying universities in
advance of controls on research, the universities can decide whether to
permit it on their campuses.
Finally, universities or scientific societies should not be expected to
police campuses or meetings for violations of information control laws,
regulations, and directives. A presumption should exist that basic scientific research should be made widely available by encouraging the publication of research results, permitting access to scientific conferences,
and supporting academic visits. 537 If Defense, State, or Commerce are
concerned that specified foreign nationals may attempt to acquire militarily critical science and technology at a meeting or during a university
visit or course of study, State should use visa controls to control the
individuals involved.

535. 5ff PANEL REPORT, supra note 309, at 19.
536. 5ff id. at 15-16.
537. The general principles on open scientific communication, published by the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development at the urging of the United States Office of Science
and Technology Policy, present guidelines for encouraging open communications between scientists of member nations. However, the two-page document does not discuss export controls, however. SPP Dickson, OECD Sfts Guidflinfs for Cooperation, 240 Sci. 716, 716-17 ( 1988).
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APPENDIX

Examples of Scientific Information Affected by Information Controls

1987
One week before a major conference on commercial applications of
super-conductivity sponsored by the White House and the Department
of Energy, the President's science advisor closed the conference to all
non-Americans. In his speech to the conference, the President proposed
amending the Freedom of Information Act to permit federal government laboratories to "withhold commercially valuable scientific and
technical information. " 538

1986
In December 1986, the FBI initiated a subpoena that was served
on the Associate Director of the State University of New York at Buffalo. The subpoena ordered the Associate Director to provide information on searches conducted on the library's databases by a foreign
student. 539

1985
Two weeks before a meeting of the Society of Photo-Optical Engineers, Defense informed scientists that their Defense-sponsored papers
had been rejected on the basis of a provision in the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1984 that permitted Defense to withhold
technical information from the public. A compromise was reached
under which the twenty-six rejected papers were presented in exportcontrolled sessions restricted to United States, Canadian, and certain
English and French citizens. 540
In a conference on advanced technology in materials processing
sponsored by the Society for the Advancement of Material and Process
Engineering, four out of thirty-nine sessions were closed to foreign
nationals. 541
A team of high energy physicists conducting publishable research
on the free electron laser for the civil fusion reactor program of the
Department of Energy discovered the possibility of gigawatt power out538. Forum, ISSUES IN Sci. & Tt:cH., Winter 1988, at 10 (letter from Robert Park, Executive Director, American Physical Society); U.S. Bars Forrignrrs from Suprrrondurlii'ity .'>rssion,
L.A. Times, July 25, 1987, at 22, col. 1.
539. H.R. REP. No. 153(II), lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 15, rrprintNI in 1987 U.S. Com CoNG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 3157, 3167.
540. Borrelle, supra note 283, at 10.
541. Long, supra note 371, at 9.
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puts. The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization which had sponsored a small part of the research, classified the research. The scientists
were threatened with jail if details were released. In April 1986, results
of the research were declassified, but the experimental details remained
classified. 542
The Society of Manufacturing Engineers held a conference on
"Composites in Manufacturing 4," in Anaheim, California. Part of the
conference's announcement read: "This conference is open to U.S. citizens only." The announcement was printed at the society's instigation
"'to avoid horror stories such as the 1982 SPIE meeting.'" Sessions
were restricted at the request of speakers who had been informed by
Defense that their papers could not be revealed to foreign nationals. 643

1984
The Society for the Advancement of Material and Process Engineering held a meeting entitled "High Tech Review-1984." Entry to
certain sessions was restricted to holders of American birth certificates
or passports. 644
The American Astronautical Society's meeting entitled "Space
Propulsion for the 1990s" included a "secret" session on research on
the Strategic Defense Initiative. 646
A course on metal matrix composites offered by UCLA's extension
school was restricted to American citizens. 646
The Twenty-Fifth Structural Dynamics and Materials Conference
was held by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics in
Palm Springs, California. Entry to some sessions required presentation
of an American birth certificate, passport, naturalization papers, or
voter registration card. The ITAR were cited as authority for controlling information at the sessions. 547
Defense and NASA held a Symposium on Composite Materials in
conjunction with the American Ceramics Society's Eighth Annual Conference on Composite and Advanced Materials. Entrance was restricted
to American citizens. 648
542. Walton, supra note 518, at 300.
543. McDonald, supra note SOB, at 5, col. 2; Park, supra note SOB, at 22.
544. Park, supra note 508, at 22.
545. Goodwin, lncidmt m'rr SP!f; Paper.' Muddies Srienllfir Senwv
55, 55-57 (june 1985).

ToDAY

546. Park, supra note 508, at 22.
547. Jd.
548. Jd. at 22-23.

h.1Uf,
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1983
After 900 copies of the proceedings of the National T elesystems
Conference were printed, three words had to be deleted from a paper
based on unclassified research sponsored by the Air Force. The contract
under which the research had been conducted did not contain a prepublication review clause. The researcher who had received local approval
for the paper's release was asked to delete the words "for example,
manpacks" (referring to a receiver's ability to locate the position of a
missile) from each copy of the proceedings. 549
A contract for biotechnology research involving the microbial degradation of organophosphates was entered into between the United
States Army and the University of Maryland. The unclassified contract
contained a provision stating: "No foreign nationals may be employed
in this contract without approval of the Contracting Officer. When requesting approval, furnish full names, date and port of entry, and position in which employee will be utilized." 550
FBI agents conspicuously arrested an East German physicist for
espionage at the Thirtieth Annual Symposium of the American Vacuum Society in Boston, Massachusetts. No classified information had
been discussed at the meeting, attended by about 2,600 scientists and
engineers. The FBI threatened to subpoena a list of conferees if its
request for the list was denied. Although the society refused to comply
with the request, no subpoena was issued. 551
Six out of twenty-four papers scheduled for presentation by members of the United States Army Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory were withdrawn from the Fourth International Conference on Permafrost in Fairbanks, Alaska. 552
Three unclassified papers were withdrawn from a joint meeting of
the Optical Society of America & IEEE in New Orleans, Louisiana,
after the Army determined that one of the papers was subject to export
controls. The scientists, experts in military applications of optical fibers, had expected their papers to be withdrawn, even though exhibits
at the conference portrayed military uses of optical fibers. 553
A paper sponsored by NASA's Langley Research Center and
549. Ramirez, The Balance of /ntnests Betwem .Vatton!ll Srmrih· Control.\ and Fin!
Amnulmml Intere't' 111 Academic Frredom, 13 JC.U.L. 17'!. 217-18 (1986) (citing 8 THE INSTITt:TF 1 (:-.far. 1984)).
550. 5 :\AAS BULL SCI. fREEDOM & NAT'L SECURITY 7, 7 (Mar. 1985).
551. Norman, To Catch a Spy, 222 Sci. 904-05 (1983); FBI L'jm/1 A.I!S br Armting Er1.1/
Gennan at Mrelill[;, 37 PHYSICS ToDAY 53, 53-54 (Jan. 1984).
552. Clrunpdou•n., on Scientific Meetings Listed in Study, 14 Su. & Gov'T Rt:P. 3, 3 (Mar.
1, 1984)
553. Stiflin[; Scientific Communications to Protect US Tnhnolo[;Y, 111jna note 240 at 41.
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presented at the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics'
Aerospace Sciences Meetings in Reno, Nevada, was restricted from the
date of its submission to NASA in February 1982 until its presentation.
The paper carried a warning stating:
Subject to Export Control Laws.
This document contains information for manufacturing or using
munitions of war. Export of the information contained herein, or release to foreign nationals within the United States, without first obtaining an export license, is a violation of the International Traffic-inArms Regulations. Such violation is subject to a penalty of up to 2
years imprisonment and a fine of $100,000 under 22 U.S.C. 2778.
Include this notice with any reproduced portion of this document.

The unclassified NASA-sponsored paper reported that up to $1 billion
annually could be saved in fuel costs by attaching flatplate airfoils to
commercial aircraft fuselage in order to break up large eddies occurring
in boundary layer turbulence. The Assistant Head of Langley Research
Center's Viscous Flow Branch imposed the restriction on the paper
partly to permit American industry to gain a headstart in developing
new technology .11114
A summary of the Proceedings of the Washington Conference on
Rapid Solidification Processing, held by the National Bureau for Standards Center for Materials Science, contained the following warning:
This document contains information which is subject to special
export controls. It should not be transferred to foreign nationals in the
U.S. (Reference Export Administration Regulations, Section 287.1,
Oct. 1, 1980, and Federal Register, Oct. 1, 1980, Vol. 45 No. 192,
page 65014).m

A course on metal matrix composites offered by the University of
tvlaryland in College Park was restricted to United States citizens. 5116
A graduate student in computer science at Stanford University requested unclassified information from Defense. The information had
been located by the student on Defense Technical Information Center
files, available through a computer link from the engineering library at
Stanford. Defense refused the request and classified the ·information.M7
Cornell University rejected a $450,000 Air Force contract that invoked the IT AR to control all technical data generated by research.
)54. Rrstrictions on Tahnical Papas Raisr Cancans, supra note 362, at 22; SASA L111ut'
Rrsrarch Paprr Distribution, 118 AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH. 23, 23 (Jan. 17, 1983).
555. Restrirtiom on Trrhnical Papns Raisr Cancans, supra note 362, at 22.
556. Park, supra note 508, at 22-23.
557. Chalk, sujna note 361, at 19-21.
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Cornell explained that the research could not be restricted to access by
American nationals-as requested by the Air Force-because of foreign
nationals already conducting research in the department at Cornell. 11118

1982
An official of Texas Instruments, acting at the Air Force's request,
asked three Texas Instruments employees to withdraw their papers
from the IEEE's International Test Conference in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The request was received five days prior to the conference
after the conference abstracts (including the three previously cleared
papers) had been printed. The Air Force reviewed and cleared the papers after criticism of its actions. 11119
Defense ordered six scientists to withdraw their papers from a
conference on blue-green laser communication sponsored by the Optical
Society of America. 1160
Several presentations were withdrawn from a conference on technology for space astrophysics because of confusion over potential
problems with Defense. The conference was sponsored by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, the Optical Society of
America, and the Society of Photo-Optical Instrumentation. 1161
Before the IEEE Electrical and Aerospace Systems' Electrical
Aerospace Conference in Washington, D.C., began, the chairman of the
group was requested by an Air Force representative to destroy all abstracts, papers, and records, and to cancel specific presentations that
were said to compromise national security. The chairman stated that
IEEE would comply with the request if the Air Force paid the expenses involved, which were estimated to be between $25,000 and
$50,000. The Air Force representative withdrew the request the following day. 1162
One week before a meeting of the Society of Photo-optical Instrumentation Engineers, the Navy ordered the withdrawal of all papers
dealing with airborne reconnaissance. The Navy had cleared the papers
for publication but the Department of Defense had not. One hundred
558. Snent!fir Communications and Sational Srrurit), llearinr; Before the Subcomm. on
Scimce, Re,mrrh and Technology and the Subcomm. 011 Science, Re.1eruch and Trrhnology and
the Subco111111. on Im•flti[!JIIIOII\ a111l 01•ersight of the Hvusr Comm. on Snenre and TNhnvlogy,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 49-50 : 1984) (statement of Dale Corson, President Emeritus, Cornell
University).
559. ClrunJHiou•n 1 an Scientific Meeting.\ Listfll i11 Study, 14 Sci. & Gov'T REP. 3, 3 (Mar.
I, 1984).
560. Long, supra note 371, at 7-8.
561. /d.
562. ClamjHiown on Scientific Meetings Listed in Study, 1ujna note 559, at 3.
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and thirty papers were withdrawn. 563
Two papers on VHSIC research were withdrawn from a meeting
of the Electrochemical Society in Toronto, Canada, because they contained information that was reportedly too sensitive to be exported to
foreign nationals. 564
Customs officials seized computer science books being shipped to
Japan by a professional society. 565
State advised the National Academy of Sciences to place restrictions on the visit of a Soviet nutritional scientist to the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. The Soviet scientist was not to view research
in nutrition or biotechnology or to have access to research and activities
sponsored by the Department of Defense. 566
Chemical Abstracts' export license to mail magnetic tapes to Warsaw Technical University was not renewed by Commerce. The renewal
was denied to the bibliographic information service which had been
mailing information to Warsaw since 1974 because export of the magnetic tape technology to Soviet bloc nations was not in the interest of
national security. 567
An article entitled Out-Numbered and Out-Weaponed by Soviets,
the U.S. Arm)' Shoots for High Technology was submitted to the IEEE
SPECTRUM. During the expert review process, a copy of the article was
sent by the SPECTRUM to the Secretary of the Army because the article
contained quotations by him. Six weeks later the Army Office of the
Chief of Public Affairs telephoned the SPECTRUM and ordered the article shredded because it contained classified information. The SPECTRUM traced the origins of the three statements objected to by the Army
and found that two statements were from an unclassified Army publication and one was from public testimony given to Congress by the
Army Chief of Staff. The Army subsequently agreed that two of the
statements were not classified, but stated that the speech given by the
Army Chief of Staff had been reclassified. 568

563. Greenberg, "Rflnotr Cmsuring," DOD Blocks Symposium Papas, 122 SCI. NEWS 148
(1982); I Lrft My PajJPr in San Dirgo, 8 OPTICS NEws 3 (Nov.-Dec. 1982}
564. Panel on Scientific Communication and National Security, Committee on Science, Engineering and Public Policy of the National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering
and Institute of Medicine, Srimtific Communication and National Srcurity 106 (1982) [hereinafter Scientific Communication].
565. Relyea, supra note 375, at 193.
566. Scientific Communication, supra note 564, at 184.
567. Chalk, supra note 361, at 19-21.
568. Willenbrock, supra note 207, at 8.
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1981
Commerce informed foreign subscribers to the MEDLINE service
of the National Library of Medicine that nationals from communist
countries were not to be allowed on-line computer access unless Commerce granted prior approval. (MEDLINE is a computerized index to
articles from about 300 medical and biomedical journals.) Commerce
was concerned about the possibility of operators switching from MEDLINE to computer files on national finance, etc. 669

1980
Commerce, Defense, and State persuaded the American Vacuum
Society to disinvite Russians, Poles, Chinese, and Hungarian scientists
from a conference on magnetic bubble memories. All foreign nationals
attending the conference were required to sign a pledge that they would
not divulge unpublished information obtained at the conference to Eastern bloc nationals. 670
State denied visas to Soviet scientists planning to attend a conference on laser fusion sponsored by the IEEE and the American Optical
Society. One of the Soviet scientists, who was a post-doctoral student at
the University of Texas, had co-authored a paper to be presented at the
conference. 671
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology declined a $250,000
contract for research on computer-aided design because of conditions
prohibiting release of research results for two years in order that foreign nations could not gain access. 672
The firm of Rohm and Hass applied for a patent for an improved
electro-chemical battery, a product of research sponsored by the company. The invention was placed under a secrecy order at the request of
the Army. Six months later, government officials rescinded the order. 673
NSF forwarded to the NSA a scientist's request for refunding a
cryptology grant. The scientist's research was unclassified. When the
NSA proposed partial funding of the grant in lieu of the NSF, the
scientist protested because of the likelihood of his research being classified. The ensuing dispute resulted in a voluntary system of prepublica569. Marshall, Medical Data Bank: A Smuity Risk, 216 Sc1. 831, 831 (l'J82).
570. Wade, Srima MPftin~;s Catch the U.S.-Sm•irt Chill, 207 SCJ. 1056 (1980); (;l!l'nwnnll
Bars Sm'll'ls }rom A VS and OSA Mrrtmgs, 33 PHYSICS ToDAY 81 (Apr. 1980).
571. Gm•rmmnll Bars So,•iftsfrom AVS om! OSA J1eflillf;.1, 3:\ PHYSICS TonAY 81 (Apr.
1980).
572. Kalata, mjnn note 195, at 524.
573. OJ BubhlP.\, Bomh.1, and Batlrries: Sfrrt'Cy Snafus, 85 TECH. REv. 36, 37 (Feb.-Mar.
1982).
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tion review of cryptology by the NSA. 574
State informed Cornell University that a Hungarian scientist could
not receive prepublication copies of research papers during a proposed
visit to the university to study electronic circuitry. In addition, State
limited the scientist's receipt of information to classroom situations,
prohibiting private discussions and seminars. The visit was cancelled. 575
Funding for an unclassified research program on Very High
Speed Integrated Circuits sponsored by Defense had been authorized
by Congress and was being conducted in several universities. When
new funding was authorized, Congress conditioned it on the program
being subject to the IT AR. Defense subsequently issued guidelines applying export controls to the disclosure of applied research and recommended that noncitizens who had not declared their intent to be citizens
be excluded from basic research. 576

1978
NSA requested that a secrecy order be issued under the Patent
and Invention Secrecy Act, 35 U.S.C. § 181 (1988), for a patent application for an advanced communication privacy device. The patent had
been applied for by a group of inventors led by a university scientist.
No explanation for the secrecy order was provided. 577
The NSA requested Commerce to issue a secrecy order under the
Patent and Invention Secrecy Act, 35 U.S.C. § 181 (1988), to a University of Milwaukee professor. The professor had requested a patent for
computer data safeguards invented by him pursuant to an NSF grant.
He had received no indication that his unclassified research, which had
been published, would be restrained. After the university's president
protested, the order was lifted. 578
574. Kolata, Prior Restraints RfCmnmmded, 211 Sci. 797 (1981); Kolata, Study Group
to Voluntary Restraints, 210 SCI. 511 (1980); Kalata, Cryptography: A Nru• Clash Betwrm Amdrmir Frndom and National SfCurity, 209 Sci. 995 (1980).
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1981 ); Kalata, supra note 195.
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(1978).
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1977
An official of the NSA, acting as a private citizen, suggested that
scientists planning to present papers at a cryptology symposium sponsored by the IEEE review their plans. According to the official, the
presentations could violate the ITAR. The symposium was held as
planned but some graduate students' papers were presented by faculty
to ensure legal support from universities. The government took no
action. 1179

1976
A Soviet theoretical physicist was stopped by officials of the Energy and Research Development Administration from delivering a
speech he was presenting to American scientists on thermonuclear
fusion. 1180
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